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Since the War on Terror’s onset, American studies have popularized philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben’s argument in the treatises Homo Sacer (1995) and State of Exception (2003) 
that modern governments have come to operate in a permanent state of emergency. 
Agamben terms this phenomenon a “state of exception” in which law may be set aside at 
any time. Critics have productively applied this theory to post-9/11 U.S. government 
actions like surveillance programs, torture, and military interventions. Scholarship treats 
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American literature depicts this exceptionalism across a wide array of sites. I explore four 
categories of spaces of exception represented across a range of genres, considering their 
 
 
interconnections and histories. In each text, a space that appears to operate as an 
exception to American legal and moral norms proves to reveal the normal but obscured 
relationships of power between the privileged and exploited. In addition to how these 
texts explore longer histories of such violent spaces, I consider how American writers 
self-reflexively examine the efficacy of their art for meaningfully engaging audiences in 
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Introduction: Instituting Violence 
 
A Literary History of Violence 
 As the organizing conceit of this dissertation, “space of exception” refers to a site 
of institutionalized violence and exploitation. In such zones, the expected norms of law, 
ethics, or morality of American liberalism are dangerously absent or suppressed. The 
spaces explored in the novels studied here serve various agendas and contexts, but they 
are linked by their common nature as sites in which citizenship and human rights are at 
risk of erasure. Moreover, these spaces are ultimately portrayed as not “exceptional” in 
the common, non-theoretical meaning of the word. The torture chamber, ghetto, labor 
camp, and corporate laboratory in these fictions underpin the rest of “normal” American 
life outside them. 
Since the War on Terror’s onset, American studies have popularized Italian 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s argument in the treatises Homo Sacer (1995) and State 
of Exception (2003) that modern governments have come to operate in a permanent state 
of emergency. Agamben terms this phenomenon a “state of exception”—from which I 
borrow for my own conceit—in which law may be set aside at any time. Critics have 
productively applied this theory to post-9/11 U.S. government actions like surveillance 
programs, torture, and military interventions. Scholarship, however, tends to treat the 
Guantanamo detention center as the epitome of a localized, perpetual suspension of legal 
and ethical norms. As my dissertation demonstrates, insufficient attention has been paid 
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to the longer tradition in literary representation of other spaces of a similarly exceptional 
nature throughout American history. 
 I examine six novels as case studies that, when read together, challenge many of 
the paradoxes inherent to contemporary liberalism’s vision of progress and the American 
Dream. In President Barack Obama’s farewell address on January 10, 2017, he described 
“the great gift our Founders gave to us. The freedom to chase our individual dreams 
through our sweat, and toil, and imagination—and the imperative to strive together as 
well, to achieve a common good, a greater good” (Blake). He summons the metanarrative 
of essential American progressive goodness even while the radical right rises in power. 
The implication at this moment and at large in his address is that any missteps in the 
practice of democracy, equality, and justice in the past, present, or near future are, in fact, 
only missteps. From this perspective, the violence and exploitation depicted in texts like 
Richard Wright’s Native Son (1940) and John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath (1939) 
appear as aberrations in our national destiny, errors to be corrected. Similarly, the 
dystopian visions of Frederik Pohl and C. M. Kornbluth’s The Space Merchants (1953) 
and Octavia Butler’s The Parable of the Talents (1998) might be read as extravagantly 
apocalyptic warnings of what could happen—but which probably will not. Such readings, 
however, are misguided. The sites around which these narratives are constructed actually 
portray their spaces of exception as integral to the nation’s political and socio-economic 
fabric. They suggest that our American myths are only sustained through their denial to 
those who are undeserving. 
 One reason for the failure of mainstream culture to acknowledge these spaces’ 
centrality to the United States is their lack of legibility. Sites like torture chambers are not 
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easily accessible to the public’s material access, or to their imaginative access. Ghettoes 
and labor camps are bounded by written and unwritten policies of discrimination and 
well-entrenched discourses of difference. These statements are not innovative in 
themselves: the lives of marginalized people are often lived at both the physical and 
discursive margins of our society. What authors like Butler, Wright, Steinbeck, Pohl, 
Kornbluth, Jess Walter, and Margaret Atwood offer readers are various modes of access 
to spaces of exception.
1
 Their novels reveal the logic of how our American landscape is 
more broadly organized around the accepted exclusion of certain people and bodies from 
the normalized privileges of American life. Broadly speaking, these spaces and the bodies 
contained within have been written out of normal law; in response, these authors write 
them into literature. 
 Many other historical and literary examples of spaces of exception exist beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. In fact, I contend that American literature can offer a pre-
history to Agamben’s analysis of the Third Reich and other totalitarian States. In the 
twentieth century, Japanese internment camps are one of the most applicable examples of 
Agamben’s theories of states of exception in the United States. The lesser known Native 
American concentration camps during American expansion are also part of the nation’s 
legacy of spaces of exception. The camps in Butler’s Talents are surely influenced by the 
histories of these sites. But, whereas the historical breadth of Agamben’s analysis is 
largely limited to Nazi Germany and later, the history of race in America abounds with 
                                                 
1
 Although Atwood is a Canadian-born author, her science fiction novels are concerned with trends focused 
in the United States. Discussing The Handmaid’s Tale (1984), Atwood says that a Canadian dystopia is 
inconceivable to her because her country, unlike the U.S., lacks the national qualities that would foster such 
“extreme” political structures (Atwood, “Using” 223). Her MaddAddam trilogy’s setting in the U.S. and 
Atwood’s personal and professional relationships with U.S. culture and literature more than qualifies these 
texts as appropriate to an analysis of representations set in “America.” 
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spaces of exception before 1900. Indeed, the specter of the slave planation hovers 
throughout the texts I discuss. Prisons and immigration detention centers, past and 
present, are an increasingly enormous piece of this legacy. My selection of sites and text 
does place a limit on my analysis. As is true for any project, however, I treat this 
limitation not as a weakness but as an implied call for further investigation and critical 
thought into other like spaces, subjects, and fictions not adequately addressed here. 
 The topics of the body, political violence, and the sites at which they intersect 
have become a consistent interest in American literary studies. Part of this dissertation’s 
intervention into literary criticism is to establish the place of novels not frequently 
considered in contemporary scholarship. Science fiction has become a more common 
object of literary analysis, but much of its consideration remains a matter of genre and not 
how these texts productively intersect with those beyond it. In contrast, lauded novels 
like Native Son and The Grapes of Wrath have nevertheless fallen out of vogue in 
criticism. This dissertation calls attention not only to the unwritten literary history of the 
representation of spaces of exception, but also to the texts that exemplify this 
inadequately acknowledged tradition. 
 
Theories of Violence 
 This dissertation borrows much of its critical approach from the work of Giorgio 
Agamben and other thinkers who analyze the legitimation of violence against 
marginalized peoples. Building primarily on the theories of Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), 
Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), and Michel Foucault (1926-
1984), the treatises Homo Sacer and State of Exception offer an incisive deconstruction of 
5 
 
the paradoxes that Agamben identifies at the center of the modern State: siting the 
capacity to suspend law as the very foundation of law. He defines his master critical 
conceit, “state of exception,” as the legal suspension of law. A state of exception is 
premised by the State’s declaration of necessity to act beyond the limits of law. This 
“necessity” is frequently underpinned by the desire to manage particular populations, 
people who are treated as, using Agamben’s term, “bare life”—life that lacks subjectivity 
or value beyond its mere existence as life. Concentration camps and the extermination of 
minority populations in Nazi Germany serve as his chief historical case study; the 
“camp” is his archetypal space of exception. 
Butler, Walter, Wright, Steinbeck, Pohl, Kornbluth, and Atwood similarly 
position particular spaces of exception as sites in which the unjust workings of social, 
political, and economic systems are most visible. But these authors of fiction catch sight 
of the complex lived experience of these spaces that Agamben overlooks in his singular 
emphasis on an extreme example, representative of the highest possible stakes. Even in 
its English translation, the phrase “state of exception” communicates a sense of crisis or 
extremity. It speaks to the scale and temporality of the State rather than the individual 
lives of its citizens. The American fictions under analysis here approach exceptional 
violence as a daily, quotidian experience that can be accreted or focused into particular 
organized, policed zones. In other words, American literary history depicts spaces of 
exception not as a sign of a fully manifested state of emergency and suspension of law 
but as part of the ebb and flow of the potential or virtual state of exception that operates 
in the United States.  
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 While I have made much use of the vocabulary and methodology that Agamben 
provides, my study of American fiction calls attention to the incompleteness of his 
political theories. Whereas Agamben focuses on the desires of the State alone, the seven 
literary writers I consider each posit strong relations between government institutions and 
private business interests in their depictions of American spaces of exception. Agamben 
treats the abandonment of unwanted “bare life” to a state of exception as primarily 
motivated by the State’s desire to justify its power and to define, by contrast, the life that 
is proper to the political sphere. This dynamic is evident in American fiction, yet the 
authors I study also present labor extraction and the accumulation of wealth as a central 
concern to workings of the torture chamber, ghetto, farm labor camp, and corporate 
laboratory. State of Exception provides a felicitous point of departure for this project, but 
American fiction reaches beyond Agamben’s methodology and conclusions. 
Nevertheless, I situate myself in conversation with this critical tradition. While 
other legal theorists have worked to understand and legitimize the state of exception as a 
structurally coherent concept within the ideologies of law and State power, Agamben 
argues that the state of exception surpasses the inside/outside distinctions of law (23). As 
such, the state of exception “constitutes […] an emptiness of law,” and reveals the 
“essential fracture” between law and the possibility of its application to material reality 
(6, 31). Claims of “necessity” are central to legitimizing a state of exception. Yet only the 
State wields the power and authority to declare beginning and end of necessity. U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson described the problem of necessity in 1952, 
writing that “necessity knows no law . . . Such power has no beginning or end” (Pyle 13). 
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In the end, the exceptional powers of the State are only under obedience to its own 
desires. 
During a state of exception, power fills the vacuum of law. Agamben argues that 
during law’s suspension, the State’s agents wield what he “force-of-law,” the power of 
law without legal regulation (State 39).
2
 Essentially, this force-of-law acts as a “floating 
signifier” without a determinate referent (38). The State removes itself from the limits of 
law without sacrificing law’s power. This ability to wield the force-of-law under the 
guise of law enables the “essential fiction” that the State still remains bound by law even 
during its suspension (86). In other words, once law becomes treated like a floating 
signifier to be interpreted at will, exceptional violence becomes available. 
 Agamben titles a section of Homo Sacer, “The Camp as the ‘Nomos’ of the 
Modern” which he sites the “camp” as the space in which a state of exception is most 
absolute. He writes, “The camp is the space that is opened when the state of exception 
begins to become the rule” (168-9). Nazi concentration camps are the historical model for 
his theory: they are sites in which the legal and cultural norms of German life are 
evacuated and in which “power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation” 
(171). Nothing stands between State violence and the people in the camps, degraded to a 
condition of “bare life” in which their humanity comes into question. For Agamben, the 
camp is the culmination of a state exception. He calls on us to see the camp as an 
extension of the State’s normal order rather than as an aberration. The camp is where the 
logic of the State becomes most evident; the violence of the camp is only possible 
through the violent potential already present in the State. 
                                                 
2
 Agamben uses an “X” to place “law” under erasure in “force-of-law.” 
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 Agamben considers the production of “bare life” to be an essential feature of the 
state of exception and the camp. He places this term under the heading of biopolitics and 
biopower, concepts formulated by Foucault. Foucault defines biopower as the 
“nondisciplanary power” that “is applied not to man-as-body but to the living man, to 
man-as-living-being” or “man-as-species,” that, as he and Agamben claim, characterized 
the politics of the twentieth-century nation-state (Foucault, “Society” 242). This shift 
from classical politics to biopolitics marks a shift in the State’s concern with “subjects” to 
a concern with “populations.” Agamben goes as far as to claim that “the production of the 
political body is the original activity of sovereign power” (Homo 6). 
He argues that the power of the sovereign—the entity who is authorized to 
ultimately decide law and to wield power over life—originates in the sovereign’s 
categorization of “life” between its two forms, what Agamben identifies in Greek as bios 
and zoē (State 35; Homo 1). Bios “indicated the form or way of living proper to an 
individual or a group;” this term indicates a “qualified life, a particular way of life,” life 
that can participate in the political sphere. Zoē, in contrast, “expressed the simple fact of 
living common to all living being,” including “animals, men, or gods,” what Agamben 
describes as “bare life” (Homo 1). Among other things, bios signifies subjectivity, both in 
a political and a metaphysical sense; a body inscribed with bios is worthy of a soul and 
entry into the oikos, the family or original political unit (2). A body inscribed with zoē, 
however, is rendered without subjectivity; Agamben links zoē to the Roman juridical 
concept of the homo sacer, the body that “can be killed but not sacrificed” (99). Bare life, 
in the genealogy of zoē and homo sacer, can be killed without repercussion. Existing 
outside the juridical and religious order, its death cannot be inscribed with meaning. 
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Ultimately, the distinction between the bare life of zoē and a qualified life of bios is the 
sovereign’s decision on “which life may be killed without the commission of homicide,” 
“the point at which life ceases to be politically relevant” (142). Thus modern biopolitics, 
as the process of deciding upon which lives matter, becomes thanatopolitics, the process 
of deciding upon death (122). The camp, for Agamben, is the space in which this process 
is most apparent. 
 Following Homo Sacer and State of Exception, Agamben dedicates the treatise 
Remnants of Auschwitz (1998) to understanding the figure of the Muselmann, Jewish 
prisoners physically and psychically degraded to the threshold between the human and 
inhuman in the Nazi concentration camp. After closely examining this figure as the 
extreme result of modern biopolitical production, he writes, “The decisive activity of 
biopower in our time consists in the production not of life or death, but rather of a 
mutable and virtually infinite survival. […] Biopower’s supreme ambition is to produce, 
in a human body, the absolute separation of the living being from the speaking being, zoē 
and bios, the inhuman and the human – survival” (155-6). In the camps, the Muselmanner 
epitomized survival for they were “walking corpses”; for Agamben, this figure “marks 
the threshold between the human and the inhuman,” the fulfilled ideation of the State’s 
desire for control over biological life (54-5). For the inhuman body, death as an event 
with any sort of semiotic density does not occur; “In Auschwitz, people did not die; 
rather, corpses were produced” (72). In the logic of biopower, the transformation of a 
“walking corpse” into an immobile corpse is no transformation at all; in being trapped in 
the threshold between life and death, the surviving body is imbricated by neither. As the 
realization of “the absolute separation of the living being from the speaking being,” the 
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surviving body is no longer recognized as a worthy political subject and is consequently 
totally exposed to State power.  
 Unfortunately, overviews of Agamben’s theories—and his own vocabulary in 
translation—tend to invite the perception that a “state of exception” is a binary 
proposition; the State is entirely lawful or it is entirely lawless. Agamben actually 
superimposes these two conditions, presenting the suspension of law as a lurking 
possibility within our legal and political apparatuses. Indeed, as Colin Dayan explains, “It 
is not an absence of law but an abundance of it that allows government to engage in 
seemingly illegal practices. We need to explore this hyperlegal negation of civil 
existence” (Law 72). In the context of Guantanamo Bay, Agamben’s own twenty-first 
century example of a space of exception, Nasser Hussain describes the legal status of the 
detention centers not as a suspension of law but as an intensification of administrative 
law that enables “an ambiguous and evolving classification of persons,” of those who 
may be tortured and those who may not, all through a nominally legal process (745). But 
Hussain’s and Agamben’s understandings are, in fact, quite in parallel. Agamben argues 
that the state of exception should be understood not as “a spatiotemporal suspension” or a 
particular tangible, visible practice or act but as permanent blurring between the normal 
condition of law and its exceptional state (Homo 37). As a result, we should think of the 
“camp” as a signifier of a broader condition. The modern State blurs the distinction 
between law and its absence, seeming to reconcile the legal norms of citizenship rights, 
for example, while enabling the violation of those rights. 
 Agamben’s theories open productive avenues of thought, but they remain further 
limited by the philosopher’s emphasis on abstractions and by his historical scope. 
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American authors have long been representing the questions he broaches, but their 
approaches focus on the lived experience of the people who pass through spaces of 
exception and systemic inequity. To think of exceptional violence and exploitation—
actions that ignore legal and moral norms even if they are supposedly enforced—as a 
matter of an ebb and flow between potential and manifested acts is crucial to considering 
the links between the representation of spaces of exception from The Grapes of Wrath to 
The Zero. Though never too far removed from actualized violence, the looming threat of 
violence better defines the states of exception in which characters like Tom Joad and 
Lauren Olamina find themselves. A space such as the torture chamber might be where 
that threat is fulfilled. In the case of the ghetto or farm labor camp, these are spaces 
where the threat is most precariously balanced against its fulfillment in order to extract 
wealth. And as each novel suggests, the constant threat of violence is a form of violence 
that strongly impacts the lives of those affected by it. 
Critics have already indicated that not every space organized along the same 
principles as Agamben’s camp model is invested in the production of bare life to the 
same degree. The same holds true for the novels I investigate. Though Agamben suggests 
that the purest space of exception, exemplified by Nazi concentration camps, removes 
any mediation between power and bodies, the six novels I analyze suggest that 
exceptional sites can exist with multiple, even competing intents. Critiques, for example, 
have already been leveled at Agamben’s theory for overlooking the historical 
significance of labor in sites like the Nazi camps and Soviet gulags. In a 2003 article, 
Neil Levi and Michael Rothberg point out such an oversight by quoting from one of 
Agamben’s chief primary sources for Remnants of Auschwitz, Primo Levi’s The Drowned 
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and the Saved (1986): “Small and large industrial companies, agricultural combines, 
agencies, and arms factories drew profits from the practically free labor supplied by the 
camps” (N. Levi and Rothberg, 34; P. Levi, 15-6). Even in Agamben’s historical 
examples, economic and political interests are intertwined more than he seems to allow. 
Such interconnections are not lost in the fictional portrayal of American spaces of 
exception. As such, in my readings I adopt the methodology of what Michael Rothberg 
describes as “multidirectional memory,” an ethic of memory that is “subject to ongoing 
negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing; […] as productive and not privative” 
(Rothberg 3). In contrast to philosophy, the heterogeneous discourses of the novel form 
allow for both a broader and narrower perspective on the material as well as the 
immaterial aspects of our lives. 
Agamben’s treatises help to locate the threads I have identified that link these six 
novels and others together, but his work alone proves an inadequate cipher for these texts. 
As a result, I have deployed a tentative critical vocabulary for this project that extends 
from Agamben’s own while heavily inflected by the terms and methods used by the 
authors whom I study here. Of course, my writing is also heavily indebted to other 
scholars and philosophers, more than those I directly cite within my pages. The following 
paragraphs outline some of the conceits that I use throughout this dissertation; such terms 
are an accretion of what I have discovered in the language and representation within these 
texts and the histories they portray. 
I focus on the violence in these novels as “extralegal” as opposed to illegal for a 
number of reasons. For one, much of the violence I discuss in fiction and U.S. history is 
not always technically illegal; as these novels and broader scholarship indicate, laws and 
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regulations are unstable, constantly changing through interpretative practices of those 
who enforce or create law. In fact, the government agents in Walter’s The Zero (2006) 
suggest that their torture programs are only illegal “under the old rules” (Walter, Zero 
258). By emphasizing the term extralegal over illegal, I draw attention to how these texts 
depict spaces of violence legitimated by the State as not in contradiction to existing law 
or wider social, legal, political norms but sometimes as in addition to law, whether law is 
present or not. 
The word “norm” emerges frequently in these pages, especially attached to the 
adjectives legal, political, ethical, moral, and cultural. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines the word as “that which is a model or pattern; a type, a standard” and “a standard 
or pattern of social behavior that is accepted or expected of a group.” I use the word to 
refer to the constellations of beliefs and practices that supposedly define and guarantee 
the well-being and liberty of American citizens. As becomes quite apparent, however, to 
any reader of a novel like Native Son, citizens live across striated fields of privilege, often 
demarcated by space and behavior. To cite the “norms” of American life is to refer both 
to the standards of law and to the ideologies outlined in our founding documents such as 
the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, doctrines like Manifest 
Destiny, and well-rehearsed discourses of the American Dream. Torture, for example, is 
an exceptional practice that violates the legal norms prohibiting cruel and unusual 
punishment articulated in the Eight Amendment as well as in the Geneva Conventions. In 
contrast, other practices like the redlining of Chicago portrayed in Native Son or the 
harassment of roadside migrant camps in The Grapes of Wrath are variously legitimated 
and not always a clear circumvention of law. But these actions nevertheless deny 
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citizens’ ability to undertake their own socio-economic destiny, a right central to our 
national narratives. 
Gathering ideology, culture, and law into the idea of “norms” allows for a clearer 
view of how spaces of exception are interlinked in the novels I study. Rather than 
following Agamben’s heavy emphasis on the role of the State and the political sovereign, 
I take a cue from Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and Félix Guattari (1930-1992). They argue 
in A Thousand Plateaus (1980) that power centers in modern states are diffuse yet 
resonate and reinforce each other. Instead of portraying spaces of exception as the direct 
and sole product of the State’s desires, these fictions depict the organization and 
operation of such sites as an effort spread across networks of power and wealth that 
bridge the private and public sector. 
In the following chapters I tend to avoid Agamben’s term “bare life,” instead 
favoring the phrase “mimetic of death” that Elaine Scarry uses in her study of torture in 
The Body in Pain (1985). Before elaborating upon my choice of this phrase, I will explain 
the trouble of “bare life,” the English translation of Agamben’s “la vita nuda” in Italian. 
The English term loses much of the nuance Agamben dedicates to it. 
For him, bare life refers to both an ideological formation and a lived condition. 
On the one hand, bare life is a fantasy of biopower. It is the idea that there exists two 
categories of human and non-human life: that with multivalent value worthy of 
recognition in the political sphere, and that which holds value only the fact of its organic 
life—bare life. His core definition for the term is life which may be killed but not 
murdered, a difference between the degrees of consequences for taking a life. It is a 
discursive label applied to mark bodies as disposable without repercussions. On the other 
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hand, Agamben also uses the term to name the fulfilled fantasy of bare life, the abject, 
degraded existence of those caught up in spaces of exception. When persons are marked 
discursively as bare life, the violence of the State then works to cause this marker to 
become reality. 
Confusion arises when critics approach this concept as a fact proposed by 
Agamben rather than as a discursive conceit that he has excavated. In other words, “bare 
life” is ultimately a matter of perception or labeling. The contrast between the position of 
non-human animals in some religions and in industrial agriculture is an illustrative 
example. To a person invested in factory farms and slaughterhouses, an animal’s primary 
value might be the fact of its living and capacity to be used and commodified. He or she 
treats the animal as a form of bare life. Yet in some religious beliefs, an animal might 
hold more value beyond the disposable utility of its body. The question of which bodies 
are or are not truly bare life is neither relevant to Agamben’s work or this dissertation. 
Rather, I consider how categories akin to bare life are imagined, deployed, and resisted in 
the fictions I discuss. 
In part as a result of his choice of model space of exception, Agamben treats bare 
life as an extreme, liminal concept. His emphasis tends to overlook the spectrum of 
potentiality between the discursive formulation of “bare life” through racism or other 
forms of bigotry and the transformation of living beings into “walking corpses.” In other 
words, when systems of inequity work to dehumanize minority populations, 
extermination is not always a primary goal even if the threat of death always looms over 
individuals marked as a kind of bare life. Other scholars have made this distinction, 
including Lauren Berlant. In her essay “Slow Death (Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral 
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Agency),” later included as a chapter in her book Cruel Optimism (2011), she contrasts 
Agamben’s formulation of bare life with “slow death,” a manifestation of power over life 
that she defines as “the physical wearing out of a population and deterioration of people 
in that population that is very nearly a defining condition of their experience and 
historical existence” (754). We do not have to consider these two concepts as separate or 
competing. To be marked as less than fully human is not always a prescription for death 
as it was in Nazi Germany; rather, dehumanization is always an exposure to violence and 
exploitation deemed otherwise unacceptable for people recognized as fully human. It is 
within spaces of exception that this exposure is maximized, where the consequences of 
marginalization become most apparent. 
In an attempt to encapsulate the effects of spaces of exception upon bodies, I 
borrow the phrase “mimetic of death” in lieu of “bare life” or other, perhaps more 
concrete or context-specific signifiers. Scarry uses the phrase in the context of torture, 
writing that “any experience of great pain” is mimetic of death as subjectivity is stripped 
from the body (48). I link her analysis of torture to Octavia Butler’s depiction in Parable 
of the Talents. But more broadly, I make use of this phrase to describe and link the 
conditions of subjects in these six novels who are variously undergoing physical suffering 
or psychic alienation intended to render them as pliable bodies rather than self-
determining subjects. “Mimetic of death” is a productive phrase because it indicates 
opposition to what it means in each novel to be fully alive and enfranchised as an 
American citizen or simply as a person. Moreover, this phrase is more capacious and less 
troublesome than Agamben’s “bare life”; it represents the stakes and intentionality of 
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spaces of exception to unravel personhood without closing off productive inquiry by 
emphasizing the most extreme of liminal states. 
Through their chosen literary forms, Butler, Walter, Wright, Steinbeck, Pohl, 
Kornbluth, and Atwood offer insightful diagnoses of the exceptional structures that 
plague us. Yet they offer little in the way of direct solutions. Interestingly, neither does 
Agamben. In an earlier treatise, The Coming Community (1990), he vaguely advocates 
for unconditional love as new political ethos for communities as an alternative to the 
modern State. In State of Exception, he refuses to call on law and politics to correct 
themselves, arguing that we cannot yet think beyond the failures of our social structures. 
Instead, he declares, “One day humanity will play with law just as children play with 
disused objects” (State 64). He invokes both the ordinary and the post-structuralist 
notions of “play,” hoping that one day the problems of “law” will be a matter of historical 
excavation. A number of the novels I study—and many more in the American tradition of 
seeking remedy to injustice in literary forms—adopt a similar ethos in their endings. 
They hope for change, propose a few ideas, but like Agamben they avoid the articulation 
of a praxis. Still, even amid the high stakes of their subject matter, these authors 
implicitly place value on the play of our imaginations that we can undertake inside the 
spaces of their texts. 
 
Genre, Reading, Representation, and Violence 
Through the nexus of readers’ shared imaginations, literary narratives can link 
critiques of systematic violence and the lived experience of individuals. The pleasures of 
reading, however sincere or ironic, draw audiences into the worlds of text. The literary 
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representation of exceptional spaces use empathy—even the skewed but inevitable 
empathy for unlikable characters such as Walter’s protagonist Brian Remy and Atwood’s 
Jimmy—to influence readers’ perspective of the abusive systems in which characters are 
trapped. Novels can reformulate accepted political or cultural narratives, and the empathy 
and wonder that authors provoke from readers instills an ethical urgency underneath 
fictions’ social critiques. With the ability to alter perspective—like slipping into the inner 
workings of a character such as Bigger Thomas who understands little of his own 
motivations—or constructing realities in science fiction that mirror our own, prose 
narrative can shatter the distance and boundaries that have been erected among people, 
ideas, and histories. Literary representation is not without its ethical challenges, but it 
remains a form of discourse that reaches audiences in ways that more academic or 
directly politicized narratives do not. 
Each text I study depicts a space of exception, but these novels’ stakes reach far 
beyond isolated sites. The torture chamber, ghetto, farm labor camp, and corporate 
laboratory are revealed as intersections of power and violence that are already diffused 
across our national landscape. These fictions offer the lived experience of spaces of 
exception, connecting their audiences to parts and people of the nation that are too often 
obscured and rendered expendable—or not worthy of representation. 
Though many more texts and art forms, fictional or otherwise, work to represent 
spaces of exception across United States history, the six novels under focus here offer 
particularly productive analysis. Their critical value arrives, in part, from how their styles 
and genres emplot spaces as part of their larger literary and political projects. In each 
case, the texts must render these spaces accessible to readers without inadvertently 
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glorifying them or enabling readerly voyeurism. The challenges in representing torture 
chambers and concentration camps have received much literary, historical, and 
philosophical attention,
3
 but the novels studied here suggest that the ghetto, farm labor 
camps, and laboratories pose similar problems. This quandary, however, is not new; 
rather, it is an extension of the existential questions of representation’s efficacy, an 
interrogation as old as or older than Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. Yet the representation 
of exceptional spaces raises the ethical stakes of these questions, especially since—as 
each novel demonstrates—representation and discourse are crucial to the justification for 
organizing these sites of violence and casting bodies into them. In response, each author 
uses different literary forms and conceives of his or her own ethical practices of reading 
and writing. 
Though many more genres and forms are present in the novels under study, satire, 
naturalism, and dystopian science fiction are the motifs of this dissertation. Satire has a 
long, though fraught, literary history of engaging socio-political hypocrisies. As 
examples of particularly dark satire, Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003) and Walter’s The 
Zero expose the hidden logics of oppressive ideologies, more or less turning them inside-
out for the reader’s benefit. The Space Merchants invites readers to laugh at the otherwise 
unnoticed absurdities of modern life before delivering its incisive critical message against 
corporate culture and mass consumerism. Satire’s process of disrupting established 
narratives enables readers to imaginatively enter spaces like torture sites and corporate 
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 For example, author J. M. Coetzee writes of this problem, stating that “the torture room is a site of 
extreme human experience, accessible to no one save the participants” (Doubling 363). Writer and 
concentration camp survivor Primo Levi even goes as far as to claim in his memoir The Drowned and the 
Saved (1986) that the only people with total comprehension of what State violence entails are those 




laboratories that are heavily guarded by their own discourses. This form, however, is not 
without its shortcomings. American satire in particular seems to be increasingly received 
for the pleasure of intellectual and moral superiority it evokes rather than for its political 
exigency. Nevertheless, satire proves a form out of which literary critics can excavate 
imaginative critiques of spaces of exception because, by definition, this genre is 
organized toward a purposeful politics. 
Along with Butler’s Parables of the Talents, The Space Merchants and Oryx and 
Crake also fall into the category of dystopian science fiction. The necessary world 
building in science fiction facilitates new conceptualizations of our accepted reality. 
Critic Darko Suvin influentially defines science fiction as the literature of “cognitive 
estrangement,” a function that, as he argues, is not limited to this genre but is best 
performed by it. The constructions of science fiction, limited by human imagination, are 
never fully removed from the world as we know it. Thus, this speculative genre always 
reflects back upon its points of reference in reality, inherently inspiring critical thought 
through the dissonance between the representation and its reality. In other words, science 
fiction can materialize metaphor; it attempts to represent the unreal or not quite real, 
portraying complex ideas that often escape a more traditionally mimetic representation. 
In part, Butler’s, Pohl and Kornbluth’s, and Atwood’s departures from realism are an 
effort to circumvent the problem of representing spaces and experiences that are, in some 
ways, resistant to ethical representation. Readers are encouraged to reconceive spaces and 
their histories just as the texts have.
4
 
                                                 
4
 Pohl and Atwood have stated similar positions regarding the genre. Pohl writes, “When you invent a new 
society, you make a political statement about the one you live in” (Way 16). To him, all good science 
fiction is “to some degree political” because it “gives it readers some new and otherwise unobtainable 
insights into our world—in fact, into all our possible worlds” (“Politics” 199, 205). In Atwood’s 2011 
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Following some forms of naturalism but not wholly beholden to them, Steinbeck 
and Wright use this genre to demonstrate how thousands if not millions of other 
individuals would encounter the same travails as their protagonists do as they suffer 
through spaces of exception. Some critics categorize The Grapes of Wrath as a modernist 
text, and Native Son is certainly an example of protest fiction. But, in a naturalist vein, 
both novels pose strong cases for the effect of social and physical environment on the 
choices and development of their characters. Each author, however, emphasizes their 
African-American and Okie protagonists’ responses to the conditions of their lives not as 
a universal fate but rather as a universal potential dictated by their racialization as a 
dangerous yet exploitable population. These two novels use literary techniques to exhibit 
the socio-political functions of Okie camps and ghettoes that are otherwise obscured by 
naturalized discourses of discrimination. Working through the stylings of naturalism, the 
texts demonstrate the potency of these spaces to transform citizens into docile, disposable 
laboring bodies. In the end, these processes are portrayed as wholly unnatural. 
All of these novels also contain projects of counter-discourse against racist or 
other dehumanizing narratives deployed against marginalized populations. Spaces of 
exception operate through a logic that certain bodies belong within them. Politicized 
bodies, racialized bodies, or bodies deemed of some kind of economic value can become 
                                                                                                                                                 
collection of essays on speculative and science fiction, she comments that one aspect in which science 
fiction can be more effective than the average realist novel is that “SF narratives can also interrogate social 
organizations by showing what things might be like if we rearranged them,” offering either direct or 
oblique criticism of present social, political, and economic structures (In Other 62, 63). Yet, in sharp 
contrast to his fellow writers, Kornbluth held a much more pessimistic position in the year before his death. 
He argues in a 1957 lecture that SF is unimportant as a mode of social criticism (Kornbluth 51). In his 
conclusion, he does qualify his disappointment with the genre by saying, “I would be delighted to be 
proved wrong in all this” (75). But he explains, “I believe that in science fiction the symbolism lies too 
deep for action to result, that the science fiction story does not turn the reader outward to action but inward 




the objects of such sites. The abuse that is common within these spaces results in a 
degradation that is then naturalized and used to justify this treatment in the first place. In 
Butler’s and Walter’s novels, torturers assault the individual subjectivity of their victims 
to then recast them as enemies who justify the constant production of the State’s power. 
African Americans in Richard Wright’s texts are excluded from white-dominated society 
in part to define what it means to be white. Racist discourse naturalizes their containment 
within ghettoes, creating a false sense of necessity for the policing and exploitation of 
black bodies. The “Okie” migrant workers in The Grapes of Wrath are not permitted to 
join local Californian communities and thus must live in destitute roadside camps or 
inhumane labor camps. Without the resources to adequately care for their families or 
permanent residence through which to ground their lives, migrants are interpolated as 
dangerous, unhygienic outsiders who must be policed. In the science fiction worlds of 
The Space Merchants and Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003), the discourse in corporate 
bioscience laboratories renders bodies into malleable, commoditized flesh, engendering 
practices and discourses that threaten to discursively transform all bodies, human and 
non-human, into pure flesh without rights. 
 My first chapter opens with the subject of State-sponsored torture, the exceptional 
practice that currently receives the most attention in American studies. The depiction of 
torture chambers in Butler’s Parable of the Talents and Walter’s The Zero reveal distinct 
intersections of race and socio-economic status. The bodies the State and its agents deem 
appropriate for the torture chamber in these two novels are racialized and lack significant 
wealth. Without the privilege of whiteness and property, the working class and people of 
color are more at risk to the State’s exceptional violence. 
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I then explicitly explore the thread of race through Wright’s representation of the 
Chicago ghetto in Native Son. Yet already Wright accounts for the investment of private 
economic interest alongside the State’s desire to maintain its power by exercising it upon 
black bodies. The African-American population of Chicago is contained by public policy 
and the threat of violence to the ghetto where their disenfranchisement is most extreme. 
In this space they become salient targets for both violence and economic exploitation. 
My next chapter explores the abuse of migrant workers in the roadside camps and 
farm labor camps of Depression-era California in Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath. This 
dispossessed population is a ripe for the exploitation of their labor, a fact Steinbeck 
renders most visible in the spaces of exception dotting the Californian countryside. Yet 
the “Okies,” too, find themselves classified as non-white, subhuman foreigners whose 
primary value is their cheap labor; this model of behavior toward migrant labor, the novel 
clearly articulates, has been well-practiced against people of color before the influx of 
white migrants during the Dust Bowl. 
I then take a speculative turn through Pohl and Kornbluth’s The Space Merchants 
and Atwood’s Oryx and Crake. Though separated by five decades, both texts explore the 
implications of commercialized advances in bioscience and the resulting spaces of 
exception. Whereas the previous authors emphasize the function of spaces of exception 
as the inscription of ideology on the bodies of “enemies” of the State and the extraction 
of labor value, my final chapter considers the laboratories in these two science fiction 




Again, these fictions and their forms are only examples—exemplary ones—of 
literary interrogations of American spaces of exception. These texts, however, are 
particularly useful for beginning to excavate this strand of literary history because they 
are so intentionally didactic. In fact, their shared subject matter seems to demand a 
guiding moral hand precisely because moral norms are so actively purged from spaces of 
exception. Each author works to counter the narratives that enable the abuse of 
marginalized populations, teaching readers in the process how to recognize and rebuke 
those same narratives. Such guidance is crucial: since spaces of exception and their 
representations prove difficult to ethically access, writers must educate their audiences in 
methods of access, representation, empathy, and—ultimately—resistance. In one sense, 
each text works to unveil a secret history, and these revelations become a form of moral 
education. Although the politics of writers can be notoriously uncertain, the political 
project of each novel is quite apparent: to call attention to systems of inequity, thus 
undermining them, through the portrayal of their most intense manifestation in spaces of 
exception. Still, from The Grapes of Wrath to The Zero, these texts avoid the perils of 
other, narrowly conceived didactic literature by avoiding the articulation of a dogmatic 
praxis. Instead, they use the act of reading to promote a more conscientious recognition 
of the worlds in which we live.  
I write of these novels as powerful ciphers for the moral and legal paradoxes of 
American life. These texts have the capacity to affect readers in manners that may only 
be possible through literary forms. Yet literary fiction, of course, does not replace other 
avenues of action. Each author, however, propose that the work of fiction can crucially 
augment other political work. According to The Washington Post, with the election of 
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Donald Trump and the intensifying of radical right rhetoric in favor of concentration 
camps and torture for undocumented immigrants and religious minorities, great numbers 
of readers have turned to dystopian fictions that similarly depict states and spaces of 
exception (Andrews). It remains to be seen whether this renewed readership of classics 
like George Orwell’s Nineteen Eight-Four (1949) and Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale 
(1985) will provide escapism or inspiration to action. Though the public might call on 
authors to use their insight and art to offer us explicit directives, Butler, Walter, Wright, 
Steinbeck, Pohl, Kornbluth, and Atwood ultimately leave responsibility in readers’ hands, 




Chapter 1: Ages of Terror: Extralegal Torture Sites and State Violence in 
The Parable of the Talents and The Zero 
 
Introduction 
 In 1998, Octavia Butler published the science fiction dystopian novel Parable of 
the Talents, the sequel to her 1993 novel Parables of the Sower. The first-person 
epistolary-style narrative follows the life of an adult Lauren Olamina, the same young 
adult protagonist from Sower, as she and her family build a new religious community in a 
near-future United States wracked by wars, economic collapse, and racialized religious 
terror. Afflicted with hyperempathy, a condition that causes her to neurologically 
experience the pain of others, Olamina founds and advocates for her new religion called 
Earthseed. This faith stresses that “God is Change,” calling for non-hierarchical 
cooperation and betterment among its members. The novel’s plot begins in Acorn, a 
small Earthseed village that continues to grow until a terrorist group of “Crusaders,” 
religious fanatics tacitly legitimated by the new U.S. President, captures and enslaves 
Olamina’s community. The camp operates as a space of exception in which persons are 
abused until their subjectivity evaporates and they remain nearly mindless bodies. 
Though set in a fictional near-future, Butler’s novel evokes the United States’ long legacy 
of terror and torture legitimated by the State, indicating how national narratives of 
security and prosperity are built on the backs of racialized others. 
 In 2007, Jess Walter’s darkly satirical novel The Zero was published and 
marketed as a “9/12” fiction. This third-person narrative offers a carefully layered 
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critique of the nation’s, the State’s, and the police agent’s response to the attacks on 
September 11, 2001 and the subsequent declaration of the Global War on Terror. The 
novel’s third-person narrative follows Brian Remy, a New York City police officer 
recruited into a new government counter-terrorism intelligence agency, the “Office of 
Liberty and Recovery.” But Remy’s narrative is severely disjointed: he experiences black 
outs and temporal shifts during which an alter ego overtakes him and participates in 
investigations that include the torture of innocent suspects. The novel’s plot follows 
Remy’s attempts to understand the uncontrolled trajectory of his life and new profession 
in which he discovers that his agency, the FBI, and CIA largely manufacture the threats 
to national security that they are tasked to pursue. Whereas Butler’s novel focuses on the 
victims’ experiences of State-sponsored violence, The Zero targets the national and 
individual complicity with regimes of extralegal State violence that proliferate spaces of 
exception. 
 Together these two novels offer productive perspective on our contemporary 
crises of American State power. While Walter’s novel offers insight into the War on 
Terror and its excesses, Butler’s earlier novel offers a recent though broader context of 
sites of torture that is not eclipsed by the spectacles of our present. Indeed, American law 
and American literature have long been concerned with questions of acceptable and 
unacceptable forms of State violence. Through its speculative future setting, Parable of 
the Talents contemplates how extralegal, State-sponsored violence and terror are 
centuries-old American mechanisms to assert racial and class dominance. Butler’s 
fictional setting, evocations, and allusions present this phenomenon not as limited to 
specific historical circumstances but rather as ready for mobilization in any time or space. 
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 In contrast, via its formal conceit Walter’s The Zero represents the eclipse of 
extralegal State violence in national memory and consciousness. By posing the 
protagonist Brian Remy as a representative American citizen and an allegorical figure for 
the nation, the author uses Remy’s severely disjointed narrative to evoke the wider 
dissonance in our national consciousness when addressing reinvigorated extralegal State 
violence. The satirical depiction of his inability to meaningfully intervene in unethical 
violence, despite his position at its center, points to the wider failure of Americans’ 
ethical comprehension and intervention. 
Like those spaces depicted in other texts discussed in this dissertation, the 
fictional torture sites in these novels are not cordoned zones of aberrant violence. The 
scenes of torture in concentration camp in Parable of the Talents and the cargo ship in 
The Zero act as important fulcrums for not only the development of each novel’s plot and 
characters but also their allegorical work. Though exceptional in the sense that these sites 
operate beyond the bounds of normal law, each text suggests that these kinds of spaces 
are all too normal and near the foundations of American political structures. Yet, despite 
the comparable representations of torture sites, the camp and the ship in these novels are 
not interchangeable. Their immediate purposes are different: torture within the camp is 
quasi-penal and disciplinary, while the torture on the ship is nominally part of an 
interrogation. But the victims in these fictions are nevertheless interlinked by their similar 
exceptional positions beyond the normal protection of law, a kind of existence that Colin 
Dayan describes as being “held in limbo in the no-man’s lands sustained by state power” 
(Law 12). Butler’s and Walter’s texts reveal the dynamic of this relationship between 
State power and particular categories of bodies by representing this limbo into the 
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physical space of exception of the torture site. By focusing on particular historical 
circumstances through the medium of fiction, these narratives are able to both specify 
different tactics for perpetrating extralegal State violence and evoke longer, wider 
legacies of more varied violence that fills the American past and present. 
 
Dominating Difference through Torture 
 Butler’s Parable of the Sower takes the narrative perspective of those who suffer 
extralegal violence authorized by the State. The text portrays torture as a part of will to 
dominance disguised by efforts to discipline persons into acceptable, docile subjects. 
Those targeted in Butler’s speculative future are “the poor and the different,” used as 
scapegoats to satisfy social and economic insecurities (Butler, Talents 289). With this end 
in mind, the Crusaders’ torture program at “Camp Christian” operates under a state of 
exception to transform minority citizens into passive bodies nearly devoid of subjectivity. 
Butler’s protagonist Lauren Olamina learns as much amid the terror and violence 
she suffers in her village-turned-concentration camp. She writes, “They will break us 
down, reshape us, teach us what it means to love their country and fear their God” (184). 
Captives are told that they “must be reeducated” to “forsake our sinful ways,” and they 
are required to refer to their jailers as “Teachers” (208, 212). These men, while not direct 
agents of the State, nevertheless invoke the nation-state as their source of authority. But 
after her escape, Olamina explains the camp’s violent hypocrisy to her brother, saying, 
“They never let anyone go. They killed quite a few of us, but they never released anyone. 
. . . I don’t see how they could have dared to let us go after what they’d done to us” (314). 
The Crusaders’ justification for their extensive physical and mental abuse of their 
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prisoners proves only superficial. Instead, Camp Christian is a space of focused abuse 
aimed not at the remaking of subjects but into their psychic annihilation. 
Olamina’s remark to her brother reveals the irony in her earlier statement about 
the camp’s true nature. The words “what it means” inject an ambiguous fulcrum into her 
sentence. Her diction and grammar before this clause clearly indicate the power 
dynamics: the torturers are in the position of subjects undertaking actions on objects, their 
victims. But the phrase “what it means” muddles the grammatical location of actors and 
objects. On initial reading, the language of reshaping and teaching suggests that the 
captors intend to discipline their captives into citizens, appropriately patriotic and 
religious. Rather than elevating the captives to equal status, however, this education 
through violence renders them as bodies stripped of personhood. “What it means” to love 
and fear the camp’s version of God and country proves to be the process of violently 
dominating bodies marked as other who are perceived as threats to orders of political, 
social, and economic power. 
 Violence is a central feature of Butler’s fictions, but the kinds of violence 
depicted in the two Parable novels are markedly different. While Parable of the Talents 
continues its prequel’s themes of non-dogmatic, non-hierarchical ethics and community 
building, Sower does not linger on scenes of torture as does Talents. For example, while 
in search of her missing father in the wild, lawless areas outside their suburb, a younger 
Olamina and her companions hear only the screams of victims being tortured by roaming 
gangs. Butler writes, “It was a man’s voice . . . We couldn’t locate the source. The echoes 
bounced around the canyon, confusing us, sending us first in one direction, then in 
another. . . . The screaming stopped, then began again as a kind of horrible, bubbling 
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noise” (Sower 132). The group would later find corpses but not witness the violence 
firsthand. Here the author offers only the description of sound as a signifier for this 
extended moment of torture. Though strongly evocative, especially in the transition from 
a “man’s voice” into an inhuman “bubbling noise,” these screams are a very loose 
signifier. They have no clearly determined referent; Olamina cannot be certain from 
whom the screams originated, or even their physical origin as the sound “echoes,” 
dislocating this signifier of pain from its source. Much of the violence of Sower is 
represented in a similarly removed manner. 
 Moreover, in contrast to the organized torture in the sequel, Sower portrays 
largely wild, chaotic violence in the wake of nationwide catastrophe. Government at any 
level is practically absent from Sower. In the opening pages of Talents Olamina’s 
husband, Bankole, relates how people in her world have come to call the period in which 
Sower takes place as the “the Apocalypse” or “the Pox” (Butler, Talents 7-8). He 
describes this period as “caused by accidentally coinciding climatic, economic, and 
sociological crises . . . caused by our own refusal to deal with obvious problems in those 
areas” (8). The resulting collapse of the economy and infrastructure creates a state of 
nature environment through which Olamina and her soon-to-be Earthseed followers 
navigate as “homeless wanderers” (9). Sower depicts three main categories of violence 
that become excessively visible in this world. Some individuals prey upon others for 
survival. Other communities and corporations that still maintain a power base are shown 
to exploit and even enslave destitute persons who have limited resources for survival. But 
Olamina also recognizes the destructive violence generated by “frustrated, angry, 
hopeless” people. She writes, “They have no power to improve their lives, but they have 
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the power to make others even more miserable. And the only way to prove to yourself 
that you have power is to use it” (Sower 143). Ultimately, Sower’s narrative is a heroic 
journey that eschews the trope’s traditional assertions of male power through violence, 
replaced by Olamina’s empathy and new religious ethic. 
 By the time of Talents the apocalyptic chaos has lessened. A version of 
government has returned to the U.S., but lawlessness persists across the majority of the 
nation. As Bankole notes, the worst of the Pox has passed, but “[i]t has not ended” 
(Butler, Talents 8). He claims that the United States of America “did not survive the Pox. 
. . . What is left of it now, what it has become, I do not know” (8). Still, the shift in 
setting between these novels also marks a shift in predominant kinds of violence to which 
Olamina and her followers are exposed. The torture and violence of Sower is a 
manifestation of “war of all against all” in Thomas Hobbes’s concept of a state of nature. 
In contrast, Butler’s representation of extreme abuse at “Camp Christian” and elsewhere 
in Talents indicates a highly organized and institutionalized violence that originates in 
part from the reinvigorated State.  
Butler invites the reader to begin recognizing this difference as Olamina observes 
the Crusaders transforming her village into Camp Christian. Olamina writes, “Our 
captors were keeping our land, then. Until that moment, this had not occurred to me. 
They were not just out to steal or burn, enslave or kill. That was what thugs had always 
done before. . . . But these were staying, building a fence. Why?” (Butler, Talents 199). 
The author calls the reader’s attention to this paradigm shift between the two novels with 
the fence. The fence creates the space of the camp, establishing a visible zone that is 
rendered distinct from all space around it. What occurs within the camp is forcefully set 
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apart from the world outside both physically and symbolically, creating a space of 
exception. 
Butler incorporates the fence and the power dynamics it symbolizes into this 
passage that calls attention to the change in setting from one novel to the next. The 
author’s further description of Camp Christian shows that these fences function only to 
demarcate space, not to actually restrict the captives. The devices that control and inflict 
pain on the camp victims is Butler’s science fiction invention of electronic shock collars. 
These collars are placed on prisoners’ necks and enact their own perimeter, inflicting 
horrendous pain on those who move outside a defined radius from the control unit 
(Butler, Talents 199, 195). Importantly, these collars do no permanent damage to their 
wearers (130). As a result, the fence is mostly a signifier that differentiates space in 
which certain kinds of bodies and behaviors belong. These camps are decidedly 
exceptional; the violence inflicted upon Olamina and others marked as outcasts is only 
permissible if it is out of sight, away from population centers and those citizens not 
directly employed in this torture regime. But, as long as they meet these criteria, the 
camps prove acceptable. 
 Butler writes at great length to inform her readers that the experience of torture is 
not limited to physical pain. The violence targeted at Olamina’s body serves as a conduit 
to the destruction of her individual subjectivity. From the beginning of her captivity, the 
experience of direct torture of lashings and rape alongside the psychological torture of the 
constant threat of violence works to transform Olamina and her peers into almost 
subjectless bodies. The camp’s exceptional function ignores the protections of American 
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legal and moral norms for individuals, inflicting psychic death while preserving useful 
biological bodies. 
The text portrays the first step of this alienating process as a traumatic break with 
language. After the village is captured, Olamina writes, “I could hear people around me 
moaning, crying, cursing, talking, but their words made no sense to me. They might as 
well have been in a foreign language. I couldn’t think of anything except that I wanted to 
die” (Butler, Talents 197). Her suffering begins to break down her status as a subject, 
temporarily ejecting her from language’s system of knowing and communicating. This 
scene reflects a common scholarly understanding of the relationship between pain and 
language, established by Elaine Scarry in the monumentally influential study The Body in 
Pain (1985). Scarry argues that, “Physical pain does not simply resist language but 
actively destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, 
to the sounds and cries a human being makes before language is learned” (4). In Butler’s 
text, however, not only does Olamina seem unable to speak, but she is also estranged 
from her peers’ voices. This torture dissolves relationships and communities alongside 
subjectivity. The camp as a space of exception works to produce bodies that are only 
appropriate to exist within them. 
Olamina’s struggle with language continues throughout her captivity, only 
intensifying. Hard labor, food and water deprivation, jolts of electricity akin to an analog 
lashing of a whip leave Olamina feeling “so bad in every possible way, so horrible, so 
scared” (203). She further writes, “After a while, all I could think of was water, pain, and 
where was my baby? I lost track of everything else” (203). While her imprisonment in 
this space of exception already separates Olamina from the wider world, the physical pain 
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and mental anguish over the loss of her family inflicted upon her works to further unseat 
her psyche from reality at large. 
In many scenes Butler presents Olamina’s suffering and its effects on her “voice.” 
Scarry describes the destruction of voice as the central process of torture. She writes,  
For what the process of torture does is to split the human being into two . . 
. The goal of the torturer is to make the one, the body, emphatically and 
crushingly present by destroying it, and to make the other, the voice, 
absent by destroying it. It is in part this combination that makes torture, 
like any experience of great physical pain, mimetic of death[.] (48) 
Scarry writes of what is now a well-established understanding of torture by scholars and 
practitioners as a mean for the “rapid destruction of personal identity” (Todorov 37). 
From this perspective, Olamina’s experience is representative of institutionalized torture. 
This experience, however, is not hers alone. Other women are lashed electronically for 
expressing grief, “for talking, screaming, crying, cursing, and demanding answers” 
(Butler, Talents 205). This list of verbs emphasizes how the torturers assault every aspect 
of voice, encompassing mundane, fearful, mournful, and angry expression of one’s self. 
Throughout her time in the camp, Olamina’s testimonial account is a form of 
resistance to the Crusaders’ efforts to totally objectify her body without a voice or 
subjectivity. Much of the novel’s narration arrives from Olamina’s secret journal. She 
claims to write in order to “make a record of all this . . . so that, someday, Earthseed will 
know what Earthseed has survived” (185). But Olamina also writes for herself, 
withstanding the camp’s function of breaking her away from systems of meaning beyond 
pain. She expresses, “Now I must find a way to write about the past few weeks, to tell 
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what has happened to us—just to tell it as though it were sane and rational. I’ll do that, if 
for no other reason than to give some order to my scattered thoughts” (208). Her writing 
works to counter the effects of torture which causes her to “lose track of everything.” 
Writing, though a flawed medium for representing extreme violence, nevertheless serves 
as a tactical imposition of “order” on her experiences, a temporary epistemological lens 
for both Olamina and her readers to grasp something of the camp’s torture.  
Despite her resistance, Olamina’s ongoing torture proves tactically successful, 
transforming much of her existence into a condition as a subjectless body or, as Scarry 
writes, “mimetic of death.” Olamina later writes about other episodes of abuse that, “The 
worst was the way I felt afterward, I don’t mean the physical pain. This place is a 
university of pain. . . . I was a zombie for several days after the lashing” (Butler, Talents 
227). She is rendered into a state comparable to the fantastical figures of the living dead, 
a condition at the limits of life. This condition is analogous to Agamben’s term “bare 
life,” the biopolitical conception of a purely organic existence improper to political 
community. Olamina expresses this thought directly, bypassing simile and perhaps even 
metaphor. In this speculative science fiction text, the reader is invited to wonder if torture 
has carried Olamina past a figurative zombie-like state into a literal condition like that of 
the creatures portrayed in such films as the Night of the Living Dead (1968). As Butler 
writes, “A collar . . . makes you turn traitor against your kind, against your freedom, 
against yourself” (131). Torture and its threat alienate a victim from everything, including 
oneself, turning a person into an embodied phantasm of her former self. 
While Butler offers the extreme figure of the zombie to suggest the full 
implications of life conditioned by the physical and mental abuse in the camps, she also 
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provides the reader with a sense of how pain’s infliction is a process that varies in 
intensity. Olamina further reflects on the attacks against her subjectivity, writing, “But 
somehow, it had not occurred to me that . . . that bits of my own mind could be snatched 
away too. I knew I could be killed. I’ve never had any illusions about that. I knew I could 
be disabled. I knew that too. But I had not thought that another person, just by pushing a 
small button, then smiling and pushing it again and again . . . [sic]” (Butler, Talents 228). 
The unfolding of Olamina’s revelation here draws the reader’s attention to torture’s 
process, again reinforcing the non-visible psychic stakes of this violence. The reference 
to her “bits of my own mind” implies how the desired zombification of her person occurs 
in a piecemeal process, one “bit” at a time that builds into the inexpressible ellipsis at the 
end of this quote. Butler’s use of the ellipsis evokes an endless cycle that escapes the 
possibilities of representation. Moreover, the contrast of “small button” to one’s entire 
mind creates a spectrum or scale for violent acts that work to unseat subjectivity. 
Olamina suggests that if even the innocuous act of pushing a small button can split minds 
from bodies, then so could every other action that contains the same or more intense 
degrees of violence.  
The novel suggests that the Crusader camps are not only invested in violently 
dominating subjects marked as different but also in converting these people into docile 
labor or other objects of economic utility. Wealth production proves to mediate the 
camps’ violence. Though Olamina “was a zombie,” she also remarks that, “During the 
week, we are machines—or domestic animals” (Talents 223). While Olamina and her 
peers are reduced to a state that is mimetic of death, their bodies prove functional like 
obedient machines. The phrase “domestic animals” strongly inflects her statement. At 
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first the word “animals” calls the reader’s attention to how the prisoners are treated as 
less than equal humans, invoking histories of chattel slavery and different varieties of 
indentured labor. But this reference evokes associations with livestock or similar non-
human organisms, the bodies of which provide commodities or labor for their human 
masters. Through torture, the Crusaders change their victims into subhuman labor. 
Olamina learns later that the Crusaders also coerce prisoners to offer blood and organs 
with the suggestion that they are sometimes taken by force (230). As a result, the 
description of captives as domestic animals takes on a more literal meaning: they too may 
be butchered. 
While Olamina’s writing of her experience in Camp Christian focuses on the 
violent domination of her body as a means to annihilate her subjectivity, she points to 
these other factors that influence the function of this exceptional space. Once she escapes, 
she has the opportunity to reflect on the wider implications of the camps and the political 
and economic networks in which they are situated. Ultimately, Butler’s imagining of the 
camp links the desire for violent domination with the exploitative production of wealth. 
In Parable of the Talents, the focused violence of the camps proves to not occur as an 
isolated aberration in the political order but as the most direct expression of power in a 
national landscape enveloped within a space of exception. 
 
Beyond the Camps: Exposing Bodies to Systemic Violence 
Torture camps are not isolated, anomalous locations of sadism in Talents but one 
kind of nexus in social, economic, political networks that are continually doing the same 
kind of work as the camps but in less spectacular, more insidious ways. By including 
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Camp Christian in the novel, Butler offers a highly visible frame through which the 
reader can better understand how the rest of her speculative American landscape is not 
divorced from the camps but functions as a wider space of exception in which violence 
and exploitation are less concentrated and visible. Butler’s novel and her other works do 
much of the same theoretical work about spaces of violence through fiction that critical 
theory undertakes. Talents suggests the same view as Agamben does when he declares, 
“the birth of the camp in our time appears as an event that decisively signals the political 
space of modernity itself” (Homo 174). In Butler’s world she concretizes Agamben’s call 
on his readers “to regard the camp not as a historical fact and an anomaly belonging to 
the past . . . but in some way as the hidden matrix and nomos of the political space in 
which we are still living” (166). Butler further evokes a perspective of the American 
State  akin to how social and legal critic Kristian Williams argues that, in the United 
States, torture “is not incidental to state power; it is characteristic of that power. Torture 
doesn’t represent system failure; it is the system” (3).
5
 The space within and beyond the 
novel’s camps cannot be disconnected because violent production of docile bodies in the 
camps is intended to directly serve the interests of those beyond the camps. 
Once the reader better understands the networks of which Camp Christian is a 
part, the symbolic fence that the Crusaders erect proves further meaningless to their 
victims. The camp fences pretend to contain violence and bodies deemed inappropriate 
for the national landscape, but they ultimately operate as an extension of rather than a 
                                                 
5
 Contrary to Elaine Scarry’s argument that the act of torture, by extension of its destruction of one’s voice, 
destroys “civilization” and “the world,” Idelber Avelar claims that torture is part of civilization’s and even 
democracy’s foundations (Avelar 259). Instead, torture reinforces the boundaries of civilization even as it is 
nominally categorized as outside civilized life. Extralegal, exceptional torture exhibits the power of the 
civilized State and the uncivilized lengths to which it will go in order to maintain a way of life. In this 
manner, torture’s consistent realpolitik slippage between the inside and outside of law nearly perfectly 
epitomizes Agamben’s state of exception. 
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digression from the political and economic structures of the nation-state at large. The 
camps work to disguise the slower, more insidious violence and exploitation that people 
face outside the fence. Butler’s depiction of life both inside and outside the camps 
demonstrates how such spatial distinctions are only performative when, in fact, these 
spaces are inseparably intertwined.  
 Butler imagines the torture camps as reserved for people who do not submit to the 
exploitation of their bodies and labor. She includes the example of a vagrant falsely 
convicted for robbery and sentenced to indentured labor for the Church of Christian 
America. Along with his daily labor, he is “required to donate blood twice,” and the 
Church promises to free him if he were to “donate a kidney or a cornea” (Butler, Talents 
230). When he refuses out of fear of endless demands for his organic material, he is sent 
“to Camp Christian for reeducation” (230). Even outside the camps, citizens are at 
continuous risk to a spectrum of exploitation and violence, with death and the camps 
serving as this spectrum’s most extreme possibility. 
 Despite Olamina’s escape from Camp Christian, she and her followers are not 
free from violent risk to their bodies and minds. In the sense of trauma, Olamina and her 
friends never entirely escape the camps. She writes, “We were together at last, 
comforting one another, and yet I think each of us was alone, straining towards the 
others, some part of ourselves still trapped back in the uncertainty and fear, the pain and 
desolation of Camp Christian” (269). The author emphasizes the continuous damage that 
spreads beyond the camp’s fences, writing, “Remembering wasn’t safe. You could lose 
your mind, remembering” (270). But while memories and trauma cause survivors to carry 
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the camp with themselves into the present, Butler also depicts how freedom from the 
camps does not free survivors from more extralegal violence. 
Though the camps become the clearest expression of a space of exception, the 
potential for State-sponsored exploitation and abuses begins outside the camps. 
Contemplating how her village had been at risk to the Crusaders’ torture program, 
Olamina writes, “We were nobodies, and our anonymity, far from protecting us, had 
made us vulnerable” (214). This sentence captures the macro-dynamic of the exceptional 
landscape that Butler imagines for this future United States. Earlier in the narrative she 
does note that in the still near-apocalyptic state of the world that anyone can still 
“vanish,” but Butler develops the text to depict how people on the bottom of stratum of 
power are the most systematically violated and exploited (168). Once Olamina discovers 
that the camps have no basis in written law, she still reaffirms that, “We are, as we have 
always been, on our own” (290). Without significant social, economic, or political status 
in the American hierarchy, the lives of Olamina’s followers and other groups are cast in a 
constant virtual space of exception. 
To describe the United States at large as a space of exception in Talents is not to 
say that law is absent. Laws remain that call for the protection of persons and rights, but 
as Olamina’s daughter comments, “The problem was, no one was enforcing such laws” 
(Butler, Talents 24). Instead of a binary transition from the application of law to its 
suspension, these two conditions of law lose their distinction. In imagining Olamina’s 
world of rampant extralegal violence, Butler also portrays how the apparatus of law 
enables the exceptional treatment of persons rather than preventing it. Seemingly 
foundational American legal concepts fall by the wayside across the nation. For example, 
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Olamina discusses how frequently authorities ignore “the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments—the ones abolishing slavery and guaranteeing citizenship rights.” She 
notes how “even the police would either sell [children] or indenture them illegally,” 
enabled “by custom, by Congress and the various state legislatures, and by recent 
Supreme Court decisions” (40). Olamina comments that those in power justify this 
revitalized form of slavery for the politically and economically dispossessed is, in fact, a 
kind of welfare. But she claims that “it’s just one more way of getting people to work for 
nothing or almost nothing,” enabling people to “be coerced into being quick docile, 
disposable labor” (40). Such extralegal tactics prove to be parallel in purpose to those 
inside the camps: to dominate persons deemed different for economic exploitation. 
Though the novel emphasizes the experiences of Olamina’s religious minority, 
Butler includes details on the suffering of others marked as different and exposed to 
abuse without consequence. The author speculates that creation of certain categories of 
persons to whom legal and moral norms do not apply leads to the proliferation these 
categories. Similarly, Colin Dayan suggests in her study of Anglo-American law that the 
existence of exceptional classes like slaves and felons in our real world “place the citizen 
who is both non-slave and non-felon in a fearful zone of legal ambiguity” (Law 42). More 
and more persons are opened to the risk of State-sponsored violence as its limitations 
blur. 
 Butler uses the neo-fascist President Jarret as the central figure to depict and 
explain the national space of exception. Olamina claims that “you can’t separate 
[President] Jarret from the ‘religious nonsense.’ You take Jarret and you get beatings, 
burnings, tarrings and featherings” (25). She records some quotes from Jarret’s 
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inauguration speech, notably including a verse from the biblical book of Isaiah: “Your 
country is desolate, your cities are burned with fire: your land, strangers devour it in your 
presence, and it is desolate as overthrown by strangers” (47). Butler also inserts in 
Jarret’s mouth the essential paradox of the American republic’s history; she writes, “In 
almost the same breath, he spoke of both ‘the generosity and the love that we must show 
to one another, to all of our fellow Christian Americans,’ and ‘the destruction we must 
visit upon traitors and sinner, those destroyers in our midst’” (147). Jarret asserts 
simultaneously inclusive and exclusive ethos, creating porous, ambiguous categories of 
stranger and citizen into which any person can fall. His words mirror how Agamben 
describes the state of exception as akin to a civil war that pits some citizens against 
others, using law as a tool of domination rather than equal protection (State 2). Butler 
imagines the America of Talents to fall into such an insidious civil war, in which legal 
power is used as a weapon rather than an equitable shield. 
 Of course, the exceptional, extralegal violence that proliferates in Olamina’s 
world is not directly administered by the State. Instead, the State’s institutions permit 
abuse and exploitation. Olamina notes that, while the Crusaders from Christian America 
churches “believe God is on their side,” “they have no government-sanctioned authority” 
(95). But, like her mother and others later in the narrative, Olamina’s daughter directly 
associates the Crusaders with Jarret’s government even though they do not function as 
official agents of the State. She writes, “During Jarret’s first year in office, the worst of 
his followers ran amok. Filled with righteous superiority and popular among the many 
frightened, ordinary citizens who only wanted order and stability, the fanatics set up the 
camps” (243). Jarret is perceived as a savior figure for the poor and as figure of order. 
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But the order he and his regime create is predicated on the ordering of bodies, offering 
security to some through the operation of violent order on others. Though Olamina’s 
daughter states, “What was done to my mother and to many other interned people of her 
time was illegal in almost every way,” Olamina and other characters indirectly attribute 
the Crusaders’ camps to Jarret’s political program (242, 280). 
 Butler does not, however, attribute the national space of exception to Jarret and 
his followers alone. She speculates about the public’s relationship to this regime of terror. 
Though Olamina doubts that President Jarret has authorized the Crusaders’ camps under 
the official color of law, she realizes that “no one has noticed” the camps (214). A recent 
arrival at Camp Christian confirms to Olamina that, “Most people don’t know about the 
camps” (231). Butler ultimately paints this ignorance as complicity through the 
confrontation between Olamina and her brother. Olamina’s brother, now a member of 
mainstream Christian America Church, defends the Church’s policies and actions beyond 
the camps by declaiming the Crusaders as an unauthorized “splinter group” (322). By 
applying this label, he also abdicates his responsibility as belonging to an institution that 
is, according to Olamina, inescapably tied to the Crusaders. He is the novel’s chief figure 
of being complicit by treating extralegal violence as an aberration rather than the new 
norm of the political order from which he benefits.  
Even within the Crusaders Butler imagines mostly normal people who have come 
to condone exceptional violence. To Olamina’s mind, there are two groups of Crusaders. 
Irredeemable sadists comprise the first: she writes that some men “lash us until they have 
orgasms,” and that, “These men feast on our pain.” To discuss the second group, Olamina 
focuses on the sexual abuse she and other women experience. She writes that, “Rape is 
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done with a pretense of secrecy,” because this violence cannot be officially sanctioned 
just as the camps as a whole cannot be sanctioned. But Olamina imagines that many of 
the men who assault her “must go home to their wives and kids.” A schism exists 
between this functionally extralegal rape and the conservative Christian “family values” 
that this regime espouses. Olamina writes, “They rape, but they pretend they don’t. They 
say they’re religious, but power has corrupted even the best of them. I don’t like to admit 
it, but some of them are, in a strange way, decent, ordinary men. I mean that they believe 
in what they are doing.” These men are representative of the greater schism that engulfs 
Butler’s United States. The moral dissonance of this less than secret regime of rape 
mirrors how President Jarret calls for the defense of one’s country and fellow citizens 
while still ostracizing and enabling mass violence against people marked as “enemies of 
the country” (Talents 233). In this sense, the novel casts everyone who is not a victim of 
the camp as in some part complicit, some part a Crusader. 
 Olamina’s daughter offers a retrospective summary for her mother’s theories 
about the unhinged violence sweeping the country. She blames human “competiveness 
and territoriality” and writes, 
We human beings seem always to have found it comforting to have 
someone to look down on—a bottom level of fellow creatures who are 
very vulnerable, but who can somehow be blamed and punished for all or 
any troubles. We need this lowest class as much as we need equals to team 
with and to compete against and superiors to look to for direction and 
help. (Talents 80-1) 
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The text attributes the desire to dominate and exploit persons marked as different not only 
to those with political or economic power but also to every human being. Olamina 
suspects that well-to-do people with “legal residences” would be happy to see the church 
seizing the scattered population of the homeless and squatters, removing them to 
contained and productive labor. 
 By emphasizing the role of average people in the production of a national space of 
exception, Butler raises the question for her readers of whether or not we share similar 
responsibilities. In the novel, while the camps themselves undoubtedly would raise moral 
hackles if enough public light were cast on them, Olamina wonders, “How many people . 
. . can be penned up and tormented—reeducated—before it begins to matter to the 
majority of Americans?” (231). This question represents an immediate quandary for 
Olamina and her world since the camps and pseudo-religious violence are active 
concerns. But for the novel’s readers, this question becomes rhetorical, asking us to take 
responsibility for the answer to this query. Twenty-first century readers face the onus of 
confronting the excesses of the Global War on Terror and the promises of the Trump 
administration that mirror much of what occurs in Butler’s fictional America. Yet 
Parable of the Talents evokes far more than the present and possible futures, invoking 
multiple histories to suggest that the United States has long been a national space of 
exception. 
 
The Point of Parables, or Multidirectional Memory 
Reading Butler’s novel in the twenty-first century pressingly reminds us that the 
abhorrent practices at Guantanamo Bay, Abu-Ghraib, and countless other sites are not 
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hasty, anomalous, and extemporaneous tactics. Instead, alongside our present moment of 
State torture Parable of the Talents invokes a social, legal, and political legacy of 
extralegal violence that enfolds the United States’ history. Although in the last few 
decades the American reading public has lauded texts exposing the evils of State torture, 
this novel marks a departure from the texts in this trend. Diverse acclaimed books like 
George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag 
Archipelago (1973), J. M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians (1980), Primo Levi’s 
The Drowned and the Saved (1986), and Lawrence Thornton’s Imagining Argentina 
(1987) all directly focus on State violence beyond American borders. Of course, each text 
points to the problems of government abuse and exploitation in more places than the 
Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, for example. But the emphasis in these texts’ reception 
is undoubtedly on the misdeeds done abroad. Parable of the Talents asks readers to return 
the concerns that have echoed in public writing since the Second World War to the 
American landscape. 
As Olamina’s husband writes early in Talents, the period of the Pox is not a 
contained event of chaos and predation. Instead, the Pox has a long, ongoing history that 
reaches outside Butler’s fiction into the structural crises of the twentieth and now the 
twenty-first centuries. While Parable of the Talents is set in a speculative, nearly 
apocalyptic future, this fiction brings into focus multiple aspects of the American past, 
present, and possible futures. Despite naming her series after famous biblical parables, 




Butler projects a self-reflective discussion of parables and story-telling into 
Olamina’s tale. The narrator recalls how her father, a preacher, “loved parables—stories 
that taught, stories that presented ideas and morals in ways that made pictures in people’s 
minds.” He told stories from every venue because “he believed stories were so important 
as teaching tools” (14). This early reference to the text’s title creates an ethical frame for 
readers; Butler suggests that we are to learn something from experiencing her story. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines “parable” as “A (usually realistic) story or narrative 
told to convey a moral or spiritual lesson or insight; [especially] one told by Jesus in the 
Gospels.” The OED emphasizes the New Testament’s influence on the parable form in 
English, and Butler implements it in both novels in her series. If we were to read Talents 
through the form of a biblical parable, then the moral lesson would be the central tenets 
of Olamina’s Earthseed religion: radical personal adaptability, survival, empathy, and 
growth. These character and community traits that the novel promotes are quite familiar 
to readers of Butler’s works. The author’s first novel Kindred (1979) and her Xenogenesis 
Trilogy (1987-1989) produce the same moral lesson if we were to read them in this 
manner. Indeed, to ignore the traditional parable narrative function of Talents would be a 
disingenuous interpretation, but an interpretation limited to this scope would be similarly 
inadequate. 
While the novel does indeed operate on this level, its complexity evokes much 
more than the direct signification of plot and lesson. As a fiction set in a speculative 
though historically generated landscape, Parable of the Talents evokes more than a 
singular experience. The novel conjures multiple avenues of association, gathering 
together different aspects of past, present, and future Americas in the world of the Pox to 
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teach readers through storytelling about the too often unremembered past and too often 
unthought potential futures. Although set in a fictional history, Talents remains eerily 
plausible, lying in close proximity to particular historical moments. The novel performs 
what Michael Rothberg describes as “multidirectional memory,” an ethic of memory that 
is “subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing; […] as productive 
and not privative” (3). Butler comingles divergent experiences like U.S. slavery and the 
Holocaust to produce a critical perspective for readers to recognize the ongoing histories 
of violence that are so often understated or overlooked. 
The exceptional nature of modern law and State violence in the Americas is older 
than the United States itself. Robert Pallitto’s edited documentary history, Torture and 
State Violence in the United States (2011), presents a nearly four hundred year-old 
history of the State simultaneously generating legal norms intended to unilaterally protect 
citizens while also instituting exceptions, leaving bodies exposed to the State’s violence 
as it determines necessary. Pallitto first provides excerpts from the Massachusetts Bodies 
of Liberties (1641) which includes “the rights of the accused” while “torture is explicitly 
permitted in certain cases, as long as such torture is not “barbarous or cruel” (19). 
Though Butler does not likely have this specific document in mind as a referent in her 
novels, the specific historical allusions in the Parable series do not close off the reader’s 
further associations. 
The camps themselves are one of the novel’s most immediately recognizable 
historical referent. Readers are likely to associate Camp Christian with concentration 
camps in Nazi Germany, the widest recognized form of “the camp” in popular culture. 
Like Nazi camps, Butler’s camps are used to police and destroy difference. Yet Butler’s 
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camps do not speculate about what would happen if concentration camps came to 
American shores; in fact, they have long existed here. 
Beginning with the internment of Native Americans in the early republic, the 
United States has used camps and similar spaces to abuse and exploit persons under its 
power. Such is the thesis of James L. Dickerson’s study Inside America’s Concentration 
Camps (2010) (ix, x). Dickerson points to corporate economic expansion in the American 
colonies as the driving force behind the racial and ethnic cleansing that culminated in the 
1830 Indian Removal Act (15, 23). He describes the law as the first federal law “to 
establish a legal basis for restrictive concentration camps” (23). While personnel at 
Indian internment camps were ordered to treat their captive humanely by the standards of 
the day, the exceptional nature of these spaces fostered abuse (30). These camps that led 
to the Native American reservation system laid the foundation for their modern variants. 
The other most prominent association Butler’s camps provoke with American 
history is Japanese internment camps during the Second World War. In 1942 President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, authorizing the deportation of 
Japanese, Italian, and German Americans to concentration camps. In particular, 
internment’s proponents alleged that Japanese Americans were responsible for disrupting 
the American war effort, but present intelligence and decades of historical studies have 
discounted that argument (Dickerson 66). Instead, Dickerson and a litany of other 
historians point to the “longstanding racism prevalent on the West Coast” (67). Along 
with the Executive Order, legislatures passed predatory actions that dispossessed many 
internees and others of longstanding property. What Butler imagines to happen in the 
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early twenty-first century on the West Coast has essentially already occurred in the mid-
twentieth. 
Still, the presence of “the camp” as a paradigm in Parable of the Talents is more 
than summoning the past into the present. Indeed, camps for concentrating persons have 
become a banal practice for the American State. In 1986 the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) was authorized by Congress to detain “illegal immigrants” 
in detention camps that have “attracted little public scrutiny” (Dickerson 239). Like all 
State facilities in which one group of people is empowered over a socio-political 
minority, abuse and exploitation occurs, even to the point of torture (241). A large 
portion of detainees are undocumented Hispanic immigrants, but the detention camp 
system put in place in the 1980s was activated after the September 11 terrorist attacks to 
persecute Arab and Muslim persons. Kristian Williams reports, 
In the four months following the September 11 attacks, the US secretly 
jailed about 1,200 people, mostly Arabs or Muslims from other countries. 
Of these, only one was charged with terror-related crimes, while 600 were 
charged instead with immigration violations. An unknown number of 
‘material witnesses’ were also jailed. . . . Of those who were held without 
charges, many were transferred cross-country, and some completely 
incommunicado and denied legal representation and family contact. 
(Williams 169) 
He summarizes, “Immigration status commonly serves as a convenient proxy for race” 
(169). But, by reading history through Parable of the Talents, however, we can expand 
Dickerson’s, Williams’s, and other scholars’ understanding of American camps. We can 
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recognize how this exceptional technique of statecraft can be and has been turned against 
any group of people deemed different, under whatever criteria. 
Race still plays a central factor among the historical referents of Talents. Butler 
focuses most directly on the religious fascism at the center of Christian America as an 
extension of the United States’ history of zealously abusive politics and populist 
violence. Yet she also points to a thread of racist prejudice still present in Olamina’s 
world. Another prisoner tells Olamina how since a church robber was identified as black, 
he and a dozen other homeless people were arrested and indentured for being black men 
in the vicinity of a crime (Talents 229). Olamina and a majority of her fellow Earthseed 
followers are people of color. Other narrative choices and Butler’s further engagement 
with African-American history in her other fictions raises the violent specter of extralegal 
violence against black peoples in the United States. 
 While Camp Christian evokes twentieth-century concentration camps, it also 
summons the historical memory of chattel slavery. Olamina contemplates the parallels 
between past and present slavery in both Sower and Talents. She compares the conditions 
of indentured laborers during the Pox and of black slaves: both groups are refused 
personal freedom, education, privacy, and even safety. One character suggests the risk of 
sexual abuse behind the closed doors of an employer’s home (Butler, Sower 218-9). With 
the advent of “slave collar” technology—a clear allusion—Olamina imagines it “could 
initiate a whole new level of slavery” (Talents 84). This inclusion of slavery’s memory in 
Butler’s novels points to the persistent potential for the same sort exceptional exploitation 
of slavery to be visited upon others in the present. Whereas slaves were written into the 
U.S. Constitution as exceptions by way of the three-fifths compromise, as Olamina’s 
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daughter notes, those who wield the power of law ignore the Amendments that worked to 
undo the exceptional status of blacks and others. 
 The camps themselves also perform similar functions to slave plantations. Slaves 
lived in a condition not unlike how Olamina describes the camp captives: “machines—or 
domestic animals.” Indeed, the state of life that Butler imagines in the camp is not far 
removed from the “wretched, degraded and abject” existence of black slaves (Walker 2). 
Even Olamina’s use of metaphor to describe life in the camp is in close parallel to the 
language of slavery. She describes herself as a zombie, a fantastical figure that originated, 
according to Colin Dayan, in Haitian slavery. As “a soulless husk deprived of freedom,” 
the zombie is “the most powerful emblem of apathy, anonymity, and loss” (J. Dayan 37). 
In Haitian vodou tradition, a zombie is a figure of ultimate spiritual dispossession, a body 
under the control of another in a condition mimetic to death. In both circumstances, 
historical and fictional, people are exposed to violence so that their labor may be 
exploited. And, in both cases, religion is frequently used as false justification. Though 
Butler may not have intended this specific historical connection, the narrative’s nature 
and her imagination of the camp foster these connections, inviting the reader to recognize 
how the past is not past. 
 Talents is even more particularly reminiscent of the lynching era of American 
history. Olamina makes an early association of lynching and church burning with 
President Jarret (26). The Crusaders themselves, with their name’s association with 
knighthood and chivalry, resemble in part a revitalized Ku Klux Klan, and their 
relationship to the State mirrors in part the Klan and other vigilantes’. While the 
Crusaders and historical perpetrators of racist mob violence are not direct agents of the 
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State, their relationship to the State is much closer than characters like Olamina’s brother 
and many of Butler’s readers would like to admit. 
Mob violence and vigilantism condoned by the State has a long American legacy. 
In the nineteenth century, various court decisions, law enforcement policies, legislation, 
and executive orders permitted the exercise of mob violence. Mob violence was 
commonly justified as a phenomenon that was, to quote Judge Luke Lawless in a 1836 
jury charge, “beyond the reach of human law” (Pallitto 62). As Pallitto writes, “In many 
number of cases, state officials licensed the lynchers to act and refused to prosecute them 
afterward” (73). One lynching apologist in 1899 “conceded that lynching was an 
expression of the ‘people’s wisdom,’ suggesting that although in a lynching ‘the law is 
violated in form,’ it is vindicated in substance’” (Dray 149). As part of the federal 
attempts to pass anti-lynching legislation, in 1922 Senator T. H. Caraway argued that 
lynching’s regulation or lack thereof was a matter of a state’s right. He was one among 
many who presented similar arguments for decades (Pallitto 107). Though, in the context 
of lynching culture, the State-permitted vigilante violence in Parable of the Talents more 
closely resembles the mid-twentieth-century secretive, terroristic violence against blacks 
and civil rights workers, the scale of the camps and widespread complicity in Olamina’s 
world harkens to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in which a lynching was a 
public and publicized spectacle. 
Although lynching is depicted in popular culture as a Southern phenomenon, far 
away from the West Coast where Butler stages her fiction, sanctioned mob violence was 
not limited by geography. For example, California Governor James Rolph promised to 
pardon anyone convicted of lynching in a 1933 incident (Pallitto 115). In a historical 
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study of American lynching, Philip Dray claims argues that “the idea that lynchers were 
simply following nature’s laws” was accepted on a national scale (72-3). In an 
exceptional position not adequately protected by law, African Americans faced the 
constant threat of racist mob violence across the country, leaving them exposed to 
exploitation and other injustices without recourse, in fear of lynching. As Dray writes, 
“Hovering just beyond all the other daily indignities of life in the region was lynching, 
and even where a lynching never occurred it sat, a brooding possibility, over all 
aspirations” (223). Butler’s novel makes her own case for the persistent spirit of lynching 
in the United States, while historians like Dray point to the biased justice system and 
unequal application of law to blacks and other minorities (Dray 459). 
Remarkably, since the publication of Talents even some of Butler’s futuristic 
science fiction elements have become historical referents. The electronically controlled 
slave collars anticipate the real invention of the “stun belt” now used by police forces and 
correctional facilities. Williams describes it: “This device fastens around a prisoner’s 
waist and can be activated by remote control, sending a 50,000-volt shock through her 
body for eight seconds. The shock causes the victim’s muscles to spasm, often causing 
her to fall . . . The shock is also fiercely painful, totally incapacitating, and undeniably 
humiliating” (Williams 207). In the novel collar technology enables continuous “clean 
torture” from which “you never have any marks to mess you up and drive down your 
price” (Butler, Talents 130). It prevents bodies from losing value as well as physical 
evidence that might be used to prosecute torturers. With the invention of the stun belt 
used by corrections departments, readers may now see critical associations between the 
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extralegal violence of the camps and the invisible, unaccountable “clean torture” that 
occurs in contemporary police and prison systems. 
The practice of clean torture in Talents proves to be a prescient imagining of the 
now widespread “enhanced interrogation techniques” used by agents of the U.S. 
government. Chris Pyle reports that the CIA has advised foreign police agencies to use 
“scarless torture” to foreign police agencies because, with a lack of physical marks as 
evidence, “it was easy to deny or cover up.” Pyle suggests that this same motivation was 
present when the Bush administration implemented these same techniques with prisoners 
in the War on Terror beginning in 2001 (Pyle 57). The now well-publicized practices of 
waterboarding and sleep deprivation, for example, may not leave physical marks, but 
they still accomplish what Todorov describes as “rapid destruction of personal identity,” 
the same destruction Olamina experiences under the Crusaders’ thumb. 
Famously, the Bush administration’s head of counterterrorism testified before 
Congress that after the September 11 attacks “the gloves come off” and these “enhanced 
techniques” were necessary (Pyle 7). This testimony and its pervasive spirit among 
torture apologists accomplish two rhetorical feats. It suggests that both the geopolitical 
circumstances and the violent, exceptional practices used in response are novel to the 
twenty-first century. But, as Parable of the Talents suggests to readers, the techniques 
and justifications for the excesses of the Global War on Terror have a long list of 
precedents that are well within the normal practices of the American State, even if they 
prove an exception to the apparent spirit of its laws. 
 
Terror and Interrogation 
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In sharp contrast to the numerous scenes of explicit torture in Butler’s novel, 
violence mostly occurs on the periphery of the narrative in Jess Walter’s The Zero. Once 
the focalizer Brian Remy, the brain-damaged police officer, inadvertently participates in 
an abusive interrogation, extralegal State violence becomes an absent presence in the 
remainder of the text. The torture in this central scene becomes the haunting stakes of his 
split personality. His alter ego actively participates in State violence while the Remy 
whom the reader knows can only passively and intermittently object to it. 
While Parable of the Talents focuses on victims’ experience of extralegal 
violence in a broad historical perspective, The Zero satirizes the participation and 
complicity of individuals and the nation in the excess of the Global War on Terror. To 
this end, Remy’s representative function shifts in scale throughout the text. As the 
espionage and romance portions of the plot progress, Remy is mostly an individual 
character living a bizarre existence. Yet at many points Remy stands in for the American 
people as a whole. But Walter first introduces him as a weird archetype of the State 
agent. 
This characterization occurs almost immediately after Remy’s suicide attempt. 
Alerted by the gunshot, his neighbor says she wants to “call the police,” Remy replies, “I 
am the police” (Walter, Zero 4). This statement is not simply a practical utterance in this 
scene. Remy’s self-identification to his neighbor is also his first moment of identification 
to the reader. Though he parrots his neighbor’s commonplace idiom “the police” back to 
her, his words nevertheless cast his character as a representative of this collective entity, 
“the police,” rather than a single agent, a police officer. Without further detail as to his 
particular role or jurisdiction as a police agent, Remy fleetingly aligns himself with the 
58 
 
entirety of the police apparatus. Still, this statement is simultaneously a passing idiomatic 
response and a central act of symbolic development of Remy’s function in the novel, 
despite the dissonances between these two readings. In fact, the ambivalence of meaning 
in this statement foreshadows the ambivalence of the narrative’s larger allegory. Much 
like the question of Remy’s own agency and responsibility as his brain vacillates between 
his consciousness and his alter ego’s, the novel’s symbolic content remains largely in a 
zone of ambiguity, caught between representing the travails of one man and the country’s 
without offering a clear means for deciding between the two. 
The stakes for all of Remy’s representative functions remains the State’s 
extralegal torture. He only briefly visits a site of torture, a ship in international waters, but 
this short section becomes a fulcrum for the novel. This episode begins as Remy finds 
himself taken to the ship without any explanation. His boat pilot celebrates their 
boundary crossing away from U. S. territory with three Cuban cigars, casting an 
indulgent, luxurious but only mildly prurient atmosphere over the beginning of this part 
of the text, as if the soon to be revealed torture is a similarly arbitrarily regulated vice. 
Walter describes the torture chamber, writing, 
Remy followed and they entered a long, narrow compartment, with 
chipped paint on the walls and a low, flaking ceiling, all of it illuminated 
by a bright, bare bulb in the center. There was no furniture, just a metal 
pole parallel to the ground, like a banister, or a high ballet bar, stretching 
the width of the room, about five feet off the ground. Remy gasped. 
There, on the bar, a man was perched like a trophy, hanging 
forward, his arms tied behind his back and slung on the bar so that it held 
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him by the armpits, his feet against the wall dangling a few inches from 
the floor. The man was wearing nothing but a pair of tight red briefs and 
one white sock. It was cold and clammy in the room and his thick chest 
hair was wet and matted. A bucket of water sat below his feet. His 
shoulders and clavicles rose to points well above his head, which hung 
limply, bushy black hair dripping wet. Two other men were leaning 
against the opposite wall, bored-looking young men in jeans and plain 
sweatshirts, with short haircuts, standing guard, laughing at a private joke. 
“Hey, fellas. You takin’ a break?” 
“We thought we should save you some. Guy’s an hour from being 
jerky.” One of the big guys walked over, got a tin cup out of the bucket, 
and threw water on the man’s face. His head rose slowly. Remy could see 
cuts on his cheeks and forehead and lips, and guessed it was salt water 
they’d thrown on him. The man looked around wildly, his eyes finally 
settling on Remy, who had to look down at the ground. (133) 
Later, Walter writes, “The man stunk like urine and sweat” (136). This extended passage 
signifies both the sinister and casual nature of this interrogation. The dark, spartan, and 
industrial aesthetic of the chamber meets readers’ expectations for the secretive practices 
of government violence. Remy’s gasp is an almost unnecessary prelude to the revelation 
about the prisoner Assan’s treatment. Even without descriptions of directly violent acts, 
the scene reveals a number of “enhanced interrogation techniques,” including the use of 
“stress positions” and forced exposure to “cold weather environments.” Remy’s gasp 
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invites the reader to share in his surprised repulsion at the scene, to react to what the text 
treats as a sudden but strangely banal spectacle. 
Like the novel’s overall treatment of Remy’s undercover intrigues and terrorist 
plots, the tension in this scene arrives not from a revelation that justifies unconstitutional 
treatment of a prisoner but from Remy’s discomfort and bewilderment that are then 
projected on to the reader. The guards’ blasé attitude in this scene reflects Markham’s 
and other characters’ casual approach to the violent aspects of their duties. Once 
Markham takes over the interrogation with Remy silently in tow, he proceeds to threaten 
and intimidate Assan with a number of absurd clichés. He refers to himself and Remy as 
the “closers” and the “varsity” (134). Markham’s frequent use of sports euphemisms and 
metaphors throughout the novel casts him in a juvenile light, as if detainment and torture 
were a competitive game with comparable stakes. 
The simile comparing Assan to “a trophy” evokes a number of disquieting 
associations. The man most immediately resembles a hunting trophy, a dead animal 
acquired through a so-called sporting process, put on display as a boastful 
commemoration of the hunt. The guard’s ambiguous comment that Assan is almost 
“jerky” associates him with processed meat. The word “trophy” also implies a broader 
sense of competitive victory, as if Assan’s torture is not simply part of the means to 
victory in the War on Terror but a perverse artifact of a victory already accomplished 
through the violent assertion of U.S. imperialism and State power. This “wild,” 
dehumanized trophy commemorates the victory over limitations to State violence. 
 Walter’s quick portrayal of Assan’s torture reflects the widely accepted critical 
understanding of torture. He is “an hour from being jerky,” no longer in control of his 
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body’s responses to stimuli. Like in Parable of the Talents, the torture reduces Assan into 
a condition, as Scarry writes, “mimetic to death.”  The violence unhinges his subjectivity 
so that he may become a pliable object for the State. The motivation behind Assan’s 
torture, however, differs from that behind Olamina’s. Though the reader later learns that 
Assan is innocent of wrongdoing, Markham’s agency extralegally detains him in order to 
interrogate him. Assan’s detention is part of a cycle of the State’s will to power; as Pyle 
claims, for a significant number of detainees in the War on Terror, “The cruelties and 
degradations were meant to extract confessions, true or false, in order to justify continued 
detentions” (xi). In Intimate Violence (1994), Laura Tanner describes torture and other 
violence as using a victim’s body “as a blank text on which an insecure individual’s 
worldview maybe be written” (4). In a novel about one individual’s search for meaning 
embedded in the government’s endless search and overwrought interpretation for 
information, the critical analogy of a body functioning as a text to be written on or 
interpreted gains new stakes. Tanner describes the body as a material epistemological 
“anchor,” not unlike text, in a world of contingent, ever-shifting meanings (35). The 
greater implication is at what point does the interpretative practice of torture become one 
of constructing rather than discovering meaning? Tanner, Scarry, Williams, and others 
argue that the imposition of meaning on bodies through force works reflexively to justify 
that force. The absurdly useless investigations in The Zero that rely on speculative 
reading and torture practices also suggests as much. 
 The additional subtle irony here is the parallelism between Assan’s torture and 
Christ’s crucifixion. The prisoner is adorned not unlike the traditional crucifix figure, 
except for the mildly absurd single sock that inevitably evokes commonplace, mundane 
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displeasure at nearly every person’s experience of misplacing that second sock. A Middle 
Eastern man like Christ, Assan is tortured by government agents—part of neo-imperialist 
national policy. But, while Christ’s torture was a public spectacle, Assan’s suffering is 
private and hidden from both the public and the text itself. Remy enters the torture 
chamber during a “break,” avoiding a scene of more active torture only suggested by the 
text’s reference to cuts on Assan’s face. Christ’s torture became part of a powerful 
narrative of redemption, but Assan’s torture provides nothing but his flesh as fuel for the 
violent, unchecked bureaucracy running the War on Terror. 
 Like Olamina, however, Assan is not a conveniently pliable object, despite his 
torture. In resistance to Markham’s interrogation, Assan asks him and Remy, “Are you 
some kind of police?” Markham replies, “No. We’re no kind of police” (134). 
Markham’s reply carries a sense of negativity or absence. By coyly saying that they are 
“no kind of police” to further unnerve his captive, the agent also implies the nature of his 
power and authority. The phrase “no kind of police” negates their status as “police,” but 
for this phrase to generate this meaning it still requires the invocation of policing as an 
absent presence. Moreover, the phrase more concretely signifies that Markham and Remy 
do not belong to a particular category or “kind” of police. Their agency has clearly taken 
on police powers in a broad sense, using State-sanctioned force to detain and interrogate 
prisoners, but Markham and Remy’s roles supersede any common American definition of 
police as well as traditional notions of police powers’ regulation and limitations. They are 
indeed not police but the police’s violent specter, revising Remy’s first line of dialogue in 
the novel, “I am the police.” At this point, Remy’s alter ego and his colleagues have 
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become part of a State apparatus evolved beyond Remy’s first colloquial usage of the 
word “police,” not in opposition to it. 
 When Assan invokes his legal rights to Markham, the agent’s reply also evokes 
the spectral though absent presence of law. Assan declares, “There are laws!”, but 
Markham replies, “True enough. . . . Two hundred yards west of here, anyway. But out 
here—” (135). Markham means to suggest that no court hold legal jurisdiction over 
international waters. The agent’s sudden silence suggests that to even speak of “law” in 
this locale is not appropriate. Of course, this suggestion is not quite accurate; a number of 
American and international laws pertain to Markham and Assan’s situation, even in the 
jurisdiction of international waters. But Markham’s truncated statement elides the fact 
that a panoply of laws exist to regulate his actions. In fact, the 1984 U.N. Convention 
against Torture requires that signatories must prosecute torture undertaken in any 
territory or by any person under the State’s jurisdiction (Pallitto 172). As the reader 
continues to learn, Markham and Remy’s agency operates with little oversight. As a 
space of exception, the ship and its current location, Markham declares, are beyond any 
enforcing entity. 
 The episode on the ship results in the novel’s most profound moment of Remy’s 
inadvertent complicity with the State’s torture regime. He begins to protest and then 
decides to escape with Assan. Yet he discovers that he has only been playing a role to 
gain Assan’s confidence as part of a feigned rescue attempted planned by his alter ego. 
Although Remy tries to resist the violent machinations around him, both his actions and 
words of protest are coopted into the very structures that he is weakly struggling against. 
When Remy protests what has been happening, Markham replies, “Yeah, yeah. I know. 
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It’s sloppy. My apologies” (136). Markham converts Remy’s words from their meaning 
of ethical protest to a critique of their torture program’s efficiency, interpreting Remy’s 
sentiment as a call for better torture rather than no torture. 
 Assan’s fictional experience proves fairly representative of much of what has 
been occurring during the War on Terror. Like many detainees, he is uninvolved in 
terrorist activities and his violent interrogation is entirely useless for producing 
information. Williams claims that 
not only is the US running an extra-legal, offshore concentration camp 
where it beats, starves, rapes, and otherwise tortures people it has 
kidnapped from around the world—but a great many of the people being 
so mistreated have no connection to terrorism. Some substantial portion of 
the prisoners—perhaps ‘only’ one-tenth, perhaps more than two-thirds—
have done nothing at all to offend the US government or harm its citizens. 
(64) 
Numerous reports from government agencies and other sources indicate that torture sites 
are not effective at producing accurate intelligence (53, 245). 
 Torture’s inefficacy is not new knowledge. In fact, as Tzvetan Todorov writes, 
“Philosophers throughout Western history, including Aristotle, Beccaria, Montaigne and 
Hobbes, have noted that confessions (of the lack thereof) tell us much about the 
resistance capabilities of the torture individual but that the information thus obtained is 
not very dependable” (51). Even in a 1983 CIA manual, “use of force” is described as “a 
poor technique” that “yields unreliable results” (Pallitto 166). Of course, “force” is 
relative here, but even torture’s expert practitioners recognize the inefficacy of an 
65 
 
extreme degree of coercion and violence. The 2014 U.S. Senate Torture Report cites the 
CIA’s own knowledge of torture’s inefficacy (vi). Williams further reports that detainees 
as Guantanamo Bay “are rewarded for confessing—to crimes, terrorist attacks, politics 
activities, religious beliefs, both factual and fanciful” (57). Such practices, Williams 
notes, are expressly forbidden in international law. He writes, “The [Geneva] 
Conventions do allow for the questioning of prisoners, but prohibit granting privileges to 
those who cooperate, or punishing those who refuse” (58). These ultimately exceptional 
tactics, parodied in Walter’s novel, proves ineffective for producing actual information in 
response to the declared necessity of torture and coercion. Instead, these practices seem 
to operate to create submissive bodies for the purpose of their submissiveness, not their 
information. The torture regimes of both Walter’s fiction and our reality function as the 
demonstration and maintenance of State power rather than the search for truth. 
 A number of factors enable the consistent practice of this kind of torture and State 
violence during the War on Terror and other moments of American history. As in the 
novel and reality, occlusion from public scrutiny is a powerful tactic. But much of The 
Zero emphasizes how easily these exceptional tactics and spaces are authorized when the 
State declares them a necessity, whether facilely or not. 
 
Exceptional Actors: State Agents and Spectral Necessity 
Due to Remy’s status in the narrative as an agent of the State, readers encounter 
other, less naïve agents. The text provides a satirical window upon the nature of 
intelligence operations in the War on Terror. While Walter ultimately places more 
emphasis in the novel on managers like Markham and Remy who authorize torture rather 
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than on torturers and their victims, torture and other violence remains the stakes of The 
Zero. At the center of Walter’s critique are the logic and discourse of “necessity” that the 
State and its agents use to justify its exceptional tactics. 
 The character that most clearly represents an executive statesman figure in the 
novel is the Boss. He remains unnamed, but he is without a doubt a stand-in for Rudy 
Giuliani, Mayor of New York City in the years around the September 11
th
 attacks. He is 
responsible for assigning Remy to the Office of Liberty and Recovery and assigning its 
priorities. But more importantly, the text clearly aligns the Boss with President George 
W. Bush, acting as a representative of sovereign State authority. In the following passage, 
the Boss even suggests that he has the ear of the “Decider-in-Chief,” as Bush once styled 
himself. The Boss’s dialogue even mimics the rhetoric of the Bush administration. 
In the face of Remy’s confusion and doubts about the ethics of his intelligence 
work, the Boss declares “necessity” as the rationale for extralegal tactics. Walter writes, 
Remy leaned in close to the Boss. “I may have done some . . . 
really bad things, sir.” 
 The Boss pointed his finger at Remy’s face. “Look, don’t you for a 
minute doubt yourself, Brian. I know for a fact you haven’t done anything 
that wasn’t necessary. In fact, I’ve heard”—he paused—“unofficially . . . 
very good things . . . from the top.” (117) 
Knowing “for a fact,” the Boss alludes to authoritative knowledge without actually 
divulging it. He may indeed possess intelligence and rationales for this statement. But he 
expects Remy to accept the credibility of his facts based on his authority alone. 
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By referring to the necessity of extralegal violence, the Boss continues a pattern in 
twentieth- and twenty-first century government in which States declare the suspension of 
law to be an uncontested necessity prescribed by circumstances. As Agamben’s close 
attention to this concept shows, State necessity is central to legitimizing a state of 
exception. The problem in this dynamic is that only the State wields the power and 
authority to declare the end of an official state of emergency’s necessity. Just as the Boss 
remains unaccountable to Remy, so has the Executive Branch remained largely 
unaccountable to the American people in deciding what actions are truly necessary or not. 
Instead, like Remy we are offered spectral reassurances that “facts,” which cannot be 
shared, indicate what is necessary. 
 The rhetoric of necessity has been a potent discursive tool for justifying torture in 
the War on Terror. Popularized by the television show 24 (2001-10) and other media, the 
so-called “ticking time bomb” scenario remains the crux of arguments in support of 
torturing detainees. In such a case, a detainee has crucial information that could prevent 
immediate violence, thus the ethical transgression of torture proves less egregious than 
allowing innocents to suffer. Numerous critics, however, have reasoned that this kind of 
scenario is not, in fact, a common real world situation (Todorov 43). Moreover, as even 
CIA materials explain, only in fiction does torture prove a consistently reliable source of 
information. 
 Of course, a plethora of legislation, court decisions, and Congressional and 
Executive authorization have given the color of law to U.S. practices in the War on 
Terror. As I argue in the context of Butler’s novel, according to Agamben a state of 
exception blurs the distinction between law and its absence, seeming to reconcile the 
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legal norms of citizenship rights, for example, while enabling the violation of those 
rights, particularly those against cruel and unusual punishment, enumerated in the Eight 
Amendment. Such is apparent in the treatment of prisoners in The Zero and hundreds of 
documented cases of alleged prisoner abuse at the hands of military and intelligence 
agencies in the years after 2001 (Pyle 2). 
 As Walter demonstrates through his portrayal of the Boss, the manipulation of 
language proves central to the continued justification for a state of exception. Early in the 
novel Remy finds himself in a meeting with the Boss about his new assignment to the 
Office of Liberty and Recovery. Near the end of this scene, Walter writes, “[The Boss] 
rubbed his mouth and launched into a version of his inspiring speech again, but after a 
while it seemed to devolve into random words. ‘. . . courage . . . liberty . . . reconstruction 
. . . resilience . . . faith . . . spending . . .’” (55). The text’s irony here is that the reader can 
easily reconstruct what appears to be the Boss’s jumbled meaning through these 
buzzwords that appear repeatedly in neoconservative narratives in support of the War on 
Terror and its violent excesses. The Boss’s words work like floating signifiers, 
capaciously empty utterances that operate without a determinate referent but nevertheless 
absorb meaning. His words generate an abstract narrative in his audience’s minds, 
creating non-specific conceptual justification for concrete action. 
These kind of nonsensical utterances that still manage to generate meaning are 
immediately reminiscent of President Bush’s own style of speaking. Walter includes the 
following quotes, famous Bush-isms, as motivational posters around the Office of Liberty 
and Recovery: “Our enemies should know this about the American people, which will not 
rest until Evil is defeated,” and “draw your strength from the collective courage and 
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resilientness” (157, 294). The author reminds readers that this kind of empty verbiage is 
directly connected to the violence that Remy, Markham, and other U.S. agents undertake 
outside legal norms. 
Indeed, the excess of meaning in the Boss’s rhetoric parallels the dynamic of 
excessive violence in the U.S. government’s spaces of exception like the torture chamber 
on the cargo ship. The meaning of his words escape the structure of signification in a 
manner similar to how the actions of Markham and his cronies exist beyond the formal 
structure of law. Agamben argues that during a state of exception when law is suspended, 
the State’s agents wield what Agamben terms “force-of-law,” the power of law without 
legal regulation (State 39). Assan’s interrogation on the ship is an example of this 
concept. Essentially, this force-of-law acts as a “floating signifier” without a determinate 
referent (38). Thus the State removes itself from the limits of law without sacrificing 
law’s power. The State’s ability to wield the force-of-law under the guise of law enables 
the “essential fiction” that the State still remains bound inside the order of law even 
during its suspension (86). In other words, once law becomes treated like a floating 
signifier to be interpreted at will, exceptional violence becomes readily available. 
 The Bush administration’s approach to the meaning of the word “torture” 
epitomizes the dangerous flexibility of language and law in the hands of the State. The 
infamous “Torture Memo” by the Department of Justice epitomizes how the Bush 
administration capitalized on the shifting meanings of words. Todorov reports that, in 
response to public pressure and the possibility of interrogators’ prosecution, the 
document works to redefine the legal definition of torture to exclude those “enhanced 
interrogation techniques” practiced at Guantanamo and elsewhere (26). As Pyle points 
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out, President Bush transformed laws about the treatment of prisoners into a matter of 
flexible policy when he declared that “the U.S. Armed Forces shall continue to treat 
detainees humanely” “to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity” 
(30). One tactic used by the Bush administration was “claiming that only the most severe 
actions—such as inflicting pain equivalent to ‘organ failure’—constituted torture,” thus 
excluding from this definition acts like waterboarding that have been described as torture 
since the fifteenth century and outlawed by the Mississippi Supreme Court, of all states 
(Pallitto 9; Pyle 87; Dickerson 247). Studying Defense Department policy, Williams 
concludes that “people at the highest levels of government deliberately rewrote the 
definition of torture and reconceived the restraints that it would imply for the sole 
purpose of allowing harsher methods” (69). In 2002 President Bush declared that he 
would not suspend the Geneva Conventions, though captives would not be considered 
prisoners of wars under the letter of the law; instead the “principles of Geneva” would be 
applied, another floating signifier that has legitimated abuse (64). The Supreme Court and 
White House legally restricted the definition of torture and other cruel or unusual 
violence so that for acts to be considered within these categories, “harm had to be 
traceable to some intentional act, a linkage that, in nearly all cases, would be impossible 
to prove in court,” a precedent established in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber 
(1947) reinforced by the U.S. Senate’s 1990 Reservations to the U.N. Convention against 
Torture (C. Dayan 186, 192; Pyle 88; Pallitto 130, 173).  
Ultimately, the Bush administration’s torture policies creates a paradox of 
American legal norms, creating justification through “necessity” in some circumstances 
for what the law has deemed unjustifiable in any circumstances. Tom Malinowski 
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captures this dissonance in his essay within collection Torture (2005) by Human Rights 
Watch in which he creates an extensive list of practices of State violence titled, “Torture 
Techniques Approved by the United States while Condemned in Other Countries” (142). 
In this section I have emphasized the figure of the State as the perpetrator of these 
exceptional practices. But as Walter claims of his novel, “It’s not about our leaders or our 
government or the NSA . . . It’s about us” (Walter, “Q&A”). The Zero reminds readers 
that, despite increasing executive authority over the last several decades, the American 
State and its excesses remain licensed by the American people, whom Walter does not 
refrain from viciously satirizing alongside government agents. 
 
Satirizing Cultures of Complicity 
 Despite focusing on characters involved in the counterintelligence for the War on 
Terror, Jess Walter repeatedly describes The Zero as a “satire about us” in interviews 
(Walter, “Zero”). The author constructs a broader allegory around Remy’s bumbling 
escapades and dissociations from reality. In the figure of Remy and his odd mental 
condition, Walter is able to suture representations of both an agent of the State and an 
American everyman. He acknowledges his creation of Remy as an “archetypal figure for 
all Americans” (Walter, “Q&A”). As a result, The Zero’s critique does not simply 
condemn the excesses and ethical violations of the Bush administration. Instead, by 
directly connecting a sense of the nation with extralegal State violence through Remy’s 
character, Walter demonstrates how readers are similarly complicit alongside Remy in 
U.S. regimes of terror and torture. 
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From the first paragraph, the novel links Remy’s personal physical and psychic 
trauma with the attack on the World Trade Center. The opening imagery is a long 
paragraph description of “[b]urning scraps of paper” (3) falling to the earth that certainly 
evokes debris falling from the Twin Towers when beginning a novel marketed on the rear 
book jacket as “A NOVEL OF SEPTEMBER 12.” Through only a paragraph break, the 
text then transitions into the scene of Remy’s apartment after his attempted suicide. The 
description of falling, burning paper is enough to prompt readers’ associations with 
World Trade Center, but the text does not include geographical or temporal details in this 
passage. As a result, this first paragraph’s imagery about communal trauma and its 
proximity in the text to Remy’s personal trauma intimately link his narrative with the 
city’s and the nation’s. His narrative about his loss of agency and identity alongside the 
machinations of his alter ego becomes a disjointed allegory for the nation’s same losses 
and confusion in the early twenty-first century. 
The reader is left to assume that Remy’s alter ego channels feelings of personal 
and national loss into Remy’s participation in the Office of Liberty and Recovery. The 
episode on the ship results in the novel’s most profound moment of Remy’s inadvertent 
complicity with the government’s self-declared mandate for violence. Just as on the ship 
when Remy protests Assan’s torture, Markham and others repeatedly reverse the polarity 
of Remy’s half-formed statements into expressions of approval. They also treat his 
ignorance—the result of his temporal “skips”—as an ironically stylized performance of 
his knowledge and authority. In fact, the text suggests that the effectiveness of the 
Remy’s unintentional ruse as he helps Assan escape is due to his real empathy for the 
abused man. His conscious empathy appears to paradoxically aid his unconscious 
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malevolence. Another character remarks, “This guy is good . . . Scary good. He had me 
convinced,” as if this particular interrogation technique would not have worked as well 
without the schism in Remy’s character (140). 
The scene on the ship marks the end of Part One, setting the tone for the rest of 
the novel as Remy makes a final protest to Markham, “I’m serious. You need to let him 
go” (140). The text provides no qualifying description of this line of dialogue to indicate 
a sense of tone, force, or affect, leaving the impression that Remy’s protest is, in fact, 
quite weak and indicative of his half-hearted, futile resistance. Regardless of Remy’s 
intentions in his words—unrevealed in the text—Markham completely deflates this last 
attempt when he responds facetiously, “Of course,” with a smile. Of Remy’s response to 
the whole ruse, Walter writes, “He would have liked to be more surprised” (140). A 
hidden part of Remy’s self—thanks to the plot device of his apparent brain damage—
insists on participating in the narrative that torture is an essential practice, and this 
narrative is so influential or even overwhelming that it absorbs Remy’s every act of 
counter-narrative to break free from this role into which his jingoistic side continues to 
draw him. As Walter writes just before the ship episode, “Remy knew that if he waited 
long enough . . . whatever was going to happen would happen” (129). According to the 
pattern of the novel thus far, this statement seems self-evident to both Remy and the 
reader. His choices have little to no impact on the course of the narrative. 
The most chilling moment in the text arrives when Remy tries to directly 
influence the behavior of his alter ego. He writes a note to himself on the back of a card 
and keeps it in his pocket: “Don’t hurt anyone” (181). A few pages later Remy finds a 
response written to himself: “Grow up” (190). Not only does Remy fail to influence the 
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action of people who are his subordinates, but he also is incapable of mastering his own 
penchant for violence. 
Remy increasingly discovers that he and his alter ego might be involved in 
supporting real terrorist attacks on American soil, adding a new layer to his complicity. 
Remy’s actions do indeed culminate in the killing of several innocent informants and a 
subway bombing instigated almost entirely by Remy’s agency, the FBI, and CIA to 
justify the War on Terror. Late in the novel before these final incidents, Remy expresses 
his concerns to the Boss. This dialogue echoes Remy’s earlier sentiment that events will 
occur regardless of his intervention. Remy worries, 
“That I’m causing something bad to happen.” 
The Boss laughed. “That you’re causing it? That’s a little 
grandiose, isn’t it? . . . Whatever is happening now was going to happen 
whether we were involved or not. We’ve always known that another attack 
was inevitable.” (298) 
Like the Boss’s rhetoric of necessity, his statement about inevitability works to justify the 
violence he has authorized Remy and others to undertake. But, importantly, Remy does 
not need an authority figure to reassure him that events are out of his control. He has 
already adopted this same kind of language earlier in the novel, and he repeatedly 
acknowledges how events seem to unfold in one direction despite his willing 
participation or active protests. 
Walter uses this episode and Remy’s narrative throughout the novel to satirize the 
scattered cultural moments in which Americans speak out against their own 
government’s violent practices. The absurdity of others’ reactions to Remy’s protests and 
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ignorance draws the reader’s to a larger, more mundane problem in our democratic 
republic. This fact of the text suggests that the moments when Americans collectively 
protest publicized incidents of torture do not disrupt regimes of violence but rather 
reinforce them. Metaphorically trying to save one man, as Remy tries to do on the ship, 
pushes these structures that authorize violence to, as Markham puts it, be less “sloppy,” 
to finagle further political and legal nuances to legitimate their practices, however 
abhorrent they be to the average citizen witnessing them for the first time. Incidental 
protest does not eliminate torture; instead, it prompts “clean torture.” Williams points to a 
number of surveys from 2004 and 2005 to show that somewhere between thirty-two and 
forty-six percent of Americans believe that “torture” in the abstract is “acceptable in the 
context of the War on Terror” (Williams 21). But when the idea of torture is parsed into 
actual practices like sleep deprivation and “threatening prisoners with dogs,” a majority 
of respondents found these inhumane tactics—labeled as torture by critics—acceptable 
and not considered “torture” of a constitutionally or otherwise prohibited kind (21). 
 Near the beginning of the novel’s second part after the torture episode on the ship, 
the text offers a reflection on his condition and situation, contemplating the possibility 
that Remy’s circumstances are not exceptional but quite normal. Walter writes, 
Maybe that was the answer. To float in this life, like paper on a current. 
Just lie back and let himself be . . . Maybe this was not some condition he 
had, but a life, and maybe every life is lived moment to moment. Doesn’t 
everyone react to the world as it presents itself? Who really knows more 
than the moment he’s in? What do you trust? Memory? History? No, these 
are just stories, and whichever ones we choose to tell ourselves—the one 
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about our marriage, the one about the Berlin Wall—there are always gaps. 
There must be countless men all over the country crouched in front of 
barbeques, just like him, wondering how their lives got to that point. (160) 
This moment of reflection in the novel clearly works to reassure Remy, converting his 
inability to take real action on the ship into a placating philosophy of life. When he fails 
to intervene in his new agency’s institutional violence, he reimagines his failure as the 
natural course of events. Remy’s situation and this rationalization of it are a satirical 
intensification of the political and ethical agency of “every life” and “countless men all 
over the country.” 
This particular passage highlights the novel’s allegorical work, asking the reader 
to associate Remy’s experience in some way to the fragmented narratives through which 
so many Americans live during the War on Terror. Walter further implicates the reader, 
ambiguously using the second-person pronoun “you” in the rhetorical question “What do 
you trust?” This pronoun slippage out of the novel’s otherwise consistent third-person 
narration continues as the narrator uses the words “we,” “ourselves,” and “our.” While 
this usage is not uncommon in such moments of abstract reflection, this momentary shift 
in discourse nevertheless implicates the reader in Remy’s contemplations. His 
disorientation stands in for our national disorientation in which “memory” and “history” 
lose context and relationships between cause and effect. 
Walter connects this national problem to the more mundane nature of our lives in 
the juxtaposed examples of “our marriage” and the “Berlin Wall.” At best, the text 
suggests, we generate insufficient narratives for linking the events of personal lives and 
our national life. By invoking the Berlin Wall, Walter also conjures the specter of the 
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Cold War, further suggesting that the “stories” we individually and collectively tell 
ourselves do not adequately explain the historical progression from that twentieth-century 
global conflict to our current one. While, for Remy, this passages works to abdicate his 
own responsibility for his and his alter ego’s actions, the text has the reverse effect on the 
reader since every American is not, in fact, afflicted with the satirical device of this 
character’s neurological disorder. 
 Throughout Part Two, Remy continues to justify his complicity. He suggests that 
the disconnection between his own will and the events in which he participates is, in fact, 
the normal state of American life. Walter writes, 
[P]erhaps life had returned to normal, and that normal was a string 
of single moments disconnected from one another . . . All over the city, all 
over the country, people rose from bed and scurried and fought and 
returned at night to sleep, independent of any meaning except the rising, 
scurrying, fighting, and sleeping. . . .  
This is a life, he thought, smooth skipping stones bounding across 
the surfaces of time, with brief moments of deepened consciousness as 
you hit the water before going airborne again. (163) 
As Walter says, Remy is “the only one aware of his own condition, which he comes to 
believe the rest of the world shares but just doesn’t recognize” (Walter, “Conversation” 
106). He imagines that all the mundane activity of the human race proceeds in the same 
manner as Remy’s involvement with State violence. This passage suggests, again, that 
Remy is not culpable for his involvement in extralegal violence. But it also further 
suggests that torture and fabricating terrorist plots are just as banal as the daily 
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“scurrying” of the average person. Remy diffuses his own responsibility for his 
participation in torture by spreading it across an entire culture, claiming a naturalized 
ignorance of cause and effect. 
 Upon the close ethical scrutiny that The Zero invites, readers must reject these 
kinds of assertions from Remy. Readers are prompted to dissociate from Remy, to resist 
accepting his condition as their own. Walter cites the moral necessity for confronting 
torture and other post-9/11 actions as part of his motivation for writing the novel. He 
says, “We need to wake up” after being “anesthetized,” calling his readers to refuse to 
acquiesce to Remy’s kin of passivity (Walter, “Q&A”). This ethical awakening is the 
work of so many texts, fictional and non-fictional, about State violence, but the question 
remains, how effective is the science fiction and satire of Parable of the Talents and The 
Zero in accomplishing this goal? 
 
Conclusion: Text and Torture 
Without question these two novels work toward a social or political effect upon 
their readers. On one level, the fictional representation of violence always encounters an 
ethical quandary. Laura Tanner argues that a reader’s relationship to a victim of violence 
in text risks reproducing the relationship between violator and victim, taking the position 
of a voyeur finding degrees of pleasure in suffering (9-10). Writers and readers of both 
fictional and non-fictional accounts of State violence are inevitability at a remove, unable 
to gain full ethical understanding of torture’s experience. Concentration camp survivor 
Primo Levi even goes as far as to claim in The Drowned and the Saved that the only 
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people with total comprehension of what State violence entails are the ones who do not 
survive its totality. Butler’s and Walter’s novels approach this quandary differently. 
In Talents, Butler depicts writing as a form of resistance to the Crusaders’ 
attempts to render her into a condition mimetic of death. Throughout Olamina’s captivity 
at Camp Christian she declares multiple times in her text the necessity of keeping a 
record of what is happening to her and her peers (185, 208, 223, 232, 238). Yet Butler, 
through Olamina, recognizes the challenge of adequately representing the full, complex 
reality of the extreme abuses occurring there in the comparatively flat medium of text. 
Olamina desires that “there ought to be a different way to write about these things—a 
way that at least begins to express the insanity and the terrible, terrible pain of it all” 
(190). This trouble of representation becomes an even larger concern for the novel; while 
within the text Olamina attempts to authentically document her real experiences, Butler is 
working to engage with real practices and histories of torture through this fictionalized 
account. But by presenting such meditations on the efficacy of text, the author raises her 
readers’ awareness of this problem of representation. The novel invites readers to become 
active, somewhat skeptical participants while engaging scenes of torture rather than 
positioning readers as passive voyeurs. 
Jess Walter, in contrast, almost completely subverts this same problem by 
representing very little of torture itself. In fact, the text nearly simulates the average 
reader’s relationship to torture as something in the background, barely seen. Unlike 
Butler’s novel and others, The Zero bypasses representation of torture to focus on the 
social and political structures that enable it. Despite their different approaches to 
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moments of violence, however, both Butler’s and Walter’s texts use narrative strategies 
to engage readers in the dismantling in systems of torture. 
Butler uses the model of Olamina’s Earthseed religion to explore the possibility of 
reshaping communities and even nations away from patterns of exploitative violence. For 
Butler, of course, the process of reshaping communities is intertwined with the shaping of 
oneself. She writes that being part of a community is a process of “reshaping ourselves” 
(Talents 66). Through this assertion, she calls for readers to assert their individual agency 
in addressing problems of violence in which they may even be a participant. 
Butler makes this problem one of the human condition but also offers an appeal to 
the human condition to solve it (Talents 80). Near the novel’s end, Butler contemplates 
human nature and historical cycles of violence like the situations in which she deposits 
her characters. Focusing on war as apex of humanity’s cycles of destructive potential, she 
writes, “We go on having stupid wars . . . all they do is kill huge numbers of people, 
maim others, impoverish still more, spread disease and hunger, and set the stage for the 
next war.” She suggests that, “There seems to be solid biological reasons why we are the 
way we are. If there weren’t, the cycles wouldn’t keep replaying” (358). While the 
“human species is a kind of animal,” Butler asserts that humans have a choice for 
“reshaping” themselves and their worlds. Ultimately, storytelling and writing prove to be 
Olamina’s method to reshape human communities as they begin a utopian interstellar 
colonization plan far removed from the conditions of the Pox. 
Butler asserts as much throughout Talents. Its and its prequel’s titles invoke the 
potency of storytelling as a form of moral teaching, something that Olamina also 
recollects from her father’s days as a teacher and minister. Butler further includes a self-
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reflexive moment as Olamina considers the social and political significance of books in 
her world, indicating the significance of these objects in our reality as well. The author 
writes, “People are still impressed, even intimidated, by bound, official-looking books. . . 
. Even people who can’t read are impressed by books. The idea seems to be, ‘If it’s in a 
book, maybe it’s true,’ or even, ‘If it’s in a book, it must be true’” (Talents 75-6). With 
the advent of mobile Internet-capable devices, the power of books as textual objects does 
seem somewhat diminished in the twenty-first century. But even in the world of the Pox 
and Crusaders, Butler still places faith in books and narratives to foment ethical changes 
in individuals and communities. The success of Olamina’s text in uniting a fractured 
society points to Butler’s own optimism in the power of real books and other like 
narrative media. 
 The methods of the satirical project of The Zero, however, are more ambiguous. 
Satire itself often offers critique of political and social systems without offering 
generative alternatives, a problem further addressed regarding the satirical science fiction 
discussed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. Walter acknowledges the ambiguity of ethical 
change’s possibility in the novel, commenting that The Zero holds forth a Kafka-esque 
hope, quoting Kafka to say, “There is infinite hope. But not for us” (Walter, “Q&A”). 
The author certainly imagines little hope for Brian Remy.  
At the conclusion of The Zero, Walter depicts Remy as further distanced from the 
reality of unethical State violence. While in a delirious state, Remy recovers from his 
injuries from his failed attempt to stop the subway bombing at the novel’s climax. His 
mind fails to separate dreams, hallucinations, and reality as he goes in and out of 
consciousness while receiving medical treatment. He dreams that he receives a hospital 
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roommate and that the staff “put a television on for them both, a television that turned its 
own channels—slipping insanely from one reality to another,” tending “away from 
anything unpleasant” (325). Remy’s perception of the television mirrors his own 
condition of “skips” that carry him through time and keep him divorced from the full 
gritty reality of his role in government torture. By creating this parallelism between 
television and Remy’s life, Walter further suggests that mainstream, popular American 
culture is predisposed to shying “away from anything unpleasant” to an extent as nearly 
as irrevocable as Remy’s brain damage. Moreover, Walter adds that the television “could 
jump from channel to channel, from site to site, from wrenching tragedy to absurd 
comedy, with only the laugh track to differentiate them” (325). The mention of “site to 
site” incorporates the Internet into this metaphor, further elaborating the implication of 
American society in Remy’s condition. 
More importantly, however, the author suggests a loss of orientation for the 
already passive audiences of this television metaphor. Like Remy, we can no longer 
distinguish between tragedy and comedy except when we are offered facile cues like the 
tired “laugh track” of network programming. This metaphor continues the satirical work 
of the novel, linking Remy’s life with the wider phenomenon of complicity with regimes 
of State violence. As the novel’s last metaphor, however, it reinforces Remy’s failures 
and his incapacity to be an agent of his own fate or others’. Despite his heroic efforts a 
few pages earlier, he “clung to sleep” hoping that he will wake from his weird life as if it 
“had all been a kind of fever dream” (326). He retreats back into passivity after his 
attempts to escape from his life as a State agent have failed. 
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One can hope that the author’s choice to refuse redemption for his character is an 
effort to pressure his audience to resist a real, non-absurd version of Remy’s passive 
complicity. Yet the text does not offer alternatives. On the one hand, by leaving out a 
redemptive political program from the novel, Walter avoids the need to generate a 
schema that may prove inadequate or even possibly repeat the patterns that allow for 
unregulated State violence. On the other hand, without even experimenting with a 
cognitive, cultural, or philosophical method for breaking the patterns of “skips,” 
forgetfulness, and passive acceptance characteristic of much American culture, The Zero 
risks becoming a parody of itself. It, too, moves “from wrenching tragedy to absurd 
comedy,” functioning like one of Remy’s righteous but impotent outbursts of criticism. 
The text may nearly perfectly characterize America during the early years of the Global 
War on Terror, but unless readers seize their own initiative reaching beyond what they 
read, the text may only serve as a tool of observation rather than intervention. Perhaps the 
text’s assumption that readers are not condemned to Remy’s state is actually 
empowering, refusing to condescend to readers as Markham inadvertently does to Remy. 
Walter believes that “our complicity” in the violence and mistakes of the last two decades 
“begins with our country’s reaction” to the attacks on September 11 (Walter, “Zero”). In 





Chapter 2: The “Special Existence” of Bigger Thomas in “No Man’s Land”: 
The Ghetto as Space of Exception in Native Son 
 
Introduction 
In 1940, Richard Wright’s protest novel Native Son offered a window into the 
marginalized lives of African Americans in Northern cities. Through a narrative 
deploying free indirect discourse, Wright imagines the character Bigger Thomas, a young 
black man living in redlined, de facto segregated Chicago. The text presents Bigger as 
tragically affected by his environment of violence, exploitation, and despair. Boiling with 
fear and hate, he takes a job through an economic relief agency to work as a chauffeur for 
the wealthy white Dalton family. Despite the family’s espoused racial sympathies, the 
friction between the white and black worlds of Chicago drives Bigger to—more or less—
accidentally murder the young Mary Dalton. The “more or less” here is crucial, since the 
search for Bigger’s motive in the text has gone largely unrequited. Bigger temporarily 
covers up his crime, but a city-wide manhunt begins when he is discovered. In the course 
of his attempt to evade the police, Bigger also kills his girlfriend, a young African 
American woman named Bessie. The novel’s third part focuses on Bigger’s trial upon his 
capture by a racist prosecutor and a prejudiced court. 
The spaces inhabited by black lives are at the center of Native Son from the first 
page and onward. Wright offers the novel’s opening scene in the “narrow space” of the 
Thomas family’s apartment as a foreshadowing allegory for Bigger’s narrative (Native 3). 
Kadeshia Matthews recognizes the scene as one of “improper domesticity” filled with 
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strained relationships in an environment of disrepair that allegorizes the larger Black Belt 
(281). When a “huge black rat” violates the family’s living space, Bigger’s mother 
commands him as the oldest boy to kill the invader. At one moment in the combat, 
Wright writes, “The rat’s belly pulsed with fear. Bigger advanced a step and the rat 
emitted a long thin song of defiance” (Native 6). The rat in this scene closely parallels 
how his character is cast in the public eye once he kills Mary Dalton. In both contexts, 
the “huge black rat” and the black man are treated as out of place vermin, rather than as 
living beings caught up in uneven systems of life. Wright describes the rat’s sound as a 
“song,” offering it a poetic, melodious quality, something with intentional, possibly 
complex signification—a narrative like Bigger’s that its persecutors fail to grasp but that 
is left to readers to interpret. 
Wright introduces a master metaphor to conceptualize the relationship between 
Bigger and the spaces of his life. Three times in Native Son does Richard Wright invoke 
the fraught metaphor of “No Man’s Land” to describe Bigger’s state of mind as he lives 
in the Chicago ghetto, utilizing it again in the essay “How ‘Bigger’ Was Born” (1940) 
and his later novel, The Outsider (1953). He explains the metaphor as representing how 
Bigger “was hovering unwanted between two worlds—between powerful America and 
his own stunted place in life” (“How” 451). By defining the term as a space between two 
groups, Wright evokes the connotation of “No Man’s Land” from the First World War, 
that dangerous contested ground between opposing trench lines, machine guns, and 
artillery guarded by barbed wire. By definition the literal, real space from the war was 
under no government’s authority or law and was thus where soldiers found themselves 
most exposed. Choosing this model of violent lawlessness and translating it into Bigger’s 
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conception of himself and his daily life in the Black Belt, Wright casts Bigger’s inner life 
as existing in a kind of perpetual state of war. This martial metaphor of space establishes 
a dynamic of power and alienation in both the ghetto and the interior space of Bigger’s 
mind. 
Wright presents Bigger Thomas as one example of a “special existence” under the 
marker of his race. Early in Native Son, Wright describes Bigger’s vertiginous reaction as 
he feels his blackness beneath white gazes, even those of Jan and Mary Dalton who 
profess their sympathies for black lives. The author describes how Bigger “felt he had no 
physical existence at all right then; he was something he hated, the badge of shame which 
he knew was attached to a black skin. It was a shadowy region, a No Man’s Land, the 
ground that separated the white world from the black that he stood upon. He felt naked, 
transparent . . .” (67). In Bigger’s experience, the feeling of being recognized for his 
black skin is a sense of erasure of any identity beyond his race—feeling “naked” or 
“transparent.” Wright later describes him as “a dispossessed and disinherited man” with 
nothing to claim except shame or violence (“How” 446-7). He is conditioned to feel that 
his existence is evacuated of everything except his racial status—something less than 
human. The author’s choice of words is direct: Bigger feels that “he was something he 
hated, the badge of shame” of his skin color. He does not wear or represent a “badge of 
shame” in the text; he “was,” slipping into an existence as a marker of shame, the feeling 
of having done wrong in the eyes of others. 
By reading the novel through the lens of space, I also address the longstanding 
debate over the text’s form and its problematic protagonist, whether to read Bigger as an 
individual or universal figure. Instead of accepting a conflict between these two 
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perspectives, I argue that readers can recognize that Bigger is not posed as a universal 
figure but rather a person—albeit fictional—caught in vast structures of iniquity and 
violence. Epitomized by the ghetto as space of exception, those overwhelming, powerful 
systems that profit from Bigger’s degradation take on a universal aspect. To suggest that 
many individuals, fictional or real, might react to circumstances like Bigger’s in a similar 
manner should not detract our attention to those individuals as individuals. And yet, 
though Richard Wright presents readers with a specific context of Bigger’s life in 
segregated Chicago, part of the novel’s so-called universal aspect hinges on how Bigger 
circumstances are not unique to 1930s and ’40s Chicagoans or even black peoples in the 
U.S. The conflicts and language that overflows within the novel is part of a long and wide 
American literary and historical pattern. 
Representing the “special” conditions under which African Americans lived, 
Wright’s conceit of No Man’s Land closely mirrors other spatial metaphors and 
depictions of space in American literature—what I call “spaces of exception.” This 
chapter takes Native Son as a case study in the American literary representation of sites 
intended to contain and control racialized bodies. Focusing on contemporary events, 
American studies has emphasized Giorgio Agamben’s model for a “state of exception” 
and the spaces in which this model of political power is most evident: sites like death 
camps and torture chambers. Yet sites like urban ghettoes, reservations, internment 
camps, and deportation camps throughout U.S. history have functioned in a similar 
pattern in which legal and moral norms are suspended for a racist purpose coded as 
necessity. Space organized in order to contain or police racialized bodies are spaces of 
exception. By reading a novel somewhat distanced from our current political moment, my 
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purpose is to connect the contemporary scholarly focus on states of exception with 
established criticism of systematic American racism. Drone strikes, shadow courts, 
warrantless detention, and undeclared wars have drawn attention to the exceptional 
operations of the American State in recent scholarship. But by reading past canonical 
texts through a similar tact, we can discover how U.S. writers have long been concerned 
with these ethical and political problems, though in different terms and contexts. 
The novel presents these living conditions as a breeding ground in which people 
of color are simultaneously alienated from dominant society and from their own sense of 
being or value. In a 1937 essay titled “Blueprint for Negro Writing,” Wright describes the 
existence of African Americans under segregation and mass racism as a “special way of 
life.” He writes, “This special existence was forced upon them from without by lynch 
rope, bayonet and mob rule. They accepted these negative conditions with the 
inevitability of a tree which must live or perish in whatever soil it finds itself” (100). 
Wright uses the word “special” in ways that parallel the use of contemporary scholarship 
of the word “exceptional.” The African American “special way of life” is special because 
its enforced differentiation from a normalized ordinary—white—way of life becomes a 
norm inside the structures of power and law. 
Across his body of work, Wright reveals how black lives inhabit physical, 
political, economic, and even existential spaces of exception because they are excluded 
from the “idealism” of American nation. Wright assesses the spirit of our nation, writing, 
“We live by an idealism that makes us believe that the Constitution is a good document 
of government, that the Bill of Rights is a good legal and humane principle to safeguard 
our civil liberties, that every man and woman should have the opportunity to realize 
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himself, to seek his own individual fate and goal, his own peculiar and untranslatable 
destiny” (“How” 451). Bigger, however, is displaced from the possibility of this idealism, 
and the author undertakes to demonstrate how and why to the reader. And as the author 
emphasizes, this “special existence” is characterized by the looming threat of violence 
and “mob rule” that violates the democratic ideals articulated in the nation’s founding 
documents. 
In the previous chapter, I discussed how Octavia Butler’s Parable series evokes 
the American legacy of spaces of exception, including the various means to discipline 
people of color. Reading the Chicago Black Belt as a kind of exceptional space offers 
contemporary readers multiple insights into ongoing American history and literary 
representation. On the one hand, reading the novel through this critical lens connects past 
and present abuses of law and power. On the other hand, thinking through Wright’s 
representation of the ghetto as a space of exception also expands and adds layers of 
complexity to Agamben’s and others’ theories that focus on the more spectacular, 
obviously abnormal spaces of “camps.” Moreover, Wright’s emphasis on the exceptional 
or “special” nature of racially segregated spaces encompasses more than the State’s 
desires, implicating wider networks of power and influence in the degradation and 
exploitation of people of color. In parallel to the novel’s representation of the Black Belt, 
sociologist Loïc Wacquant claims that the two primary though conflicting goals of all 
ghettoes is both “labor extraction and social ostracization” (Wacquant, “Deadly” 99). 
Wright’s Chicago Black Belt offers a model of how private and public sector interests 
can be cooperatively engaged in maintaining the status of black life in its social and 
psychic No Man’s Land. 
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By juxtaposing this chapter and the previous one about torture sites, I approach 
the conceit of a “state of exception” as a spectrum that includes both spectacular and 
quotidian suspensions of legal and moral norms. Narratives like Wright’s demonstrate 
this connection between what Saidiya Hartman describes as “the terror of the mundane 
and the quotidian” of everyday racialized oppression and its culmination in “the shocking 
and the terrible” (Hartman 4). Native Son and similar texts remind readers in the age of 
social media and instant video that spectacular violence and its haunting, oppressive 
specter have a long entwined history. 
Wright displays this “special way of life” in Native Son by allowing uninitiated 
readers into not only the cordoned space of the ghetto but also the otherwise opaque 
space of Bigger’s mind. Granting access into these spaces, even in fictional form, proves 
crucial to the author’s project. Wright uses what he describes as the “potential cunning” 
of his art to “steal into the inmost recesses of the human heart” to portray the inner life of 
a young man so powerfully influenced by his oppressive environment (“Blueprint” 102). 
In fact, the space of the ghetto becomes a model for Bigger Thomas’s sense of self. 
Critical race studies have familiarized scholars with the kind of self-alienation that racial 
containment and discrimination are apt to breed. But, using numerous spatial metaphors, 
Wright goes further to represent Bigger’s inner life as seemingly structured like the very 







Blackness as an Exceptional Status 
Throughout Native Son, Richard Wright represents the internal life of a young 
black man cast outside the bounds of a fulfilled life of rights and freedoms. Late in the 
novel, the author succinctly expresses the nature of being black, even in a northern city 
like Chicago, in the first half of the twentieth century. Bigger goes through the motions of 
his arrest and trial, and Wright writes, “Had he not taken fully upon himself the crime of 
being black?” (Native 296). Bigger understands blackness as an illicit status within the 
structures of American life. Being black is not a literal crime, but by using this conceit 
Wright expresses the idea that African Americans are cast as living in opposition to the 
social, legal, and economic systems under which they live. Importantly, however, though 
a crime is defined as illicit activity, something marked as outside law’s bounds, crime is 
nevertheless defined by law. Crime, by definition, does not exist without law or other 
norms. Extending Saidiya Hartman’s nineteenth-century scholarship about slavery, 
Matthews declares that Bigger’s only availably form of “agency recognized by law” is 
“criminality” (295). Wright’s more abstract conceit, “the crime of being black,” 
represents very real relationships for African Americans. He reiterates this claim during 
Bigger’s trial when his lawyer argues, “His very existence is a crime against the state!” 
(Native 400). Like antebellum blacks, Bigger and his peers are continue to be 
marginalized but held close by structures of power—placed in spaces of exception. 
Critical race studies have established that throughout U.S. history the 
marginalization of people of color has served the economic and political gain of others. 
Whether in earlier centuries of Native American genocide, Japanese internment and 
property seizures, or during slavery and Jim Crow, or in the present moment of 
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militarized police forces excessively targeting non-white populations, people of color in 
the United States have encountered violent exploitation or its threat. To consider race in 
the United States as category of exception in political theory is not a long stretch of the 
critical imagination. In fact, aside from using a separate critical vocabulary, Charles Mills 
does just this in his influential monograph The Racial Contract (1997). Fallacious 
doctrines in American history like “separate but equal” can be easily translated into the 
terms “norm” and “exception.” 
These dynamics were apparent to Wright. Later in life, he would call for the equal 
“enforcement of the Constitution,” implying that the suspension of Constitutional ideas is 
the foundation for the “special existence” of African Americans (Clapp). This special 
existence is the subject of much of his fiction, and he elaborates upon the exceptional 
status of people of color through his own experience in his memoir Black Boy (1946). 
Late in his memoir after offering numerous examples of discrimination and the threat of 
violence, he writes, “Culturally the Negro represents a paradox: Though he is an organic 
part of the nation, he is excluded by the entire tide and direction of American culture” 
(320). While Amendments to the U.S. Constitution unraveled the three-fifths 
compromise, Wright illuminates how race remained a marker of exclusion and 
exploitation well through the Jim Crow Era. 
Into the present, whiteness continues to function as a zone of normalcy in which 
persons are generally provided social and legal rights, while people are color are exposed 
to exploitation and oppression. Parallel to how Agamben argues that the potential 
suspension of law creates the foundation for law’s normal operation, the socio-economic 
and political exclusion of non-whites from full access to American life enables the 
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primacy of whiteness in the first place. Hartman argues as much, writing that in the 
nineteenth century, “The slave is the object or the ground that makes possible the 
existence of the bourgeois subject and, by negation or contradistinction, defines liberty, 
citizenship, and the enclosures of the social body” (62). Through the twentieth and even 
twenty-first century, black bodies and other people of color remain the objects of this 
dynamic. In his study of Richard Wright’s body of work, Abdul JanMohamed asserts 
similar claims (8). Thus, to identify a person as non-white in the U.S. variably places him 
or her beneath the shadow of an exceptional status not experienced by majority of people 
perceived as white, in order to sustain the privilege of whiteness. An emphasis on the 
lived experience of African-Americans in particular spaces like the pre-Civil Rights era 
South Side of Chicago in Native Son attunes readers to these dynamics, both the visible 
ones and those that are less so. 
 In Native Son, Wright points to reports and newspapers as a medium of white 
supremacist discourse used to maintain the notion of savage, animalistic black 
criminality. He claims to have merely rewritten reports from the Chicago Tribune and 
other sources (Wright, “How” 455). Before Bigger is suspected as Mary’s killer, a 
reporter remarks to a peer, “Say, I’m slanting this to the primitive Negro who doesn’t 
want to be disturbed by white civilization” (Native 214). He plans to pander to the 
expectations of his racist white audience, framing it as a matter of black people’s agency 
to remove themselves from “white civilization.” He reverses the agency in the exclusion 
of blacks from “civilization,” presenting a well-worn paternalist stereotype that African 
Americans naturally desire the exclusion that white society offers them. The article 
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presents a casual, naturalized notion of black exclusion despite the political power 
generated by racism and wealth created through segregation.  
In the novel Wright most directly captures the attitudes of the racist American 
public and State in the dialogue of State’s Attorney Buckley. As the prosecutor of 
Bigger’s trial, he takes on the mantle as spokesperson for both the State’s institutions and 
the clamoring mob outside the courthouse. He more aggressively applies the 
dehumanizing language that Wright includes in newspaper reports, referring to Bigger as 
“some half-human black ape,” a “bestial monstrosity,” and a “black lizard” (408-9). 
Contradicting Bigger’s lawyer, Boris Max, Buckley argues that Bigger is subhuman 
because he does not acquiesce to what he calls the “sacred law” and “sacred customs” of 
“American civilization.” He declares, “I say that the law is holy because it makes us 
human!,” claiming that Bigger’s violation of law demonstrates his lack of humanity 
(408). Ira Wells summarizes Buckley’s argument, writing, “Civilization may behave 
barbarically . . . when barbarism is necessary to conserve civilization itself,” an argument 
that “unleashes a logic whereby the law is provoked into undoing itself” (891). In such 
statements Wright depicts the white supremacist ideology that masks the actual 
relationship between law and people of color. Whereas Buckley posits that Bigger other 
“black apes” are less than human because they do not abide by the State’s laws, the 
previous four hundred pages have prepared readers to recognize how the prosecutor 
distorts the ways in which law and unwritten policies actively oppress African Americans 
in the Chicago Black Belt. Moreover, the author is rehearsing the socio-political fiction 
of the “savage” which Charles Mills would later describe as a figure of negative self-
definition crucial to Western polities (Mills 43). Mills argues that the notion of primitive, 
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uncivilized savages was invented to justify Western ideas of civilization. By insisting that 
Bigger and other blacks exist in a lawless state of nature, Buckley maintains the fiction 
that dominant white society is a bastion of order and justice by its opposition to fictional 
“savagery.” 
This state of exception under which blacks and other people of color live and have 
lived is a foundation for the “normal” situation of American society since its inception. 
And black writers have recognized this relationship. For example, in his 1828 pamphlet 
Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World, David Walker calls to African Americans, 
both free and enslaved, to recognize the common inhumanity imposed upon them. A 
black used-clothes dealer in Boston, he lambasts the failed application to people of color 
of American democratic, egalitarian ideals articulated in the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution. Throughout his pages, he describes how whites justify the treatment 
of slaves by declaring that blacks are “not of the human family” (original emphasis, 12). 
He even references the claims of one of the nation’s architects, Thomas Jefferson, from 
Notes on the State of Virginia (1785) that blacks have “descend[ed] originally from the 
tribes of Monkeys or Orang-Outangs” (original emphasis, Walker 12). By casting people 
of color as subhuman or inhuman, Walker claims, the nation justifies its exceptional 
relationship to them; “human” standards do not apply. 
In Native Son, Bigger’s lawyer offers a leftist theory for the dehumanization of 
African Americans and other workers. He explains that people of wealth and power view 
all people who labor as “inferior,” and this label creates a fictional justification for the 
exploitation and violent control of blacks and others (428). Though Max paints with too 
broad a brush—as I discuss in this chapter’s later sections—Wright uses his words and 
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other elements of his novel to draw readers’ attention to the economic dynamics inherent 
to American racism. Closer to the present, Black studies and political science scholar 
Cedric Robinson argues in Black Marxism (1983) that since the Early Modern period 
ethnoracial differentiation has been used as a tool in the oppression and exploitation of 
laboring classes. He writes that “. . . the rationale and cultural mechanisms of domination 
. . . Race was its epistemology, its ordering principle, its organizing structure, its moral 
authority, its economy of justice, commerce, and power” (xxxi). He sites race at the 
center of modern capitalism since its inception. During European feudalism, Robinson 
claims that, “Race became largely the rationalization for the domination, exploitation 
and/or extermination of non-‘Europeans’ (including Slavs and Jews)” (27). The marker of 
difference or foreignness is used to justify separate treatment, creating the grounds for a 
state exception directed at racialized bodies, creating antagonisms among laboring 
classes. The racialized forms of domination and exploitation in twentieth-century 
America, Robinson claims, are an extension of this historical pattern. 
More recently, in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire (2001), the two 
political theorists trace the structures of violent exploitation throughout modern history. 
In their critical turn to the United States, they address the exceptional status of African 
Americans, writing that “black labor was an essential support of the new United States: 
African Americans had to be included in the Constitution but could not be included 
equally” (170-1). Hardt and Negri point to the three-fifths compromise as the inscription 
of this separate status into the foundation of U.S. law. Though legislation, practices, and 
policies have evolved since the first years of the republic, critics point to daily news items 
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in the twenty-first century as evidence that what Wright describes as the “special” status 
of black citizens and other people of color continues to loom over the nation. 
To connect racist American culture and law to the critical concept of the 
“exception” is not a difficult task. Yet, in fact, a text like Native Son seriously 
complicates the present conception of a “state of exception” in Agamben’s work and its 
scholarly reception. On the one hand, Agamben emphasizes the current and last centuries 
as the period in which modern governments begin a rapid shift into functionally 
permanent states of exception—i.e. the Global War on Terror. On the other hand, 
attention to the experiences of people of color represented in literature, art, and history 
suggests that racist nations operate in a mode of exception by merit of their racism. 
Richard Wright’s depiction of an urban ghetto reinforces this idea. 
 
Wright’s Chicago Ghetto as Space of Exception 
Wright quickly establishes for his novel’s readers that space is racialized even in a 
northern city like Chicago, a place supposedly less severely racist than the South. Bigger 
and a friend decide to “play white” on the street, a game in which they mock what they 
understand as the attitudes and idioms of white people. Afterwards, Wright writes, “Then 
they guffawed, partly at themselves and partly at the vast white world that sprawled and 
towered in the sun before them” (Native 18). Even in this scene of adolescent play, the 
realities of racial containment are evident, casting a background for the entirety of 
Wright’s narrative. The imagery in this sentence presents Bigger’s black world enclosed 
by an endless “white world” that even towers over their heads. The verb “sprawling” in 
its present progressive form connotes a continuous action. Instead of defined segregated 
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boundaries that isolate whites and blacks from one another, “sprawling” implies that in 
Bigger’s perception the white world is actively reaching into the Black Belt to entrap and 
threaten him. In contrast to specific geographical details, this cognitive mapping 
immerses readers into Bigger’s living experience of the city. 
 Wright continues to represent the Black Belt of Chicago as a technology of 
containment. Assigned to a particular space bounded by specific written and unwritten 
rules that apply only to black bodies, the city’s African Americans are exposed to 
potential violence and exploitation. While black lives are always at a higher risk for 
exceptional abuse in nearly any American space, the concentration of people in sites like 
ghettos proves particularly productive for the maintenance and profitability of the 
nation’s racist hierarchies. Alongside active abuses and exploitation, the Black Belt was 
an unsafe and unhealthy environment, unsupported by the city’s infrastructure. Historian 
Allan H. Spear reports that “the core of the black belt was a festering slum” in which a 
majority of buildings were in disrepair even in the early part of the century (24). In 
addition, Charles Scruggs writes that Wright understood how Chicago was spatially 
configured to sustain the exceptional position of non-whites. He summarizes, 
What Bigger doesn’t know, but Wright does, is that Chicago’s grid, laid 
out in accordance with the Land Ordinance of 1785, is not neutral but 
contains within its apparent rationality a secret record of money, power, 
and racial prejudice. As Mario Gandelsonas has shown, an invisible wall 
separates ‘north Chicago from south Chicago, white Chicago from black 
Chicago. This wall [is] implied from the fact that the monumental north-
south axes seem to come to an abrupt end at the point where the streets 
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change their name from north to south, marking a significant shift in the 
social geography of the city.’ Even though Bigger finds his way around 
some of Chicago’s walls, others equally invisible will effectively exclude 
him. (Scruggs 151) 
Scruggs reminds us that Wright presents Chicago not as a space of democracy and 
freedom perverted by racism, but as a city founded on this principle of exclusion. 
Though Bigger is not fully aware of the city’s history, he understands through his 
own experience how the Black Belt contributes to the “special existence.” Indeed, the 
reader learns that, “It maddened [Bigger] to think that he did not have a wider choice of 
action” in his simultaneously socially, economically, and spatially constricted life 
(Wright, Native 12). A few pages later, Bigger declares, “Every time I think about it I feel 
like somebody’s poking a red-hot iron down my throat. Goddammit, look! We live here 
and they live there. We black and they white. They got things and we ain’t. They do 
things and we can’t. It’s just like living in jail. Half the time I feel like I’m on the outside 
of the world peeping in through a knothole in the fence. . . .” (20). Life in the Black Belt 
is “like living in a jail,” a sentiment closely connected to his later acceptance of the 
“crime of being black.” The Black Belt functions like a jail, detaining African Americans 
and limiting their freedoms, operating in response, as Matthews and Hartman argue, to 
the political and social criminalization of blackness. Historical Chicago municipal 
policies exacerbated this dynamic before 1912 when prostitution and other illicit ventures 
were permitted in “vice districts” located near or in black neighborhoods. Despite the end 
to legal prostitution in 1912, “vice continued to be centered in the black belt” (Spear 25). 
The black Chicago ghetto was arranged as a space of illicit lives and livelihood. 
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The socio-political technology of the ghetto has a long history inside and outside 
the United States. The word itself is first used in U.S. for in reference to the housing 
segregation for European immigrants who fell outside the cultural ideal of an Anglo-
American race. But, as Wacquant argues, American ghettoes have always functioned as a 
method of ethnoracial exclusion. The sociologist elaborates that “a ghetto is not simply a 
conglomeration of poor families or a spatial accumulation of undesirable social 
conditions – income deprivation, housing blight, or endemic crime and other disruptive 
behaviors – but an institutional form. It is [a form of power] . . .  whereby a population 
deemed disreputable and dangerous is at once secluded and controlled” (“Black” 2). The 
Chicago ghetto is no exception: Spear reports, “The development of a physical ghetto in 
Chicago, then, was not the result chiefly of poverty; nor did Negroes cluster out of 
choice. The ghetto was primarily the product of white hostility” (26). Citing historian 
Sam Warner, Jr., Scruggs highlights the idea of the “slum” in nineteenth- and twentieth-
century cultural consciousness. He writes,  
As poor people became more and more segregated, and hence isolated 
from what was seen to be only the authentic way of life (that is, middle-
class life), the word slum took on a metaphoric and exotic character. A 
‘slum’ was like a foreign country that could be visited, as by tourists; it 
was also a place set apart, having no connection to ‘normal’ life: ‘No one 
went slumming when the poor lived on the alley behind her or his house.’ 
Moreover, the word slum tended to hide the  possibility that there might be 
an economic cause for such a place: ‘Slums were just there, facts of life, 
found objects.’ (158) 
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As Wright illuminates, the imagined need for the control of “disreputable and dangerous” 
populations frequently exceeds the bounds of normal law. Bigger reflects that housing 
restrictions and the like “keep us bottled up here like wild animals” (Wright, Native 249). 
He recognizes how the dehumanizing operations of the ghetto and broader structural 
racism project a quality of danger on to people of color.  
Ideologies of white supremacy present this racist containment of dangerous black 
bodies as a matter of necessity. Mills points to the racist circular logic that sustains this 
narrative. Under the auspices of Western racism, Mills argues that “spacing” becomes a 
“circular indictment”: “You are what you are in part because you originate from a certain 
kind of space, and that space has those properties in part because it is inhabited by 
creatures like yourself” (42). He elaborates, “that certain spaces [are marked as] 
intrinsically doomed to welfare dependency, high street crime, underclass status, because 
of the characteristics of its inhabitants, so that the larger economic system has no role in 
creating these problems” (50-1). The ghetto becomes viewed as a symptom of some other 
problem rather than as an engine of disparity. 
With such a framing of necessity, the State and other apparatuses justify 
exceptional police powers and the unequal application of law’s force in the ghetto, 
mirroring the more formal states of exception declared in wartime. Without question, the 
perceived necessity of containing bodies of color overrides the Constitutional and other 
rights of black citizens in the novel. As Wright’s chief example of this dynamic, the 
manhunt for Bigger throws the ghetto into a spectacular state of exception comparable to 
more formal martial law and totalitarian governance. But, alongside the spectacle, 
Wright’s narrative also depicts the lives of African Americans as always outside the 
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accepted norms of law within this space. By thinking through the ghetto as a constant 
space of exception in which power and violence ebb and flow on a spectrum, we can 
recognize the work it does as a technology for containing and disciplining bodies in 
parallel to other spaces of exception like Agamben’s paradigm of the “camp” or the 
torture sites, work camps, and laboratories discussed in other chapters of this dissertation.  
The Black Belt of the novel, however, is maintained by more than direct 
government action. Wright reiterates that white folks live “Over across the ‘line’” where 
African Americans are barred from buying or renting homes (Native 21). These unwritten 
policies became central to the city’s organization as black migration from the South 
increased. Scruggs writes, “The Chicago Defender, which for all its criticism of 
conditions for blacks in the south had never advocated immigration, changed its editorial 
policy in 1916: the new word was ‘Come on up’”; nearly seventy thousand black 
southerners transplanted to Chicago in the following few years (147). Wacquant reports 
that “by 1940 over nine-tenths of Chicago’s 337, 000 Negroes were ‘packed solidly’ in a 
‘narrow tongue of land, seven miles in length and one and one-half mile in width,’ and 
were becoming ever more concentrated in it” (“A Black City”). This practice of redlining 
enforces segregation through business policy in Chicago where Jim Crow laws 
accomplish the same in the South. 
During Bigger’s inquest, his lawyer Boris Max questions Mr. Dalton about his 
relationship to Bigger’s family as their landlord. The lawyer asks, “Isn’t it true you refuse 
to rent houses to Negroes if those houses are in other sections of the city?” (327). Max’s 
emphasis on the active verb “refuse” focuses readers’ attention on the constantly active 
work of de facto segregation, disrupting apologetic narratives that explain segregation as 
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a passive or natural social formation. The policies of redlining were so effective in 
Chicago that people in the Black Belt “held a mock-election of the ‘Mayor of 
Bronzeville,’” implying the severe separateness between the ghetto and the rest of the 
city’s polity (Wacquant, “A Black City”). Native Son points to how practices of 
segregation are not limited to law or the State. In a city without strict segregation laws, 
this economic segregation lays a significant foundation for creating spaces across the city 
that exist under the unequal application of law and power. 
While Native Son offers readers insight into the organization of the city around 
the exceptional space of the ghetto, Wright provides a spectacular illustration in the form 
of the police manhunt after Bigger. Police and vigilantes search, seize, and brutalize 
black citizens as a racist hysteria overtakes the city (Native 225). Jeffrey Clapp claims 
that the author’s “stories are consistently preoccupied with the most intensive and widely 
distributed form of State power, the police” and “transgressions of constitutional 
principle.” The text imagines how the isolation of African Americans in a space marked 
as criminal and degenerate leaves them open to widespread exploitation and violence. A 
newspaper article in the novel justifies this unrestrained police authority through a 
“blanket warrant from the Mayor,” but this decree is immediately suspect if not outright 
unconstitutional (Native 225). Readers are left with the impression that the Fourth 
Amendment—the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures—is being 
roundly ignored. Indeed, the phrase “blanket warrant” should be anathema to due process 
in the United States. Twenty-first century readers will recognize this kind of loosely-
justified tactic as a predecessor to the surveillance and detainment policies of the Global 
War on Terror that cite vague necessity rather than concrete evidence as just cause. While 
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scholarship and popular critique views our current era as one of increasing governmental 
lawlessness, Native Son offers a representative example of all too commonplace 
suspension of law and its principles throughout American history. 
The racist reasoning implied in the mayor’s “blanket warrant” reveals much about 
the Chicago ghetto’s status in the city’s political structure. In spaces not set aside for 
criminalized blackness, the police require just cause in a warrant to treat citizens as 
criminals. The mayor’s “blanket warrant,” however, naturalizes the criminalized status of 
African Americans, taking for its just cause simply the existence of black citizens. 
Though only Bigger’s girlfriend, Bessie, is actually implicated in his crimes, the city’s 
racist logic holds all other blacks responsible by merit of their blackness. 
Once armed with the authority of this blanket warrant, the Chicago police act like 
an invading army asserting martial law. The author writes, “Immediately a cordon of five 
thousand police, augmented by more than three thousand volunteers, was thrown about 
the Black Belt” (Native 243). Wright invites readers to see through the racist rationale for 
this siege of the South Side, suggesting that the state of exception declared by the city’s 
power structure is not an incidental but a spectacular demonstration of the regular 
treatment of black citizens. Indeed, Mills notes, “There is a well-known perception in the 
black community that the police—particularly in the jim crow days of segregation and 
largely white police forces—were basically an ‘army of occupation’” (85). In the novel, 
as a result of the white hysteria and unmediated police authority over the space of the 
ghetto, Wright describes how, “Every street car, bus, el train and auto leaving the South 
Side is being stopped and searched. Police and vigilantes, armed with rifles, tear gas, 
flashlights, and photos of the killer.” He continues to detail how, “Several hundred 
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Negroes resembling Bigger Thomas were rounded up from South Side ‘hot spots’; they 
are being held for investigation.” The newspaper also records how “several Negro men 
were beaten” across the city (Native 244). The racist logic behind these detainments is 
obvious, but the power to detain black men without true legal justification is 
demonstrably exceptional. Not available to the people of the Black Belt under many 
regular, mundane circumstances, personal security and due process under the law are 
non-existent under the auspices of the necessity conjured around Bigger’s crime. 
Wright further uses the example of “organized vigilante” groups to showcase 
exceptional nature of the spaces in which black citizens live. In the newspaper article, the 
author writes, “[The Chief of Police] said this morning that the aid of [organized 
vigilante] groups would be accepted. He stated that a woefully undermanned police force 
together with recurring waves of Negro crime made such a procedure necessary” (Native 
244). As discussed in my previous chapter in the context of Butler’s Parable of the 
Talents, vigilante groups that operate beyond all bounds of law, often claiming mandates 
of a nebulous, racist “higher law” or justice were frequently endorsed by local and state 
governments as well as many national politicians. Operating by definition outside the 
law, the free reign of vigilantism is another exceptional form of violent power alongside 
unchecked police power. While the text suggests a broader vigilante practice and 
tradition across the United States, what is more sinister in this particular fictional instance 
is how Wright imagines the established agents of the State—the police—resorting to 
vigilante manpower. In fact, the State endorses the need for this deployment of 
unregulated power and potential violence; it is a “necessary” procedure that places what 
should be normal rights of black citizens under erasure. 
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Clapp suggests that Native Son demonstrates a shift of interest in Wright’s works 
from the “extralegal, summary violence” of “mob violence and lynching” toward the 
oppressive power of law in its totality. But this transition does not leave behind the 
history of racist vigilantism. Bigger’s capture does not preclude and set aside the mob 
outside the courtroom whose “rumbling voice” he hears (Wright, Native 406). In fact, 
Buckley threatens Bigger with the mob if he does not collaborate with the prosecution. 
Historian Michael Pfeifer argues that mob violence across the nation declines in the early 
twentieth century as the State normalizes the death penalty, formalizing the values of 
vigilante justice in a form more palatable to middle- and upper-class society (7). He even 
points to Native Son as an illustration of the close connection between vigilante justice 
and the courtroom. Pfiefer argues that Buckley’s claim to uphold what he calls “sacred 
law” directly echoes the theories of not clearly defined but nevertheless ideologically 
“higher law” used to justify lynching in the past one hundred years (150). Wells claims 
that Wright implies “that the justice system has in this case simply imbued a semblance 
of legitimacy and legality to what was in effect a lynching” (890). Ultimately, the text 
presents the obviously exceptional quality of vigilantism at not ending as the court’s steps 
but as infusing the entire legal process for Wright’s protagonist. 
The technology of the ghetto functions to concentrate the intimidation, violence, 
and exploitation wielded against African Americans, politically constructed in such a way 
as to enable narratives of necessity for the extralegal of its residents. In addition, the 
isolating mechanism of the ghetto that casts the great “sprawling” white world around 
Bigger and other black citizens works to cast such spaces as mere blemishes on am 
otherwise ideal republic—attributing responsibility for these flaws in the nation’s 
107 
 
landscape to the people policed within them. Wright again addresses this phenomenon in 
The Outsider: his character District Attorney Houston says, “You call this civilization? I 
don’t. This is a jungle. We pretend that we have law and order. But we don’t, really. We 
have imposed a visible order, but hidden under that veneer of order the jungle still 
seethes” (135). Native Son illustrates Wright’s theory: the organization of space in 
Chicago provides a “visible order” and the impression of “law and order,” but these 
structures only increase the efficiency of maintaining the precarious nature of African 
American lives. 
 
The “No Man’s Land” of the Mind 
 While Wright uses Chicago to illustrate the physical and economic constraints on 
African Americans in the Jim Crow U.S.A., the majority of Native Son emphasizes the 
very real psychic impact on Bigger’s inner life. In fact, the author depicts his protagonist 
as absorbing the exceptional nature of the ghetto around him into a model for his own 
sense of being. The ghetto’s space of exception becomes a kind of living metaphor for his 
mental space. As mentioned in this chapter’s introduction, Wright uses metaphor of “No 
Man’s Land” to express Bigger’s sense of alienation and exposure to the world around 
him. The phrase carries multiple meanings, the most immediate as a space of total war 
without governance or security. Native Son demonstrates that the exceptional nature of 
the ghetto is, in fact, the product of government policies and less formal racist social 
compacts. But this organization of life in the Black Belt engenders, as the author 
suggests, a potent feeling of socio-political and spiritual abandonment among its 
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residents. Again, in this space of exception emerges a condition that is “mimetic of 
death.” 
The “No Man’s Land” metaphor emerges twice in Bigger’s thoughts when he is 
speaking to whites. In the first instance, Wright writes, “He felt he had no physical 
existence at all right then . . . It was a shadowy region, a No Man’s Land, the ground that 
separate the white world from the black that he stood upon. He felt naked, transparent.” 
For Bigger, No Man’s Land does not simply represent a position of not belonging, but a 
position of annihilation. Reading this passage, Gregory Phipps describes Bigger’s 
subjectivity as “a formless domain of raw vitality and energy—an inescapable negation 
within preexisting models of American white consciousness” (339). This effect is so 
powerfully cultivated in Bigger’s mind that he experiences it even in the presence of 
whites who he begins to perceive as allies. The author writes, “[Bigger] felt that he 
should have been able to meet Max halfway; but, as always, when a white man talked to 
him, he was caught out in No Man’s Land” (Native 347). Bigger’s feeling of 
disappearance echoes another, older sense of this key phrase. One of the Oxford English 
Dictionary’s definitions for no man’s land is “a piece of waste or unowned land; an 
uninhabited or desolate area,” with citations as old as 1350. Like this meaning, Bigger’s 
consciousness enters a zone of desolation in which he feels lifeless, formless, or that his 
body no longer belongs to him. 
Wright’s portrayal of Bigger’s exclusion from white society is not necessarily 
notable in the context of other fictional black characters, but this metaphor and other 





 While this “No Man’s Land” mental space becomes evident to 
Bigger in moments when he speaks to whites, the novel leaves the impression that Bigger 
and other characters are continually caught up in this interior space of exception, just as 
they are contained in the ghetto’s physical space.
7
  
The author’s own experience of American racism informs his depiction of Bigger 
as a disenfranchised young black man. After being harassed by whites out of a job, 
Wright recounts, “For weeks after that I could not believe in my feelings. My personality 
was numb, reduced to a lumpish, loose, dissolved state. I was a non-man, something that 
knew vaguely that it was human but felt that it was not. . . . And because I knew of no 
way to grapple with this thing, I felt doubly cast out” (Wright, Black 229). On top of his 
racist exclusion from the world of whites, Wright struggles to comprehend this injustice 
and how to retrieve his agency. He describes his experience as being “doubly cast out,” 
                                                 
6
 Wright returns to this topic in The Outsider in which the author describes his protagonist, Cross, as 
having “no party, no myths, no tradition, no race, no soil, no culture, and no ideas—except perhaps the idea 
that ideas in themselves were, at best, dubious!” (377). He already lives in state that another character, 
District Attorney Houston, later describes as “a kind of No Man’s Land.” Wright presents Cross as not 
living in a secondary, subordinate, or oppressed culture, but rather as wholly ejected from any culture, in a 
kind of exceptional void. But while he possesses no ideology or culture of his own, the dominate culture 
founds itself on the demonization and exploitation of his body. In the full quote, Houston says to Cross, not 
knowing his true identity initially, “Negroes, as they enter our culture, are going to inherit the problems we 
have, but with a difference. They are outsiders and they are going to know that they have these problems. 
They are going to be self-conscious; they are going to be gifted with a double vision, for, being Negroes, 
they are going to be both inside and outside of our culture at the same time. . . . But their getting those 
elementary things [the right to jobs and living space] is so long and drawn out that they must, while they 
wait, adjust themselves to living in a kind of No Man’s Land” (129). The DA’s assessment of the position 
of African-Americans in American life mirrors what Wright has expressed elsewhere. But his words remain 
clinical and incrementalist, divorced from the visceral experiences of Wright’s black characters like Cross 
and Bigger who do not respond to their constricted lives with the patience that Houston implies. Houston’s 
example suggests for Wright’s readers that the ability to recognize the exceptional position of blacks in 
American life must be combined with an empathetic approach to the individual experiences of those living 
in this condition. 
7
 In contrast to my reading of the metaphor, Kadeshia Matthews reads “No Man’s Land” as a space of 
blackness in her article arguing that Bigger’s actions are oriented around escaping the feminized status of 
his race. She writes, “In attempting to escape the supposed No Man’s Land of blackness, Bigger has seized 
on a version of manhood premised on whiteness and therefore on the very othering and rejection that have 
been practiced against him” (294). She interprets Bigger’s violence as reenacting that with which whites 
threaten him. This is a compelling reading that does not necessarily conflict with mine. This nebulous 
“shadowy region” that Wright imagines is not clearly explicated in the novel, and the very nature of an 
ungoverned No Man’s Land in the mind allows for the proliferation of paradoxes and layered meanings. 
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and expression that further exemplifies the No Man’s Land of the mind that the author 
explores in his fiction. The deprivation historically experienced by African Americans is 
not only material but psychic or spiritual. The word “doubly” communicates a crucial 
parity between the material aspects of being fired for being black and the entailing 
dehumanization. 
While outside a ghetto Wright finds himself exposed to what he would come to 
describe in fiction as a No Man’s Land of the mind, he presents the strict, violent spatial 
containment of African Americans as exacerbating the abuse suffered by Bigger 
Thomas’s psyche. Critiques have been levelled at Wright, however, for his emphasis on 
his naturalistic portrayal of an environment’s inevitable influence upon a character. The 
author would later comment in “How Bigger Was Born” that he does not 
think that environment makes consciousness . . . but I do say that I felt and 
still feel that the environment supplies the instrumentalities through which 
the organism expresses itself, and if that environment is warped or 
tranquil, the mode and manner of behavior will be affected toward 
deadlocking tensions or orderly fulfillment and satisfaction. (442) 
In fact, Wright insists that on the parallel importance of understanding the individual 
experience of African Americans and the material constraints on their lives or else the 
reader will be left with the impression that they were essentially and organically bad” 
(437). Ralph Ellison provides an early defense in his review of Native Son; he writes,  
Some reviewers are calling Bigger Thomas a neurotic, but it is a mistake 
to dismiss him as such. He is not crazy, he is the product of the restrictions 
placed upon 15,000,000 American citizens, in the narrow sense, and upon 
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one-third of the nation in the broader sense. . . . Deprived of education and 
forced by the reality of Jim-crow to reject the common American 
assumptions that all men are created equal and endowed with the right of 
health and the pursuit of happiness, Bigger reacted as life had taught him: 
violently. (44) 
The novel emphasizes Bigger’s response to the conditions of his life not as a universal 
fate but rather as a universal potential dictated by the discursive marking of his body as 
black and the socio-political technologies arrayed against him. 
 Despite the potential philosophical or political flaws in his presentation, Wright 
continues to emphasize the conditioning force of the Chicago’s ghetto space throughout 
the novel. Expanding on Bigger’s impression of a “sprawling white world” around him, 
the author writes,  
To Bigger and his kind white people were not really people; they were sort 
of a great natural force, like a stormy sky looming overhead, or like a deep 
swirling river stretching suddenly at one’s feet in the dark. As long as he 
and his black folks did not go beyond certain limits, there was no need to 
fear that white force. But whether they feared it or not, each and every day 
of their lives they lived with it; even when words did not sound its name, 
they acknowledged its reality. As long as they lived here in this prescribed 
corner of the city, they paid mute tribute to it. (Native 114) 
Like the active sprawling of the white world, the “force” of whites that has established 
the ghetto’s space of exception continuously encloses the African Americans who live 
there. The present continuous verbs “looming” and “swirling” describe an active effect of 
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the Black Belt, indicating the ever-present threat of “force”—through physical violence 
or other terroristic means. Although Bigger imagines that there are zones of safety within 
certain “limits” of blacks’ behavior, Wright complicates this notion with the later 
manhunt. Bigger alone has violated these “limits,” but every resident suffers on account 
of him during the police and vigilante raids, arrests, and firings. At the very least, the 
ghetto’s inhabitants are treated as always accountable for their peers’ violations of the 
limit, rather than receiving individual Constitutional treatment as citizens with rights. 
In congruence with Wright’s framing No Man’s Land metaphor, here Bigger also 
provides a metaphor of a position outside the bounds of community or law—in fact, the 
lack of a stable position at all in a “deep swirling river.” This metaphor implies the risk of 
both drowning or being washed away by white “force,” all while being contained in the 
literal space of the Black Belt. By using naturalizing metaphors of a “river” and a 
“stormy sky,” Wright highlights the victim’s perspective on vigilante violence, so often 
as appealing to a higher, natural law over the laws of the State. Importantly, however, this 
naturalized enmity that seems to exist outside the artifice of law is always present; as 
Bigger feels, “even when words did not sound its name, they acknowledged its reality.” 
African American lives in this space are always a “mute tribute” to the exceptional 
relationship in which the ghetto exists with the rest of the city. In other words, the nature 
of the space appears to infect the mentalities of its residents; race is naturalized and felt as 
a “force.” 
The novel further depicts how these enclosed spaces of exception contribute to the 
alienation of living under a racialized marker of exception. Though Wright focuses on 
Bigger, he indicates that other black characters share his condition; Bigger’s girlfriend 
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Bessie, whom he later murders, also describes herself as “lost,” disoriented and 
disconnected from any sense of meaning while she lives in the Black Belt and labors as a 
domestic servant at the whims of whites (Native 184). Bigger’s life is little different; 
Wright explains, “never had he felt a sense of wholeness” (240). Though the starkness of 
the desolate, alienated space of his mental No Man’s Land appears during confrontations 
with whiteness, the nature of this metaphor permeates his entire racialized and segregated 
life. 
Wright continues to emphasize the strangle hold that the structures of power have 
over Bigger’s black body and mind. He writes, “. . . but even after obeying, after killing, 
they still ruled him. He was their property, heart and soul, body and blood; what they did 
claimed every atom of him, sleeping and waking; it colored life and dictated the terms of 
death” (Native 331-2). Though not a slave, Bigger still feels that he is the property of 
whites in body and soul. Rather than being personal property to a single white person, he 
now lives a disenfranchised life nebulously under a kind of ownership by all whites. 
Wright also deflates here any apologetic notion of a congenial balance between white 
authority and black servitude. The passage presents Bigger’s domination as surpassing 
every conceivable limit. He imagines that neither his obedience nor his certain death ends 
this relationship. In fact, the text presents Bigger’s existence as entirely lacking protective 
limits; not even his “heart and soul” are guarded against violent intrusion. Marked by the 
exceptional status of his race, Bigger is exposed in both body and being to unmitigated 





Black Lives Matter (insofar as They Facilitate Profit) 
 The Chicago Black Belt in Native Son clearly works to keep people of color 
contained, both socially and literally in their racist-prescribed place. But, while the novel 
depicts how these kinds of spaces of exception are a response to the “danger” of 
racialized bodies, the novel also shows how such spaces render people of color available 
to exploitation. The social and legal inequality evident in these spaces permits not only 
different forms of State violence that would not be acceptable elsewhere but also unfair 
labor practices. Wacquant reminds us that ghettoes have always worked in this way, 
paradoxically accomplishing both “labor extraction and social ostracization.” Using 
Bigger and Wright’s other characters even as anecdotal examples, Native Son portrays 
the policies of the ghetto and its alienating effect as exposing African Americans to 
economic exploitation. Ultimately, since people in the ghetto are generally at risk to the 
State and its social, legal structures, they also have no reliable recourse to law or other 
institutions. The psychological alienation that the author depicts through Bigger’s No 
Man’s Land of the mind further suggests the ghetto’s work in convincing its inhabitants 
that they are not fit for a coeval economic relationship with the dominant white majority. 
Wright demonstrates to his readers how leaving racialized people in these unprotected 
zones renders them available to exploitation. 
Wright points to the same paradox that Wacquant identifies in his scholarship 
between the simultaneous exclusion of black bodies from white society and inclusion of 
their exploited labor and wealth. In one of Boris Max’s statements to the court he 
describes the racist majority’s desire to exclude and even annihilate people of color. But 
by articulating this seemingly barbaric desire he hopes to appeal to each individual’s 
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empathy. Max says, “But if we say that we must kill [Bigger], then let us have the 
courage and honesty to say: ‘Let us kill them all. They are not human. There’s no room 
for them.’ Then let us do it” (Wright, Native 405). He identifies the genocidal teleology 
of racist ideology and calls attention to its gross inhumanity. But in this case Max misses 
one of the ghetto’s primary goals. As Wacquant explains, the racist systems used to 
control black people from slavery to the present “have, each in its own manner, served 
two joined yet discordant purposes: to recruit, organize, and extract labor out of African 
Americans, on the one hand; and to demarcate and ultimately seclude them so that they 
would not ‘contaminate’ the surrounding white society that viewed them [as] irrevocably 
inferior and vile.” The violence condoned in the ghetto’s space of exception, as 
Wacquant argues, enables the temporary resolution of the tension that arises from these 
two conflicting purposes. He writes, 
When the tension between these two purposes, exploitation and 
osctracization, mounts to the point where it threatens to undermine either 
of them, its excess is drained, so to speak, and the institution restabilized, 
by resort to physical violence: the customary use of the lash and ferocious 
suppression of slave insurrections on the plantation, terroristic vigilantism 
and mob lynchings in the post-bellum South, and periodic bombings of 
Negro homes and pogroms against ghetto residents (such as the six-day 
riot that shook up Chicago in 1919) ensured that blacks kept to their 
appointed place at each epoch. (“Deadly” 99) 
Thus, flying in the face of Max’s line of argument, the deployment of violence against 
people of color in systems and spaces of exception is mediated by a profit motive. Such 
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has been evident in Octavia Butler’s thinking and will also be so in John Steinbeck’s 
representation of Californian farm camps in the next chapter. 
 In Native Son, the constant economic pressure of the ghetto is referenced from its 
earliest pages. The redlining of the Black Belt is one of the novel’s more obvious 
example of such constriction. For example, Bigger and his friend say to each other, 
“Yeah; them old white landlords sure don’t give much heat,” followed by, “And they 
always knocking at your door for money” (Wright, Native 16). White property owners 
provide few services for outrageously inflated prices. The exploitation of African 
Americans remains a constant backdrop in this novel about Bigger’s violent reaction to 
his oppression, Bigger offers his own theory of socio-economic race relationships when 
Wright writes, “And rich people were not so hard on Negroes; it was the poor whites who 
hated Negroes. They hated Negroes because they didn’t have their share of the money” 
(33). Yet, by providing insight into the economic relationship between the Thomas and 
Dalton families, the novel upends the premise of Bigger’s theory. Wright suggests that in 
particular the wealthy white stratum of city is implicated in Bigger’s crimes by offering 
him an existence in which his only choices are a death-in-life existence or an embrace of 
the criminality that racist ideology has already thrust upon him. 
 Mary’s father, Mr. Dalton, is the novel’s illustrative figure of the wealthy white 
elite in the city who benefit from the conditions of black people’s lives. Dalton is an 
interesting figure, however, because Wright portrays him not as a kind of outright 
villainous robber baron, instead giving his character something of a beneficent nature. 
Dalton supports the NAACP and offers Bigger relatively lucrative employment as his 
family’s chauffeur (Native 53). But later in the novel, Wright contemplates through 
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Bigger the dissonance between Dalton’s philanthropy and his real estate businesses. He, 
in fact, owns the Thomas family apartment that Wright presents as a brief allegorical 
model of the Black Belt. The author writes,  
He had never seen Mr. Dalton until he had to come work for him; his 
mother always took the rent to the real estate office. Mr. Dalton was 
somewhere far away, high up, distant, like a god. He owned property all 
over the Black Belt, and he owned property where white folks lived, too. . 
. . Even though Mr. Dalton gave millions of dollars for Negro education, 
he would rent houses to Negroes only in this prescribed area, this corner of 
the city tumbling down from rot. (Native 174) 
Mr. Dalton is part of the “white world,” the “force” that looms over him and swirls at his 
feet that Bigger feels is bearing down on him at the beginning of Native Son. Whereas 
Bigger thinks of African Americans treated as “wild animals” by being redlined into the 
Black Belt, Dalton seems like a “god.” Despite his distance “far away, high up” from the 
ghetto, the knowledge is common that his wealth is intimately bound up in the South 
Side’s unfair practices. Noting that Dalton owns property where whites live as well, 
Wright suggests that Dalton’s allegiance is not to race but to money. Dalton both gives 
money to “Negro education,” he earns a portion of that money from black subjugation in 
substandard housing “tumbling down from rot.”  
 Like Wright’s complex protagonist who incites both sympathy and antipathy, Mr. 
Dalton is not a two-dimensional villain. The text’s narrative strategy approaches Dalton 
with relative kid gloves, slowly dissolving the character’s naiveté, perhaps anticipating 
reactions from similarly charitable yet exploitation-perpetuating readers. For example, in 
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a dialogue between Bigger’s lawyer and Mr. Dalton, he deflects responsibility for the 
city’s housing practices: 
“I don’t fix the rent scales,” Mr. Dalton said. 
 “Who does?” 
 “Why, the law of supply and demand regulates the price of 
houses.” 
 “. . . Why is it that you exact an exorbitant rent of eight dollars per 
week from the Thomas family for one unventilated, rat-infested room in 
which four people eat and sleep?” (Native 326) 
Dalton ascribes the responsibility of setting prices to market forces, suggesting that as a 
businessman he has no choice in the matter but to charge “exorbitant” prices for “rat-
infested” rooms. Dalton references a naturalized notion of the “law of supply and 
demand” to explain the high prices for the limited amount of housing for blacks. His 
explanation imitates the form of other naturalized justifications for racist practices, 
implying that his and others’ business practices are acting in response to the constructed 
necessity of “supply and demand.” Yet Max’s further questions reveal to readers how 
whites and property owners have created the conditions for this “law.” But Max’s line of 
questions begins to demand that Dalton recognize his personal role in the conditions of 
Bigger’s life that have culminated in his two murders. Max asks, “Isn’t it true you refuse 
to rent houses to Negroes if those houses are in other sections of the city?” (327). Dalton 
again shares responsibility with other real estate owners, but both he and the reader are 
drawn toward an awareness of how Dalton is implicated in the cycles of oppression that, 
as Wright portrays, generates figures like Bigger. 
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 Near the novel’s end Bigger opines on the relationship between white ownership 
and black subjugation. The text connects property and oppression when he says, “Well, 
they own everything. They choke you off the face of the earth. They like God. . . . They 
kill you before you die” (Native 353). Bigger links both ownership and violence—
through the image of choking—to abject condition mimetic to death in which you feel 
that you are killed “before you die.” Wright reminds readers that this state of social death 
is not limited to socio-political arrangements of power. Economic power proves 
inseparable in the nation’s relationship to African Americans. 
 In another speech that does not sit quite well with the attentive reader, Boris Max 
offers a broad perspective to Bigger about the city’s socio-economic structures. Many 
critics have noted, however, in the context of the following passage how Max is less a 
Marxist messiah figure than another color-blind white character.
8
 Such a move on the 
author’s part is not surprising; Wright’s break with mainstream American Communism is 
well documented, including by himself in Black Boy. Regardless, Wright uses Max to 
deploy slanted, unfinished truths about his racist capitalist society. Max says to Bigger, 
[The rich and powerful] want the things of life, just as you did, and they’re 
not particular about how they get them. They hire people and they don’t 
pay them enough; they take what people own and build up power. They 
rule and regulate life. They have things arranged so that they can do those 
things and the people can’t fight back. They do that to black people more 
                                                 
8
 James Miller and others have also pointed out the flaws in Max’s representation of Bigger. While Miller 
argues that Max fails to demonstrate that he fully understands Bigger in the way that Wright invites his 
readers to, the critic also indicates that Max’s legal arguments are incongruous with the standard leftist 
strategies of his day, a fact with which Wright himself would likely be familiar (Miller 123). Though Max 
works to be Bigger’s ally, many critics have called attention to how this character’s oversights subtlety 
mirror the author’s criticisms of the American Communist Party’s relationship to its African-American 
members and people of color generally. 
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than others because they say that black people are inferior. But, Bigger, 
they say that all people who work are inferior. And the rich people don’t 
want to change things; they’ll lose too much. (Native 428) 
Max’s opening presents the rich and powerful as figures of sovereignty not far removed 
from the figure of the political sovereign outlined in the theories of Schmitt and 
Agamben. In fact, the statement that the rich “rule and regulate life” places the capitalist 
elite in the position of the modern biopolitical sovereign, whom Agamben describes as 
the decider of “life,” separating organisms into categories of lives that variously matter or 
do not matter in the political sphere.
9
 Max’s broad, abstract terms about citizens’ shared 
desires, wanting “the things of life,” recalls the novel’s opening allegory. The lawyer 
suggests that, like Bigger and his rodent foe, the rich desire a fulfilled life, unthreatened 
by competition. Max claims that the oppression experienced by blacks is a universal 
feature of capitalist labor exploitation. Wright’s inclusion of Max’s voice reminds readers 
that black people are not alone as targets of discourses of “inferiority,” that the present 
state of capitalism is a problem—inseparable—from the disgraces of racism. But the 
lawyer occludes the difference in policy and practice used to extract value from the labor 
                                                 
9
 In his 2005 monograph The Death-Bound-Subject: Richard Wright’s Archaeology of Death, Abdul 
JanMohamed declares, “Though critics have commented on the ubiquitousness of violence in Wright’s 
work, it is curious that no one has yet fully articulated the fundamental ideological and political functions 
of death in his work and life” (1). Like this dissertation, JanMohamed analyzes Wright’s texts through a 
theoretical lens greatly informed by the political philosophy of Giorgio Agamben. JanMohamed 
insightfully proposes that we think through the power over black bodies in the Jim Crow era in Agamben’s 
terms of “bare life” and sovereignty (8). Yet in following pages of his study he emphasizes how an abstract, 
existential conceit of a binary of death and life inhabit Wright’s works rather than ever-present threat of 
real violence and physical, final death for many of Wright’s characters and himself. Wright offers many 
figures, Bigger Thomas among them, who are caught up in apparent vacuum of life and death, a death-in-
life that complicates any binary presentation. Though JanMohamed places Wright in compelling 
conversation with many schools of critical theory, this approach elides the lived experiences of African 
Americans that Wright works to represent. In fact, JanMohamed asserts, “Native Son, in short, is structured 
like a dream and has to be read as such” (77). While I do not discount the validity or critical productivity of 
comparing the novel to a dream, JanMohamed’s particular approach sets aside the ethical need to imagine 




of various working class groups. The oppression experienced by African Americans and 
other people of color frequently exceeds that applied to working-class whites. Still, the 
entirety of Native Son urges readers to not so casually agree with Max’s quick dismissal 
of race in the exploitation of African American workers. But this moment does not 
license Americans to white-wash the particular experiences of people of color. Wright 
presents the “special existence” of black people as demanding an equally special or 
particular understanding and response. 
  
Failures of Sympathy 
Alongside the tragedies and violence within its pages, Native Son depicts 
responses and forms of resistances to the city’s racist structures and institutions. The 
author represents two methods that are particularly inadequate: uncritical sympathy and 
selfish violence. Critics have discussed the latter at length: scholarship has cast Bigger as 
a failed revolutionary or a man driven mad by the circumstances of his life.
10
 But the 
novel’s more central object is the problem of sympathy. The Dalton family serves as 
Wright’s figures for the failure of sympathy. He portrays their naïve benevolence and 
paternalism as central in the chain of events leading to Mary’s and then Bessie’s 
murder—though the novel does not clearly explicate a full opinion on the family’s 
responsibility. Ultimately, Wright implies that this kind of sympathy generates more 
harm than good for the afflicted people in the Black Belt. 
                                                 
10
 Matthews discusses famous praises of Bigger Thomas as a kind of black revolutionary, including Frantz 
Fanon’s and Eldridge Cleaver’s (288). But she points out that Bigger cannot be a revolutionary in the 
model of Fanon’s political theory because “there is no such thing as a revolution of one” (291). Similarly, 
Wells discredits readings of Bigger as a “freedom fighter” or “revolutionary warrior,” instead arguing that 
his violence has no agenda and is an “automatic response to Bigger’s desperation” (893). 
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Near the novel’s conclusion, Wright offers the stakes of his narrative. Bigger 
finally explains the schism of consciousness between white and blacks that results in his 
killing of Mary Dalton. He says simply, “White folks and black folks is strangers. We 
don’t know what each other is thinking” (351). Wright’s fictional creation of Bigger’s 
interior world and the inability of so many other characters to access it clearly work to 
address this problem. Wright would later declare in Black Boy the equitable meeting of 
racialized strangers as a particular goal of his artistic project. After working in close 
proximity with whites in a restaurant, he recounts,  
It was in the psychological distance that separated the races that the 
deepest meaning of the problem of the Negro lay for me. For these poor, 
ignorant white girls to have understood my life would have meant nothing 
short of a vast revolution in theirs. And I was convinced that what they 
needed to make them complete and grown-up in their living was the 
inclusion in their personalities of a knowledge of lives such as I lived and 
suffered containedly. (320) 
For Wright, both the socio-politically dominant and subordinate groups suffer—with 
obvious differences—from systemic racism. The task for his literary work is to offer 
“knowledge” to readers toward their maturation into a kind of existential or moral 
completeness. Native Son provides a particularly powerful challenge for readers—past, 
present, and future—not critically initiated into the problems of race in the United States. 
Wright further argues that the problem of race affects every American. He writes, 
“I felt that the Negro could not live a full, human life under the conditions imposed upon 
him by America; and I felt, too, that America, for different reasons, could not live a full, 
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human life. It seemed to me, then, that is the Negro solved his problem, he would be 
solving infinitely more than his problem alone” (Black 350). As the author suggests in his 
memoir, Bigger’s statement about whites and blacks existing as strangers is not a matter 
of changing the circumstances of one group of people but a political project of 
commingling, to not set apart people into normalized and marginalized categories of 
thought, language, political, social, or economic structures. The novel’s implication of 
changing whites and blacks from strangers into another kind of relation points to a kind 
of community building, ending the destructive, violent, and exploitative strangeness too 
long cultivated by American systems of power. And as Wright more directly states in his 
memoir, the incongruence between the lives of whites and people of color is a shared 
problem—a problem that can explode in figures like Bigger Thomas. 
While Wright desires to erode the estrangement among American peoples, in 
Native Son the Daltons’ brand of sympathy—even Mary’s more radicalized version—
proves inadequate as an ethical response to the strangeness of Bigger’s life. Wright does 
not provide a simple portrait of the family for his readers to easily judge the quality of 
their intent, but their limitations and failures are quite evident in the text. Despite Mr. 
Dalton’s charity and employment offer to Bigger, his wealth, influence, and skin color 
leaves him like a “god” in relationship to Bigger and other African Americans in 
Chicago. What sympathy or understanding the Dalton patriarch exhibits is directly 
enabled by the city’s inequity of race, labor, and property. Charity reinforces rather than 
allays the established socio-political power dynamics. This exploitative paternalism is the 
brand of sympathy that receives the most direct criticism in the text, primarily through 
Dalton’s courtroom scenes with Max. 
124 
 
Mr. Dalton’s wife is another figure of failed sympathy. Scholars have long agreed 
upon the symbolism underlying Mrs. Dalton’s blindness. Such is apparent to some of the 
novel’s earliest literary criticism. In his 1958 monograph The Negro Novel in America, 
Richard Bone writes that Native Son contains “a constant play on blindness, focused 
around the figure of Mrs. Dalton but aimed ultimately at the reader, who is expected to 
grope his way to an understanding of Bigger’s life” (147). Following after Bone’s 
argument, Ian Afflerbach offers an extensive reading of what he describes as the “rhetoric 
of blindness” throughout the novel. He argues that sight and the ability to see the world 
clearly permeate the text from its opening to its conclusion. This dynamic itself is most 
apparent in scenes with the blind Mrs. Dalton (94). His wife’s literal blindness ultimately 
reflects Mr. Dalton’s own blind eye to his city’s and industry’s racist injustice. 
Ultimately, however, Mary Dalton proves a more dissonant example of 
inadequate sympathy than either of her parents. Her well-meaning words while Bigger 
drives her and Jan around Chicago speak to a failure of developing effective empathy. 
She says, “We want one of those places where colored people eat, not one of those show 
places. . . . I’ve long wanted to . . . just see how your people live. . . . We know so little 
about each other. I just want to see. I want to know these people. . . . Yet they must live 
like we live” (original emphasis, Wright, Native 69-70). Rather than creating a space of 
inclusive dialogue between her and Bigger in which they might develop grounds for 
mutual empathy, Mary’s words cast her as a spectator looking upon the lives of black 
people. Though she recognizes the differences between her and Bigger’s socio-political 
positions, she does not realize how their positions regulate their dialogue, preventing a 
mutual equitable interchange. She appears ignorant to the very real risks he courts by 
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engaging her, a wealthy white woman, as a peer. Moreover, like her father, she takes for 
granted the privilege that allows her to offer her inadequate sympathy to her black 
chauffeur as she rides in relative luxury back and forth across Chicago’s color line. Her 
freedom and mobility to attempt sympathy for Bigger arrives directly from her whiteness 
and wealth, both of which are founded upon the oppression and exploitation of black 
bodies. This aspect of Mary’s failure is not a blindness to lives in the Black Belt but to 
the circumstances of her own. 
Even Mary’s words reenact the differences that she wishes to ameliorate. Her 
words portray her as a spectator or even a tourist of the Black Belt, casting African 
Americans as the objects of her gaze. But her attention remains on the surface level, only 
on what she can see. She fails to perceive Bigger’s own feelings in the moment despite 
her depicted benevolence. Though she states that she does not want to visit a “show 
place” but an eatery patronized by average African Americans, she nevertheless 
emphasizes only seeing the external features of black people’s lives. Scruggs insightfully 
describes the conflict she incites; he writes, “Because Bigger knows the misery of his 
own world so intimately, he perceives the obscene element in Mary’s wish. Bigger’s 
inarticulate rage represents a felt knowledge of existence that Mary is not privy to, hence 
his reject of the kind of sympathy Mary has to offer: she only wants to see” (157). 
Scruggs qualifies the power of Bigger’s reaction, writing “that he remembers Mary’s 
precise words on four separate occasions in the novel, and Wright seems to link his 
killing of her to those words. His anger represents a long history of enforced separateness 
which Mary’s ‘innocent’ remarks cannot begin to broach” (158). The novel points to the 
varying failures of the Daltons’ sympathies, challenging Wright’s readers who perhaps 
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identify more with Mary or Jan than with Bigger to become cognizant of the blind spots 
in their own positions. In particular, the text’s challenge for white readers is to engage 
Bigger Thomas not in the ways that the privileged and powerful in Native Son do, 
through exploitation, spectacles of violence, and Mary’s voyeurism. The author instead 
invites us to imaginatively enter the internal life of Bigger Thomas, to empathetically 
conceive of how he experiences the world on his own terms. 
 Bigger’s lawyer Boris Max represents a departure from the Daltons’ blindness. He 
demonstrates a stronger grasp on the social, political, and economic structures that create 
the landscape of Bigger’s life. Yet critics are divided on his ethical or ideological role in 
the novel. In a 1940 review of the novel, Malcolm Cowley writes that Max’s “long 
courtroom speech . . . sums up the argument of the novel” (38). More contemporary 
critics have agreed with this assessment; for example, Yoshinobu Hakutani claims, 
“Through Max, Wright speaks for and to the nation, thereby creating a narrative voice, a 
point of view that is indeed sympathetic to Bigger but entirely impersonal in shaping 
racial discourse” (183). In contrast, Afflerbach argues, “Bigger lacks the education or the 
disposition to join in Max’s New Deal values” (100). On the one hand, Max’s relation to 
Bigger mirrors the uneven dynamics between Bigger and Mary earlier in the novel. On 
the other hand, Afflerbach points to Max’s final “failure to read” Bigger at the novel’s 
end when Bigger embraces his crimes (Afflerbach 101; Wright, Native 429). James 
Miller takes a similar position, writing that “the concluding scene of the novel clearly 
belongs to Bigger and his recovery of his voice at this crucial moment in Native Son not 
only undermines the argument that Max functions as a spokesman for Wright’s political 
views” (119). This debate, however, remains to be settled. 
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 More so than the Daltons’, Max’s struggle to comprehend Bigger’s experience is 
perhaps the most poignant site of exigence for Wright’s choice of medium. Despite the 
lawyer’s sophisticated vision of race and class relations in America, he remains an 
outsider to the lives of Bigger and other African Americans. As many have noted, Max’s 
inadequacy reflects in part Wright’s own falling out with the Communist Party. But this 
problem is more closely tied to the ethos in Native Son’s production. In specific context 
of the Marxism of his era but touching on all intellectualizing of life, Wright once 
claimed, “No theory of life can take the place of life” (“Blueprint” 102). Max’s structural 
analysis of Bigger’s circumstances does indeed provide some insight into Bigger’s world. 
But he fails to imaginatively inhabit Bigger’s life with the simultaneous empathy and 
judgment that Wright invites from his readers. This latent critique of Max-like figures in 
the novel also highlights the shortcomings of all such theoretical analysis, including, of 
course, Agamben’s political theory that informs much of this dissertation. What Wrights 
reminds critics and lay readers alike is the enormous material and social complexity 
surrounding the lives of disenfranchised, exploited people that is so readily obscured by 
spectacle or further degraded by uncritical voyeurism. The novel form provides one kind 
of tool for grasping that complexity, creating both sweeping visions of our social, 
political, and material landscapes along with what Wright describes as the penetrating 
“cunning” into the lives of others. 
 
Conclusion: From Where and When to Read Native Son 
Keneth Kinnamon reports, “Irving Howe once wrote that ‘the day Native Son 
appeared, American culture was changed forever.’ The change was not basic or profound, 
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but it was real. The several hundred thousand readers of the work could no longer see 
racial issues in quite the same way” (5). Hundreds of reviews agree (2). To accomplish 
this change of perspective, Wright uses fiction to enable the reader’s access not only to an 
insider’s perspective on the space of the ghetto but also to the internal life of Bigger 
Thomas. Through other characters’ inability to perceive Bigger’s state of mind, the novel 
suggests that the exceptional structures define the ghetto and the lives of its inhabitants 
are difficult to enter and adequately comprehend. But with the “cunning” of fiction, 
Wright works to acquaint readers with Bigger and the Black Belt. This representation 
points toward a larger practice of politicized empathy, encouraging readers to act against 
such political and economic arrangements of violent iniquity. 
 For the past, present, and future readers of Native Son, how one understands the 
stakes of the novel is tied to how one reads the character Bigger Thomas. Critics will 
likely continue to stake new claims on this question, usually declaring Bigger as either a 
localized individual subject or a symbolic, universal figure. In what Kinnamon qualifies 
as “one of the very best early essays” on the novel, Donald B. Gibson “emphasizes 
Bigger as an individual person rather than a social symbol” (Kinnamon 8). More 
contemporary critics seem to lean in the opposite direction. JanMohamed categorizes 
many figures in Wright’s works as “composite characters” who “must also be understood 
as ‘collective,’ as opposed to idiosyncratically individuals, subjects” (33). Similarly, Ira 
Wells looks to Wright’s essay “How Bigger was Born” to support her argument that 
Bigger Thomas isn’t a specific contextualized figure but a universal one (892). In most 
cases, critics present valid cases for their differing conclusions. The most productive yet 
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difficult answer, however, is one that accounts for both of these seemingly divergent 
poles of Bigger’s representative status. 
 To not acknowledge Bigger’s presentation as an individual rather than a type 
would be to repeat the failures of Mary and Max. Yet, he is a fictional character who does 
representative work. Indeed, as Wright declares in “How Bigger was Born,” he has 
recognized the violent anger with which he infused in Bigger Thomas in whites as well 
(441). Instead of accepting a conflict between these two perspectives, readers can 
recognize that Bigger is not posed as a universal figure but rather a person—albeit 
fictional—caught in vast structures of iniquity and violence. Those overwhelming, 
powerful systems that profit from Bigger’s degradation take on a universal aspect. To 
suggest that many individuals, fictional or real, might react to circumstances like Bigger’s 
in a similar manner should not detract our attention to those individuals as individuals. 
And yet, though Richard Wright presents readers with a specific context of Bigger’s life 
in segregated Chicago, part of the novel’s so-called universal aspect hinges on how 
Bigger circumstances are not unique to 1930s and ’40s Chicagoans or even black peoples 
in the U.S. The conflicts and language that overflows within the novel is part of a long 
and wide American literary pattern. 
Through Boris Max, Wright invokes a major metaphor of the twentieth century: 
the living dead, the dead-in-life, zombies, life that is mimetic of death. In the previous 
chapter, I discussed how Octavia Butler summoned this image during Olamina’s time in 
the camps. In the next chapters, similar representations will become apparent. In Max’s 
statements during Bigger’s trial he refers to the young black man as a kind of risen 
“corpse” (Wright, Native 392). Of course, as numerous critics have argued, Max is not 
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necessarily either a reliable observer of black lives or an unmediated mouthpiece for the 
author’s own ideas. But Max’s words nevertheless leave an impression on the reader even 
if the text invites doubt over his legitimacy as a social critic. The metaphor of a “corpse” 
to describe Bigger’s existence presents an image of his life as a body without animating 
force. A walking corpse is a figure of abjection, a human automaton without agency. Max 
earns criticism for implying that Bigger entirely lacks control of his choices, but his 
argument that the ghetto works to render Bigger and other black citizens as walking 
corpses as part of its exceptional function is not out of line. 
The corpse metaphor is a recurring feature in black diasporic writing and 
American literature more broadly. Octavia Butler portrays her speculative concentration 
and torture camps as producing walking corpses and “zombies” in part as a reference to 
how people of color and other minorities have often been cast into this position in 
American history. Orlando Patterson influentially termed the status of slaves as one of 
social death, and scholars have argued that this condition, in different forms, extends to 
other disenfranchised groups after the Civil War as well. Even in David Walker’s 1828 
Appeal he casts conditions of slave life that engender apathy and abjection in the same 
light. He writes that the African American slave exists in a state of both “death-like 
apathy” and “death-like ignorance” outside the civil and legal life of the nation (65, 68). 
To be excluded from the full life of the nation, the Appeal suggests, is to live under the 
shadow of death—an existence mimetic of death. Walker captures the conditions of 
blacks as a group set outside the bounds of citizenship and humanity in order for their 
labor and difference to be exploited by economic and political power. 
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Bigger Thomas’s relationship to this recurrent American, indeed global metaphor 
of the living dead and its violent, exploitative context is the chief inspiration for critics to 
identify him as a universal representative figure. Bigger’s experience is more 
immediately similar to that of other people of color in the United States than to victims of 
Nazi Germany, torture victims in the fiction of Butler and Walter, migrant laborers in 
Steinbeck’s, or monstrous organisms in science fiction. But reading these texts as 
examples in a larger pattern of representations of American bare life and spaces of 
exception allows each example to inform the other, generating a stronger understanding 
of each author’s political project and the realities in which each is engaged. Yet texts like 
Native Son carry their exigency into the present, for the contexts may have changed but 
the stakes of exceptional power and zombified black bodies persist. 
The pattern of violence depicted in the novel has parallels across centuries of 
African-American writing, reaching to the present day. I have cited David Walker’s 
nineteenth-century Appeal throughout this chapter, but contemporary author Ta-Nehisi 
Coates writes about the same problems in his 2015 book Between the World and Me. Of 
his childhood in West Baltimore ghetto, Coates writes to his son, “Fear ruled everything 
around me, and I knew, as all black people do, that this fear was connected to the 
[American] Dream out there, to the unworried boys, to pie and pot roast, to the white 
fences and green lawns nightly beamed into our television sets” (29). Like Bigger 
Thomas, Coates feels a world of whiteness sprawling around him, constricting him. To 
Coates, this arrangement of life in the United States is strongly enforced by the police, 




And you know now, if you did not before, that the police departments of 
your country have been endowed with the authority to destroy your body. 
It does not matter if the destruction originates in a misunderstanding. It 
does not matter if the destruction springs from a foolish policy. . . . The 
destroyers will rarely be held accountable. Mostly they will receive 
pensions. (9) 
Coates’s twice-used phrase “it does not matter” signals what he sees as the continued 
exceptional nature of American police forces and the systems in which they operate. 
The violence and exploitation of Wright’s Chicago may have changed form and 
tactics into the present, but its nature persists within and without American cities. The 
deaths of black people at the hands of police continue, as does the damaging effects on 
black communities. Among many others, a text such as Native Son helps twenty-first 
century audiences to penetrate the endless repeated spectacle of cellphone footage and 
better imagine and empathize with the lives of people like Michael Brown, Freddie Gray, 
and Laquan McDonald. Though the novel has fallen from the spotlights of literary 
criticism, the work that Native Son seeks to accomplish—unmasking systems of violent 
exploitation and challenging readers to break cycles of failed empathy—similarly 




Chapter 3: “Ain’t the Law”: Migrant Workers and the Exceptional Spaces of 
Depression-Era California in The Grapes of Wrath 
 
Introduction 
In 1939, John Steinbeck’s epic novel The Grapes of Wrath rolled over American 
literary culture with its soulful depiction of dehumanized migrant workers in Depression-
era California. The text alternates between the narrative of Tom Joad and his family and 
“intercalary” chapters or “interchapters” that offer a grander, almost Grecian chorus-like 
vision of the forces shaping Oklahoma’s and California’s communities. Amid the Dust 
Bowl and Great Depression, the Joads and countless others are first literally dispossessed 
from their homes by banks and then gradually from their collective personhood as they 
migrate to pursue false promises of sustaining labor to the west. Despite the Joads’ status 
as American citizens, Californian corporations, police, and local communities actively 
degrade and abuse migrants—through tactics already refined over decades against 
laborers of color. Death and despair splinters the Joad family during their search for 
work, climaxing in fugitive status for Tom after he fights back against anti-migrant 
vigilantes and the stillbirth of his sister’s child. Yet Steinbeck injects a strain of hope with 
his closing scene in which the grieving mother offers her breast to a starving stranger. 
The greatest challenge for the Joads and their peers is the exposure to unregulated 
violence on the road and in corporate farm camps. These characters are cast both legally 
and in the public’s mind as dangerous outsiders. In fact, halfway through the narrative, 
Tom remarks about sheriff’s deputies, “. . . if it was the law they was workin’ with, why, 
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we could take it. But it ain’t the law. They’re a-workin’ away at our spirits. They’re a-
tryin’ to make us cringe an’ crawl like a whipped bitch. They tryin’ to break us” (Grapes 
278-9). The notion of “breaking” as a loss of one’s sanity or will to life occurs repeatedly 
through the novel, including as one of its opening motifs. Despite the hardships of 
imminent eviction, the narrator declares in the first interchapter that tenant families will 
not yet “break” so easily (3, 4). The forces that do threaten to “break” migrants, however, 
are police, vigilantes, local government, and corporate policies. Tom’s claim that “it ain’t 
the law” is not an argument about the nuances of legislation and court rulings. Rather, he 
means that the treatment of migrant workers is a violation of a greater ideal of justice and 
moral norms in which Steinbeck compels his readers to believe as well. Even without the 
vocabulary of political theory, the Joads and other migrants in the novel recognize the 
irregularities around them setting them apart from the hopes and fairness promised in our 
national imagination. 
The Grapes of Wrath is deeply invested in portraying the nature of the spaces and 
communities that the Joads and their peers traverse. The representation of these spaces 
binds together the individual stories of migrant families. The desolate stretches of 
highway, road camps, and corporate farms are among the spaces that Steinbeck reveals as 
hostile to migrants’ humanity. Importantly, the more concrete, localized spaces of camps 
and farms are only half the story. The “road” itself becomes a space of exception in the 
text, where local government, police, and vigilantes can act against migrants at will. 
While Steinbeck is also concerned with the representation of real, bounded sites of 
Oklahoma and California, the stretches of space between proper locations congeal into 
this seemingly endless road-space that is not unlike the trial-filled deserts of biblical tales. 
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The corporate growers’ camps, where migrants can find starvation-level wages, emerge 
as the novel’s symbiotic counterpart to the hazards of the road. These farms capitalize 
upon the migrants’ suffering, using the threat of violence and expulsion back to the 
starvation on road as a means of labor management. Steinbeck saw as much in his own 
experience as an erstwhile journalist and researcher. Corporate growers’ profit motive, so 
Steinbeck’s narrator argues, is responsible for the treatment of migrants that so closely 
mirrors the conditions of State torture victims and ghettoized minority groups in my 
previous two chapters. 
In many venues, the author links the organization and use of power in California’s 
agricultural regions with mid-century European fascism. A letter to his editor declares as 
much (Steinbeck, Letters 158). One of Steinbeck’s characters in In Dubious Battle (1936) 
remarks during an agricultural labor strike, “They’ve got this valley organized like Italy,” 
in reference to Benito Mussolini’s government (115). Whereas Giorgio Agamben finds 
the model for his theories in Nazi Germany, Steinbeck already locates a landscape 
marked by spaces of exception in the United States. Indeed, social scientist Nelson 
Pichardo describes the nature of the key organization behind migrants’ abuse, 
The [Associated Farmers of California] was perhaps the most virulent and 
notorious right-wing American group, with the possible exception of the 
Ku Klux Klan. . . . the power elite created and mobilized vigilante groups, 
organized under the auspices of the [Associated Farmers], that engaged in 
a reign of terror and intimidation targeted against the efforts of the 
farmworkers to agitate and organize. (25) 
136 
 
Though the power of the Associated Farmers is most intensely organized around their 
members’ labor camps, this group ultimately transforms the entire countryside into a 
space of exception for migrants. Yet these sites and the violence exercised on the road are 
not motivated by the immediate desires of the State but by private interests’ of the 
wealthy elite. As a result, this history and Steinbeck’s representation of it productively 
complicates European political theorists emphasis on the power and violence conjured 
solely by the State. 
The novel itself and the author’s letters bely how some critics have characterized 
his work over the decades. For example, F. W. Watt wrote in 1962 that “Steinbeck wrote 
neither to inspire, nor to provoke, nor to condemn, but to understand and portray honestly 
an aspect of life he found fascinating and perhaps bewildering” (52). Contrary to this 
claim, the choice to portray the lives of migrants at all in such a vast, epic narrative 
implies a need or responsibility—perhaps ethically, perhaps morally, perhaps 
politically—to see, at least in one’s imagination the people driven to the roads and 
placeless spaces of California. I characterize The Grapes of Wrath as an epic narrative 
following Eric Carlson’s claim that the novel is “epic in form as well as theme, mainly 
through the skillful interweaving of the interchapters and the narrative chapters” (755). 
As Peter Lisca claims, interchapters offer a picture of “social background” and “amplify 
the pattern of action created by the Joad family” alongside the function of “providing 
such historical information as the development of land ownership in California” (731). 
This intertwining allows readers to engage in the very personal experiences represented 
among the Joad family without losing sight of hundreds of thousands others caught up in 
the same spaces and circumstances. 
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Steinbeck’s formal choices work to show how these many individual tragedies 
constitute a crisis in our democratic institutions. The novel’s split form bridges the scales 
of its two concerns, the individual experiences of the Joads as part of a tapestry of 
thousands of migrants. By using the Joads as an example alongside the more expository 
narration in the interchapters, Steinbeck creates a sense of a general development, 
adaptation, and perseverance of the “Okie” population that mirrors the Joads’ own 
growth. Importantly, through the Joads The Grapes of Wrath personifies the sign of 
“dispossessed migrant” and “Okie,” undoing the discursive work of Californian 
institutions that casts these people as unwanted, dangerous outsiders. 
 
The Road and a People in Flight 
Before offering access to the specifically bounded spaces of corporate farm 
camps, Steinbeck introduces readers to the space of the “road.” Highways first pose 
natural challenges for families without money piled into unreliable vehicles. Much of the 
novel’s information about violence against migrants arrives from minor characters or 
disembodied speakers in interchapters. This relative distance of the Joads from violence, 
at least until later chapters, creates a sense of looming danger. This suspense and limited 
depiction prevents the abuse of migrants from becoming quotidian for the reader. In fact, 
the reader joins the Joads’ transition from ignorance to experience of the terror and 
violence on the roads of California. 
Not until they enter California do they encounter more human threats. But 
eventually the Joads and readers learn that the open spaces of road operate as a zone in 
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which migrants are abandoned to destitution and violence, especially those whose labor 
has been exhausted or those who refuse to remain docile workers. 
At first, Steinbeck links migrants and the road in a naturalist mode: they find 
themselves in competition with a harsh, naturalized environment. The Joads start out on 
what almost seems like a heroic journey or a biblical exodus to a promised land. Though 
these choices bely the man-made systems that are the true threat to Okies, the author’s 
choices in the first half of the text depict the migrants in a noble light, as would-be 
conquerors of their own travails. But underlying even this early representation of the road 
is the fact that Okies have been expelled from established communities. Without the 
protection of rights and bonds generated through organized communities, migrant 
workers are dangerously exposed to both the natural and human threats on the road. 
As the Joads join the masses of migrants traveling west they enter a state of 
placelessness. Steinbeck describes the travel of whom he names “a people in flight.” He 
writes, 
66 is the path of a people in flight, refugees from dust and shrinking land, 
from the thunder of tractors and shrinking ownership, from the desert’s 
slow northward invasion, from the twisting winds that howl up out of 
Texas, from the floods that bring no richness to the land and steal what 
little richness is there. From all of these the people are in flight, and they 
come into 66 from the tributary side roads, from the wagon tracks and the 




Importantly, Steinbeck describes the migrants in this passage as a “people in flight” 
rather than using a verbal phrase such as “people fleeing.” The Joads and their peers are 
not a group undertaking an action; they are described as a group defined by this process, 
as if perennially caught up in “flight” and its consequences of not belonging to any 
locality or community. 
 Though Steinbeck offers a noble naturalism in this interchapter passage, he has 
already foreshadowed the Okies’ tribulations through the rebellious character Muley 
Graves. Refusing to decamp from his Oklahoma community, Muley promises to fight a 
guerrilla campaign against “bank men.” To Casy and Tom, he declares, 
God knows the lan’ ain’t no good. Nobody been able to make a crop for 
years. But them sons-a-bitches at their desks, they jus’ chopped folks in 
two for their margin a profit. They jus’ cut ‘em in two. Place where folks 
live is them folks. They ain’t whole, out lonely on the road in a piled-up 
car. They ain’t alive no more. Them sons-a-bitches killed ‘em. (Grapes 
52) 
Muley’s characterization and dialogue seem to strike both Tom and Casy as overwrought, 
an impression the reader is invited to share. Yet his prophecy proves accurate. Strikingly, 
however, Muley does not suggest that the steady degradation of migrants’ on the road 
will begin there. Through this character, the author suggests that the displacement of 
communities and families is already a deadly blow to their identities as whole, 
enfranchised people. For the first significant moment in the text, Steinbeck suggests—
though readers are left to be credulous or skeptical of their own accord—that this 
population of migrants is automatically entered into a kind of exceptional death-in-life 
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when their bonds to family farms is severed. And already from the outset of the Joads’ 
journey, Muley identifies “margin a profit” as the chief cause behind the Okies 
marginalization and exploitation. 
Even without the police oppression and threat of vigilantism they find in 
California, existence on the road without proper shelter, food, or work takes a toll on 
migrants. At the end of the interchapter Chapter 21, Steinbeck writes of how the road 
transforms them: “And the roads were crowded with men ravenous for work, murderous 
for work” (284). Evicted from communities through which they might collectively 
manage resources, migrants are thrown into competition against each other for artificially 
scarce wages. They are driven to the extreme states of “murderous” and “ravenous,” but 
Steinbeck nevertheless centers the desire for productive, fulfilling labor at the heart of 
their corrupted desires. They are caught up in a condition that becomes mimetic of death, 
but they retain a form of human dignity in the desire to work. John Reed writes astutely, 
“Steinbeck is not romanticizing the passions of the Okies, as the constant animal imagery 
indicates; he is simply demonstrating that they retain a sensuous and vital force that has 
gone out of the business and managerial class” (Reed 829). He elaborates, “The Okies are 
not strangers to violence. . . . Steinbeck carefully shows that the Okies live in a climate of 
toughness and violence and are prepared to respond violently to protect themselves” 
(836-7). On the one hand, this description marks the oppressed Okies as dangerous. On 
the other hand, it also hints at their power, if it could be harnessed.  
The Grapes of Wrath emphatically depicts the inherent risks for migrants caught 
up in the placeless spaces of the road. But this exceptional existence entails a further 
danger of violence from people and institutions invested in, even profiting from enforcing 
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the Okies’ status as outsiders. The police are one such threat, as one character explains to 
the Joads. He says, “Deputy sheriff comes on by in the night. Might make it tough for ya. 
. . . Got a law about vagrants” (186). Such vagrancy laws and others of the kind give the 
color of law to the actions of police, deputies, and vigilantes that Steinbeck highlights in 
the novel. 
Without protections from local communities or State institutions, The Grapes of 
Wrath emphatically insists that violence is near at hand for migrants on the road. At a 
roadside camp, an unnamed young man explains to Tom and Ma Joad while alluding to 
police and vigilantes, “They’ll pick you right off. You got no name, no property. They’ll 
find you in a ditch, with the blood dried on your mouth an’ your nose. Be one little line in 
the paper—know what it’ll say? ‘Vagrant foun’ dead.’ An’ that’s all. You’ll see a lot of 
them little lines, ‘Vagrant foun’ dead’” (Steinbeck, Grapes 247). Though this character’s 
claim is about the vulnerability of migrants in particular, the text also implies a lack of 
“name” and property can leave anyone exposed to potential violence. The young man 
implies that the corpses of agitating migrants will be unceremoniously forgotten for 
resisting the active enforcement of their outsider, dispossessed status. 
The Grapes of Wrath offers multiple accounts of police powers used to prevent 
dangerous, unwanted Okies from contaminating towns and cities. One of the earliest 
moments occurs in Chapter 12 in one of the text’s many abstract dialogues without 
quotation marks between unidentified speakers. Steinbeck writes, 
This is a free country. Fella can go where he wants. 
That’s what you think! Ever hear of the border patrol on the 
California line? Police from Los Angeles—stopped you bastards, turned 
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you back. Says, if you can’t buy no real estate we don’t want you. Says, 
got a driver’s license? Le’s see it. Tore it up. Says you can’t come in 
without no driver’s license. (120) 
These L. A. police tactics, loaded with the implied threat of force, are portrayed as 
exceptional, demanding unlawful proof of a right to free passage. The text’s 
representation is based on historical reality. Susan Shillinglaw states, “For a few weeks in 
early 1936, the Los Angeles Police Department, on its own initiative, threw up a 
blockade across the California-Arizona border, the ‘bum-blockade,’ which prevented 
migrants from crossing into California,” lasting for two months (111-2). The criterion for 
becoming part of the Los Angeles polity is clear: property, which migrants lack by 
definition. These policies work to contain migrants on the road, a space in which 
Americans’ idealized right to pursue their own socio-economic destiny is actively 
subverted. 
In both The Grapes of Wrath and In Dubious Battle Steinbeck depicts deputies 
and vigilantes—technically illegitimate but partnered with local police and economic 
interests—using violence and its threat in order to maintain an oppressive order over 
migrant bodies. One character says,  
“People gonna have a look in their eye . . . Gonna be deputy sheriffs, an’ 
they’ll push you aroun’. You camp on the roadside, and they’ll move you 
on. You gonna see in people’s face they’re scairt. They know a hungry 
fella gonna get food even if he got to take it. They know that fallow lan’s a 
sin an’ somebody’ gonna take it. What the hell! You never been called 
‘Okie’ yet.” (Steinbeck, Grapes 205) 
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The speaker acknowledges the rationale behind such oppressive tactics, implicating the 
“people” of these counties not in a fear charged by ignorance but rather in open 
knowledge of the economic injustice and the entailed suffering when he says, “They 
know that fallow lan’s a sin.” The text suggests that these particular results of how 
agricultural production is organized in the state are not arcane or hidden but quite obvious 
and well-established. 
Experienced residents of the federally-funded Weedpatch Camp, a relief camp for 
migrants, demonstrate a closer knowledge of police tactics than most. As the character 
Huston says, “You know a vagrant is anybody a cop don’t like. An’ that’s why they hate 
this here camp. No cops can get in. This here’s United States, not California” (Grapes 
334). While such vagrancy laws carry the color and form of law, Huston points to their 
exceptional intent—not to manage vagrancy itself, but to use the sign of “vagrancy” as a 
tool to constrain undesirable bodies without legitimate cause. The government camp’s 
saving grace is that it falls under federal jurisdiction, whereas the efforts to oppress and 
exploit migrant workers arise from local and state-level actors and institutions. 
Fascinatingly, in this passage Huston marks a firm distinction between California and the 
United States. Given the context of the previous sentence, he means to note the fact of 
separate jurisdictions. But his words create a dissonance, suggesting that California—at 
least the portion in which the characters are living and trying to work—is literally 
separate from the rest of the country. This comment, like so many others in the novel, 
heightens the impression that California’s public and private institutions are acting 
outside the scope of national moral ideals and legal norms. 
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Steinbeck depicts many deputies as deliberately instigating trouble in migrant 
camps in order to brutalize and exert power. In an interchapter, his unnamed narrator 
impersonates a deputy to say, “Talking in the camps, the deputies, fat-assed men with 
guns slung on fat hips, swaggering through the camps: Give ‘em somepin to think about. 
Got to keep ‘em in line or Christ only knows what they’ll do. Why, Jesus, they’re as 
dangerous as niggers in the South! If they ever get together there ain’t nothin’ that’ll stop 
them” (Grapes 236). This action of “keep ‘em in line” with implied violence is the most 
explicit connection the author will make between the systematic oppression of Okies and 
other minority labor groups. This passage suggests that the tactics deployed against 
migrants are not an isolated aberration. By linking Southern blacks and Okies, the author 
highlights the longer history and refined practice of American economic interests 
spreading ideologies of dangerous difference. 
Indeed, the xenophobic assertion of power is not the only motivation for police 
and their agents in the novel. Steinbeck suggests another motivation for police to 
brutalize migrants. The text notes at one point, albeit through the hearsay, that police 
forces are offered financial incentives for their abuse of the Okies. A character claims, 
“Sheriff gets seventy-five cents a day for each prisoner, an’ he feeds ‘em for a quarter. If 
he ain’t got prisoners, he don’t make no profit. This fella says he didn’t pick up nobody 
for a week, an’ the sheriff tol’ ‘im he better bring in guys or give up his button” (Grapes 
271). The novel speculates that police are not simply politically aligned with the 
Associated Farmers, but they have immediate financial incentives as well. In other words, 
widespread profit motives lay beneath the fear mobilized against migrants to justify the 
transformation of the road into an active and massive space of exception. 
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Still, police and sheriffs are not the only institutions involved in the exercise of 
power over migrants on the road. The California Department of Health, contrary to the 
sense its title might evoke, used its ordinances to disrupt migrant camps, preventing their 
permanence and the risk of community organizing. The Grapes of Wrath mentions at 
several points what was a key plot element in the farm laborers’ strike battles at the 
center of In Dubious Battle: the role of the Department of Health in ruling what kind of 
assemblies are a threat to “public health.” For example, the author writes, “And then the 
raids—the swoop of armed deputies on the squatters’ camps. Get out. Department of 
Health orders. This camp is a menace to health” (237). On this subject Shillinglaw 
reports, “A health official in Fresno declared that migrants were ‘incapable of being 
absorbed into our civilization.’ He continued his speech: ‘You cannot legislate these 
people out of California . . . but you an make it difficult for them when they are here’” 
(122). Like the police, the Department of Health uses facile cause to justify the disruption 
of the camps of migrants and strikers alike. In Priscilla Wald’s monograph Contagious: 
Cultures, Carriers, and the Outbreak Narrative (2008), she examines how American 
discourses of public health have been repeated used to marginalize and contain minority 
populations throughout the twentieth-century. What Steinbeck alludes to here shares this 
legacy. Most significantly, however, this connection to state government implies the 
existence of a much broader network in the management of these spaces of exception in 
collusion with the brutish police and corporate farms. 
While the novel criticizes the police and other institutions, vigilante activity is the 
exceptional factor that leads to Jim Casy’s death and Tom’s flight from the family. The 
vigilante armies in The Grapes of Wrath are grounded in reality. Moreover, vigilantes 
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and legitimate police forces often worked hand in hand. Pichardo, for example, claims, 
“The police were often conspicuously absent until after a vigilante raid, and later arrested 
workers rather than the vigilantes” (36). The space of exception that the roads of 
California become proves fertile for the embrace of vigilantism and other lawlessness. 
Describing this phenomenon, Steinbeck writes, “The local people whipped themselves 
into a mold of cruelty. Then they formed units, squads, and armed them—with clubs, 
with gas, with guns. We own the country. We can’t let these Okies get out of hand. And 
the men who were armed did not own the land, but they thought they did” (Grapes 283). 
Here Steinbeck offers his insight into the wedge driven between the non-elite classes of 
California and the migrant workers coming from the east. The “local people” think of 
themselves as “owners” of land and thus part of a local hierarchy and community, part of 
the lowest common denominator of the privilege erected by excluding others. Steinbeck 
portrays the communities of California as fiercely founded on a negative definition and 
hostility to otherness despite the inequities already present within them. 
A passage from Steinbeck’s earlier In Dubious Battle offers a broader, more 
historical insight into how the author understood the vigilantes that also appear in The 
Grapes of Wrath. Jim, one of two main characters, asks the other, Mac, a committed 
Communist Party labor organizer, “Mac, who in hell are these vigilantes, anyway? What 
kind of guys are they?” Mac responds, 
 “Why, they’re the dirtiest guys in any town. They’re the same ones 
that burned the houses of old German people during the war. They’re the 
same ones that lynch Negroes. They like to be cruel. They like to hurt 
people, and they always give it a nice name, patriotism or protecting the 
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constitution. But they’re just the old nigger torturers working. The owners 
use ‘em, tell ‘em we have to protect the people against the reds. Y’see that 
let’s ‘em burn houses and torture and beat people with no danger. And 
that’s all they want to do, anyway.” (Steinbeck, Dubious 131)  
Though less explicit in The Grapes of Wrath, in this novel he connects the vigilantes 
organized against agricultural union efforts to the violence used against other exploited or 
vulnerable groups. Importantly, Mac’s explanation captures the construction of difference 
by the “owners” at the foundation of these predations. His examples of vigilante targets 
include African Americans who suffered at the hands of “the old nigger torturers.” Again, 
but more directly, Steinbeck links the exceptional structures deployed to manage the 
labor and bodies of black people with those being used against white migrant workers. 
Both Steinbeck and many critics have argued that the characters’ sentiments in In 
Dubious Battle are not exactly the author’s own, so Mac’s assessment that vigilantes 
“like to be cruel” cannot be casually accepted as author’s point of view. But whatever 
vigilantes’ motivations are, Steinbeck acknowledges the long tradition of police and 
private interests acting in capacities that, as Tom Joad says, “ain’t the law.” On the road, 
beyond the bounds of established civil communities, police and vigilante power has little 
to no restriction. 
The vigilantism in the novel is reflective of a well-documented history. Carey 
McWilliams reported in 1942 that “The Associated Farmers were to raise an army of 600 
men; the business interests in Modesto were to raise and to drill a similar force. Both 
groups were organized in such a way that they could be mobilized on two hours’ notice” 
(668). Pichardo states that the Associated Farmers formed and mobilized vigilantes due 
148 
 
to “the threat of farmworker militancy” and “the inability of normal institutional power to 
combat farmworker unionization efforts” (30).
11
 He continues to write that the Associated 
Farmers organization “was responsible for engineering vigilante attacks upon striking 
farmworkers. It also sought to pass antipicketing ordinances, withhold relief payments to 
farmworkers, and prosecute union leaders under the Criminal Syndicalism Act” (30). The 
Associated Farmers’ rationale arises from the threats that unions posed to its members’ 
profits and power, in not only the agricultural sector but also other industries. A Fortune 
magazine writer in 1939 explained the situation:  
[A union’s] mere existence as a strike threat fill California’s growers with 
panic. Harvesting can’t wait on negotiation. Crops must be picked within a 
few days of ripening or not at all; and if not at all, the result may be 
financial ruin. This has created a situation of which thoughtful 
Californians are far from proud. Vigilante activity against strikers and 
organizers since 1932 has been bloody and direct. Scores of workers have 
been injured and so have a number of strikebreakers and deputized 
townspeople and farmers. California’s industrialized farming can exhibit 
all the customary weapons of industrial warfare including tear gas, finks, 
goon squads, propaganda, bribery, and espionage. (“I Wonder” 635) 
                                                 
11
 Historian David Selvin writes that the surge in California’s Depression-era vigilantism was a new kind of 
violence organized specifically against the threat of unions (51). Though the organization and sponsorship 
of vigilante groups by corporate interests like the Associated Farmers is relatively novel by the 1930s, we 
see in my first chapter how vigilantism has a deeply ingrained and symbiotic history with the economic and 
legal institutions in the United States. The representation of vigilantism in texts like The Parable of the 
Talents, Native Son, and The Grapes of Wrath forms an image of American vigilantes as an exceptional 
mechanism to maintain power over disenfranchised groups, including those racialized as dangerous others 
and those dominated for their labor value. Indeed, as each of these texts have suggested, these two 
categories are far from mutually exclusive. 
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In contrast to these accounts, Steinbeck’s portrayal of vigilantes seems quite subdued. 
But he nevertheless points to the role of these private citizens in enforcing the exceptional 
nature of the spaces in which migrants were allowed. 
 The flood at the novel’s conclusion symbolizes the cumulative effect of life on the 
road upon migrants. Just as Steinbeck earlier presented the road in a naturalistic mode, he 
returns to a naturalist metaphor with this biblical flood. This kind of choice again 
obscures the man-made suffering that the flood exacerbates, but the power and 
devastation of this catastrophe further reveals the absolute exposure of migrants living on 
the road. In the same vein, a return to this style infuses a sense of the heroic rather than a 
tragedy of marginalized figures. Steinbeck writes, 
Then from the tents, from the crowded barns, groups of sodden 
men went out, their clothes slopping rags, their shoes muddy pulp. They 
splashed out through the water, to the towns, to the country stores, to the 
relief offices, to beg for food, to cringe and beg for food, to beg for relief, 
to try to steal, to lie. And under the begging, and under the cringing, a 
hopeless anger began to smolder. And in the little towns pity for the 
sodden men changed to anger, and anger at the hungry people changed to 
fear of them. Then sheriffs swore in deputies in droves, and orders were 
rushed for rifles, for tear gas, for ammunition. Then the hungry men 
crowded the alleys behind the stores to beg for bread, to beg for rotting 
vegetables, to steal when they could. (433-4) 
The word “to beg” appear six times along with verbs like “to cringe,” “to steal,” and “to 
lie.” Steinbeck presents migrants, these “sodden men” in a liminal state, mimetic of 
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death. Along with the literal connotation of wetness, the Oxford English Dictionary 
defines “sodden” as “rendered dull, stupid, or expressionless” and “characterized by 
heaviness, dullness, or want of vivacity.” The natural and artificial forces arrayed against 
Okies on the road makes real the dehumanizing discourses deployed against them. Here 
Steinbeck indicates a cycle of migrants’ exclusion from proper communities: they are 
categorized as unwanted and dangerous, and the result of this labeling leads to the 
smoldering of “a hopeless anger.” Even this great natural catastrophe further feeds into 
the dynamics established within the road’s zone of exception. 
 
Camps and Corporate Farms 
Filled with the terrors of scarcity and violence, the open, seemingly unbounded 
spaces on the roads of California are nevertheless not the only spaces of exception 
represented in The Grapes of Wrath. The peach orchard that the Joads arrive at late in the 
novel is one of the few corporate growers’ camps depicted or mentioned in detail in the 
text. These farms are organized like labor camps, intentionally exploiting an abject 
population and maintaining order among them through the threat of violence and 
expulsion. Moreover, these farms are the nexuses around which the treatment of Okies is 
organized. Yet, before the Joads reach the peach orchard, Steinbeck delivers them to 
Weedpatch Camp, a federally-funded relief camp. He juxtaposes his representation of 
these two spaces in order to, through their contrast, demonstrate the nature and 
motivations of the forces invested in the exceptional treatment of migrant workers. 
 The federal camp provides migrants with basic sanitary necessities alongside 
recognition of migrants’ rights in opposition to the unchecked power of local police and 
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vigilantes on the road. Residence in such camps, however, is not free: the Joads are told 
that a site costs “a dollar a week” or matching labor (Grapes 287). Weedpatch, a camp 
watchman explains, is governed by an elected Central Committee that sets rules and 
keeps order among the migrants. In fact, in Steinbeck’s writing journal he kept while 
composing The Grapes of Wrath, he notes Weedpatch camp as a crucial experience of 
“democratic procedure” for the migrants (Working 64). This kind of existence is in stark 
contrast to the status of Okies as virtual non-citizens, even non-people while they live out 
on the road. 
 As a result, however, these camps serve as a great source of animus in the novel. 
The Central Committee member Thomas explains to Tom Joad, “Well, the Association 
don’t like the government camps. Can’t get a deputy in there. The people make their own 
laws, I hear, and you can’t arrest a man without a warrant. Now if there was a big fight 
and maybe shooting—a bunch of deputies could go in and clean out the camp” (296). 
Federal jurisdiction protects these camps from the casual abuse of power by local law 
enforcement, requiring that police respect the constitutional requirement of a warrant 
before arresting a citizens. But, as Thomas suggests, police are prepared to act in the 
necessity of an emergency—which would justify the suspension of law—to break up the 
camp. This comment strongly implies the police’s desire to manufacture such necessity. 
Even though the government camp’s status works as impediment to the Association-
sponsored police activity, Steinbeck implies a continual effort to undermine migrants’ 
ability to organize themselves into enfranchised communities. 
Steinbeck is explicit upon this point. Another character from the government 
camp explains to Tom the nature of this conflict—also, of course, for the reader’s benefit. 
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He says of the police and Associated Farmers, “They’re scairt we’ll organize, I guess. 
An’ maybe they’re right. This here camp is a organization. People there look out for 
theirselves. . . . We ain’t never had no trouble with the law. I guess the big farmers is 
scairt of that. Can’t throw us in jail—why, it scares ‘em. Figger maybe if we can gove’n 
ourselves, maybe we’ll do other things” (297). The lack of specific details in favor of 
abstract concepts in this speech is perhaps representative of the young speaker’s lack of 
education and worldliness. He suggests that migrants could “do other things,” as if he 
cannot imagine the possibilities of an organized community of thousands. Yet this 
moment of vague abstraction serves a larger purpose in the text; Steinbeck’s choice of 
less specificity here creates a great open moment of speculation about the potential for 
what a migrant organization could become—grounded in the “democratic experience” of 
Weedpatch Camp. But this sense of possibility is exactly what the local Californian 
interests wish to suppress; the potential to imagine a different existence—and specifically 
one of resistance to their dispossession—makes Okies dangerous. 
In truth, Weedpatch Camp is only a stop-gap, New Deal-style, moderate liberal 
solution to migrants’ plight. The camp offers limited housing and no opportunities for 
sustained employment. The communists from In Dubious Battle, for example, would 
certainly demand more. But Steinbeck emphasizes what he portrays as the core value of 
the camp: its status as a space of law and respect for human dignity. Thus, Weedpatch 
Camp exists in the narrative not as an idealized goal but as a stark contrast to the 
treatment of migrants in corporate farm camps.  
Earlier in the novel, Steinbeck foreshadows the ill-intent behind large agricultural 
labor camps. A man on the road explains to the Joad family the exploitative labor 
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recruitment and management tactics. He describes how corporate farmers mass advertise 
a limited number of jobs to thousands desperate for work as a strategy to keep labor 
readily available and wages depressed. He states, “The more fellas he can get, an’ the 
hungrier, less he’s gonna pay” (190). Corporate farmers’ logic is that when workers 
become more pressed for survival, they will be more amenable to worse labor conditions 
and wages. The same “ragged man” further explains how this system affected him and 
his family. He says, 
“I tried to tell you fellas,” he said, “Somepin it took me a year to find out. 
Took two kids dead, took my wife dead to show me. But I can’t tell you. I 
should of knew that. Nobody couldn’t tell me, neither. I can’t tell ya about 
them little fellas layin’ in the tent with their bellies puffed out an’ jus’ skin 
on their bones, an’ shiverin’ an’ whinin’ like pups, an’ me runnin’ aroun’ 
tryin’ to get work. . . . ‘Them children died a heart failure.’” (190) 
At first caught up in the desperation to feed his family, this man could not see the futility 
of his labor. Though he tries to warn the Joads of the trap of survival that they will enter 
in the corporate farming system, he admits that nobody can “tell you” the truth to an 
extent that migrant workers might escape this double-bind. Even conjuring the images of 
his dead wife and children as an example are not enough to sway migrants away from the 
perils of California. With little resources, the Joads and other migrants cannot risk turning 
back east. Of course, this moment in the text serves two purposes: to highlight the awful 
choices facing migrants in these growers’ camps and to call readers’ attention to the 
stakes of migrants’ lives. 
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More secondhand details of life in farm camps emerges throughout the text before 
the Joads arrive at one themselves. Two characters in the government relief camp discuss 
that conditions they endured while working at a cattle company compound. One “sad 
boy” says, “Honest to God, they got a cop for ever’ ten people. Got one water faucet for 
‘bout two hundred people.” This comparison between the number of cops and faucets 
highlights the priorities of such sites: armed labor management over hygiene and health. 
The other man replies, “You ain’t got to tell me. I was there. They got a block of 
shacks—thirty-five of ‘em in a row, an’ fifteen deep. An’ they got ten crappers for the 
whole shebang. An’, Christ, you could smell ‘em a mile.” Though this description is only 
one example, the novel clearly suggests that it is representative of a number of corporate 
camps. Then the second speaker continues, “One of them deputies give me the lowdown. 
. . . He says, ‘Give people hot water, an’ they gonna want hot water. Give ‘em flush 
toilets, an’ they gonna want ‘em.’ He says, ‘You give them goddamn Okies stuff like that 
an’ they’ll want ‘em’” (333). Again, the author leaves a comparison to the community 
and protections of the federal camp and the near complete lack of these qualities in other 
spaces where migrants, according to local authorities, properly belong. 
The Joads eventually learn firsthand about corporate growers’ camps after they 
have to leave Weedpatch Camp in order to find more sustainable work. The account in 
Chapter 26 is one of the most detailed accounts of a specific location since the first one 
hundred pages set in Oklahoma. They find themselves ominously escorted by police to a 
“Hoopers Ranches, Incorporated” peach orchard. At the compound “high wire gate” 
guarded by two men with shotguns awaits them. Steinbeck writes that “Tom saw a line of 
men standing in the ditch beside the road, saw their mouths open as though they were 
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yelling, saw their shaking fists and their furious faces” (368). As another deputy checks 
the Joads into the new camp, he warns, “Now you look here. We don’t want no trouble 
with you. Jes’ do your work and mind your own business and you’ll be alright” (369). In 
these few pages the text already creates an atmosphere of hostility in this camp. The 
police gather migrants on the road and lead them directly to the orchard, as if to prevent 
migrants from lingering around the local town on other private and public lands. The 
security and apparent unrest around the compound points to the risk of violent conflict 
without yet elaborating upon its factors. The purpose of armed guards is initially 
ambiguous: whether to keep trespassers out or to keep laborers in line within the camp. 
 The family’s assigned living quarters prove barely fit for human habitation. 
Steinbeck writes, “Ma opened the door of the house and stepped inside. The floor was 
splashed with grease. In the one room stood a rusty tin stove and nothing more. The tin 
stove rested on four bricks and its rusty stovepipe went up through the roof. The room 
smelled of sweat and grease” (369). The shack more resembles an animal den than a 
human domicile. The text’s emphasis on “sweat and grease” characterizes this space as 
one of bodily residues, an amalgam of both human sweat and non-human animal grease, 
suggesting a loss of distinction between human and animal in this space. Just as the 
excess grease stains the room after the consumption of animal products, Steinbeck leaves 
readers’ with the impression that human laborers, too, have been bodily consumed here. 
Even though Ma tries to put the shack in a good light for her family, Steinbeck writes, “A 
fear had fallen on them” to capture the rising though still subdued tension the Joads are 
discovering here (369). This decidedly untidy space without sufficient hygienic facilities 
is a sharp, intentional contrast to what the Joads encountered at the Weedpatch camp. 
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Here Okies are laboring, unruly bodies, while in the government camp they were treated 
as dignified citizens deserving of mutual respect. 
 Steinbeck communicates much of the orchard camp’s nature through his 
description of its atmosphere. Though this method of representation effectively shares the 
Joads’ experience with readers, the novel still does not offer quite a full picture of these 
sites. Offering more historical detail, Shillinglaw summarizes, “Shacks were often 
substandard. A toilet might be shared by fifty workers, and separate male and female 
facilities did not exist. Communal cooking facilities were scarce. Families were crowded 
into one room hovels” (121). Fortune magazine further reports, 
They live under physical conditions ranging from the fairly 
tolerable to the terribly bad. Most of California’s growers supply either 
tent space or permanent shelter on their own land . . . Some growers’ 
camps are well built and equipped, but the average is poor. The last 
reports of the state Division of Immigration and Housing, which since 
1933 has had only three full-time inspectors for the job of examining over 
8,000 publics and private camps, rate almost a third of them as “bad”—
i.e., either poorly equipped or poorly policed. A typical big grower’s 
camp, not a “bad” one, consists of frame cabins arranged in rows, with a 
water line between every two rows. There would be communal 
bathhouses, perhaps flush toilets or perhaps a few earth-pit privies. The 
cabins rent for from $1 to $10 a month, and are furnished typically with a 
wood- or gas-burning stove, cots or pallets, and a water pail. But not even 
the big growers provide housing for more than part of their peak labor 
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load. Many of the migrants live in dirty roadside tourist camps, labor 
contractors’ camps, privately run tenting grounds, where the rents may be 
as high or higher but the equipment is more primitive. Some live in 
squatters camps. (“I Wonder” 624) 
This article indicates that there was far more variance than Steinbeck depicts among the 
kinds of camps that large farms used to accommodate their labor force. Yet the author’s 
choice to focus on the Joads’ particular experience in the orchard camp is crucial for 
enabling readers’ imaginative access to these sites. He offers an affective experience that 
the audience is invited to join as a participant. 
In the orchard Steinbeck initially depicts the Joads’ labor as exuberant and 
hopeful, but the camp takes on a pallor as the narration continues. Their interaction with 
the peaches themselves is nearly joyful (Grapes 370). Yet, exhausted by their meticulous 
work, they discover the disappointment that their untrained labor earns them a despicably 
low wage (371). At the end of the day’s work, Steinbeck writes of the Joads, “They 
emerged from the orchard into the dusty street between the red shacks. The low yellow 
light of kerosene lanterns shone from some of the doorways, and inside, in the half-
gloom, the black shapes of people moved about. At the end of the street a guard still sat, 
his shotgun resting against his knee” (377). This twilight scene echoes an image of the 
underworld or a connection to Plato’s allegory of the cave. The expression “half-gloom” 
characterizes this passage, implying that even after only a day working at the corporate 
farm, the Joads slipped into a state in which they can only partially perceive the world 
around them. The low light and “black shapes of people” suggests that the family is 
entering a space of ephemeral, not-quite-real people in which the shadows and silhouettes 
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of other laborers are perhaps indistinguishable. At this moment they cannot see the other 
workers as they see themselves; this metaphor suggests a dehumanizing 
compartmentalization of the laborers in the farm where they are not fully realized human 
beings and fellow citizens but interchangeable, wraith-like entities. Not only does this 
passage suggest that the Joads are being cut off from the other migrants around them, but 
it also foretells how the Joads themselves could become only the “black shapes of 
people.” Yet, of course, the only identifiable figure in this passage is the armed guard at 
the end of the street. The security apparatus remains distinct even when the population of 
workers becomes a hazy amalgam. 
 A later moment reveals the true purpose for the camp’s security. In the evening as 
Tom takes a walk through the compound, he overhears a conversation between two 
guards about tactics for managing the camp’s laborers. Steinbeck writes, 
 “We won’t have no job if it comes too easy,’ Mack said. 
 “We’ll have a job, all right. These goddamn Okies! You got to 
watch ‘em all the time. Things get a little quiet, we can always stir ‘em up 
a little.” (Grapes 378) 
The first speakers’ words suggest that the guards are actually in a similarly precarious 
situation as the migrant workers. He offers a glimpse into how the agricultural economy 
benefits from his relative vulnerability as a laborer as well. But ultimately Mack serves as 
Steinbeck’s straw man from the ensuing tirade. The second speaker reveals a seemingly 
contradictory prejudice against “these goddamn Okies” and acknowledgement that the 
necessity of surveillance and control of migrants is partly manufactured by guards and 
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their corporate managers. In other words, migrant workers are only a threat when they are 
made so. 
 The peach orchard and other growers’ camps are not sites as extreme as torture 
chambers and concentration camps. Steinbeck seems to limit his depiction, as if he were 
hesitant to portray his characters “breaking” rather than emphasizing their deep strength. 
But all of these spaces retain an exceptional character organized around the management 
of unruly or supposedly unwanted bodies with the underlying intent of exploiting their 
labor.  
 
The Making of “Okies” 
 The stakes of The Grapes of Wrath is the violence and suffering visited upon the 
migrant population. The road and corporate camps are sites of violence, both promised 
and delivered. The author, however, does not naturalize this violence but depicts how it is 
mobilized via a range of discourses practiced in the novel. The displaced people of The 
Grapes of Wrath are a tough and hardy lot. But, as the novel demonstrates, their literal 
dispossession along with the disregard for their humanity is bound to their very 
categorization and treatment as “migrants” and “Okies” who by definition lack proper 
homes and communities. 
Several dialogues and expositions highlight the legal and political function of 
migrants’ placelessness on the road. By keeping migrants in this kind of perpetual 
suspension without belonging to a specific polity, they are kept from either falling under 
the umbrella of a town, county’s, or state’s responsibility or democratic franchise. As one 
character explains to the other, 
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“But you jus’ camp in one place a little while, an’ you see how 
quick a deputy sheriff shoves you along.” . . . 
 “But what the hell for?” 
 “I tell ya I don’ know. Some says they don’ want us to vote; keeps 
us movin’ so we can’t vote. An’ some says so we can’t get on relief. An’ 
some says if we set in one place we’d get organized.” (Steinbeck, Grapes 
244) 
Here Steinbeck uses the one speaker’s professed ignorance as a foil for the reader’s own 
naiveté. He claims to not know the answer to “what the hell for?”, yet proffers three 
interlinked explanations for readers’ benefit. Local institutions are invested in denying 
migrant workers the political influence of the vote or community organization while also 
abrogating any obligation for the basic well-being for non-residents. In truth, the text 
implies speaker does “know” the facts on the ground. His statement does not reflect a 
lack of knowledge but an incredulity toward the inhumanity offered to migrant workers. 
 The word “migrant” itself is a slippery term. Shillinglaw points to its two 
conflicting connotations as bodies in either perpetual or temporary movement, looking 
for a place in which to settle and make residence (Shillinglaw 114). She suggests that the 
migration of whites to California from the east prompted a particular crisis for the 
established system of temporary, vulnerable labor in the state’s agricultural sector. The 
prevailing logic at the time was that, “The Joads are part of a migration—they were in 
California to stay, while the Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, and Mexican field-workers were 
migratory and thus deportable” (original emphasis, 115). The influx of white migrants 
creates a crisis within this category of exploitable laborers, which was once primarily 
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populated by people of color. The inappropriate inclusion of whiteness in this category 
both threatens the privileges of whiteness and the accepted mistreatment of laborers of 
color. Furthermore, the westward movement of displaced farmers marked an influx of 
families over the easier to manage labor pool of lone males (“I Wonder” 627). These facts 
perhaps in part precipitated Steinbeck’s own interest as a fairly moderate liberal who in 
his writing career does not display the same deep, sustained empathy for people of color 
as he does for the Okies. 
 In the interchapter Chapter 21, Steinbeck offers insight into the discourses among 
Californian communities that work to legitimize the exceptional treatment of migrant 
workers. In this abstract, disembodied exchange, he writes, 
They said, These goddamned Okies are thieves. They’ll steal anything. 
They’ve got no sense of property rights. 
 And the latter was true, for how can a man without property know 
the ache of ownership? And the defending people said, They bring 
disease, they’re filthy. We can’t have them in the schools. They’re 
strangers. (283) 
In this passage, Steinbeck undermines the discriminatory logic utilized against Okies and 
other migrant workers. He explicitly calls out the fallacy of expecting dispossessed 
people ejected from the normal sphere of capitalist American life to continue upholding 
those norms. In this commentary Okies are actively excluded from communities in which 
values like property rights are upheld, yet the reason articulated for this exclusion is that 
migrants do not conform to the communities which they are not permitted to join. 
Moreover, Steinbeck’s reference to the “ache of ownership” is partially ironic when this 
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affect and the stakes of migrants’ lives are juxtaposed: from the novel’s moral perception, 
fear for one’s property and fear of starvation are not comparable. Yet this “ache” is also 
an earnest expression; despite the moral failures it entails. 
The text further highlights the dehumanizing of Okie migrants in the novel when 
two disembodied speakers realize they are less valuable to land owners than their horses. 
One speaker says, “Fella had a team of horses, had to use ‘em to plow an’ cultivate an’ 
mow, wouldn’ think of turnin’ ‘em out to starve when they wasn’t workin’.” The other 
replies, “Them’s horses—we’re men” (434). The text offers no further explanation; the 
juxtaposition alone of well-kept livestock and neglected human beings makes Steinbeck’s 
case about the circumstances in California. The comparison here links migrants and 
horses for their shared capacity for labor. But the text implies that horses are valuable 
property that must be privately maintained, whereas migrants are treated as responsible 
for their own survival. Furthermore, at this moment in the novel there is a surplus of 
migrant labor that requires little to no private investment to maintain its usefulness for 
corporate growers. In other words, a few migrant deaths would not lead to a labor 
shortage. 
Steinbeck introduces both the reader and the Joads to the semantics of the slur 
“Okies” once they cross into California. A character explains, “Well, Okie us’ ta mean 
you was from Oklahoma. Now it means you’re a dirty son-of-a-bitch. Okie means you’re 
scum. Don’t mean nothing itself, it’s the way they say it” (205-6). This moment is 
interesting in how Steinbeck and his character feel the need to elucidate the meaning of 
this epithet. Such charged discriminatory language is not an unfamiliar feature of writing 
by minority authors like Richard Wright in Native Son. But the idea of an ethnic slur that 
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applies so forcefully and categorically to white American citizens is perhaps alien to 
these characters and many of Steinbeck’s white readers. In fact, the strategies and 
discourses applied to Okie migrant workers parallel those used against migrants and other 
laborers of color. 
 In contrast to what Steinbeck intends as the naturalistic comparison of migrant 
workers to the noble survival of animal life, Californians cast Okies as animalized 
humans. One man declares, “Well, you and me got sense. Them goddamn Okies got no 
sense and no feeling. They ain’t human. A human being wouldn’t live like they do. A 
human being couldn’t stand it to be so dirty and miserable. They ain’t a hell of a lot better 
than gorillas” (221). Here Steinbeck slyly incorporates “gorilla” as a discriminatory 
metaphor, linking the same kind of images and discourse used to degrade African 
Americans as those used against Okies. These lines are also some of the most explicit 
articulation of the animus directed at Okies, directly articulating the attitudes that 
Steinbeck observed in Californian locals. Yet, though these sentiments capture how 
migrants are cast as subhuman, the speaker here overlooks how Okies are, in fact, 
compelled to live in the conditions that he finds so deplorable. 
 Ultimately, the migrant Okies are rendered into similarly racialized categories as 
past populations of non-white migrant works. Like the alien workers before, concurrent, 
and after them, the Okies are treated as unwanted, dangerous “foreigners.” Again 
Steinbeck explores the kind of language used to dehumanize the Joads and their peers 
through abstract, generalized interchapter dialogue. He writes, 
We got to keep these here people down or they’ll take the country. They’ll 
take the country. 
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 Outlanders, foreigners. 
 Sure, they talk the same language, but they ain’t the same. Look 
how they live. Think of us folks’d live like that? Hell, no! (236) 
Here the author offers another example of the kind of discourse and categories 
Californians used to dehumanize and disenfranchise migrants. The speakers establish a 
binary opposition between “we” and “they” in the first sentence here. In order to erase the 
obvious affinities between white American citizens from Oklahoma and California and 
diminish possible sympathy, the speakers use the labels “outlanders” and “foreigners” to 
suggest an insurmountable difference between the two populations outlined in the novel. 
Even the admission that both groups speak English is quickly put aside in favor of a 
naturalized perception of Okies as a spectacle of subhuman filth that overlooks their 
material and historical circumstances that Steinbeck outlines in the text. 
Also present in this passage is the apocalyptic fear that migrants will “take the 
country,” that their presence, were it to become empowered, would culminate in a kind of 
revolution. This sentiment clearly draws on anti-communist fears that the Associated 
Farmers and others stoke as a means to undercut organized farm labor that did, on 
occasion, call for revolutionary goals. Ironically, however, migrant workers were by and 
large not involved with labor organizations during this period. Local unions were not 
organized for the unskilled labor that migrants largely found. While “Mexicans and 
Filipino workers had their private organizations and occasionally caused the growers 
trouble,” these groups were not open to white workers (“I Wonder” 633). Thus, this 
rhetoric of opposition and spectacle works as a preemption, an effort to maintain and 
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justify the vulnerability of migrant workers in order to reduce their capacity to organize 
effectively. 
This discourse of hyperbolic spectacle obscures the simple fact, as Steinbeck 
would have readers believe, that Okies are primarily interested in a sustainable income 
and basic security for their families. Alongside the illumination of how such hateful 
rhetoric is deployed, this passage slyly suggests links between the treatment of Okie 
migrants and other disenfranchised groups. In fact, Californians know exactly what it 
means to treat people as “outlanders” and “foreigners” because of the systematic 
exclusion of people of color and immigrant labor from these same communities. Even the 
fear of losing one’s “country” is closely tied to discourses of racial contamination used 
for centuries to exclude African Americans, Native Americans, and other minority groups 
from the fullness of American life. 
On the one hand, the dehumanization of Okies enables the more efficient 
exploitation of their labor. On the other hand, Steinbeck’s characters suggest that 
Californian business interests do have something to fear from the dispossessed migrants 
living on roadsides. In Steinbeck’s earlier novel In Dubious Battle, the Communist strike 
organizer Mac says, “There aren’t any rules a hungry man has to follow” (223). His 
statement is both a natural and political observation. He observes the fact of life already 
so well modelled in literary figures like Victor Hugo’s Jean Valjean that the will to 
survive, when threatened, is an overriding motivation. A hungry man, however, is also a 
potential threat to legal and social norms precisely because, disenfranchised by the world 




An Economy of Exploitation 
Despite the vitriol and violence turned upon migrants in the novel, their presence 
is utterly necessary to the profits of corporate farmers. As Steinbeck explains in a 1938 
letter, “The states and counties will give them nothing because they are outsiders. But the 
crops of any part of this state could not be harvested without these outsiders” (Letters 
158). The novel depicts how migrants are simultaneously caught between their status as 
abused outsiders and the necessity of their labor’s exploitation in California’s system of 
agricultural capitalism. But the hordes of hungry, agitating migrants—nearly three 
hundred thousand through the decade—also created circumstances in which “Men of 
property were terrified for their property” (“I Wonder” 632; Steinbeck, Grapes 282). 
Steinbeck’s depiction of California centers labor and profit near to the heart of the 
novel’s spaces of exception. 
 In the novel’s opening act, Steinbeck is initially ambiguous in his portrayal of the 
West’s agricultural economy. Interchapter characters debate the role of human 
responsibility in the “monstrous” Depression economy. A bank man claims, “[Banks] 
breathe profits; they eat the interest on money. If they don’t get it, they die the way you 
die without air, without side-meat. It is a sad thing, but it is so. It is just so,” continuing to 
explain, “When the monster stops growing, it dies. It can’t stay one size” (32). When the 
unidentified tenant farmer does not yet submit to the bank man’s argument, the dialogue 
continues, 
“It’s not us, it’s the bank. A bank isn’t like a man. Or an owner 
with fifty thousand acres, he isn’t like a man either. That’s the monster.” 
“Yes, but the bank is only made of men. 
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“No you’re wrong there—quite wrong there. The bank is 
something else than men. . . . The bank is something more than men, I tell 
you. It’s the monster. Men made it, but they can’t control it.” (33) 
This moment in the text remains ambiguous about the true nature of “banks” for several 
chapters until the narrator’s tone becomes more stringent in describing the wealthy elite 
of California. The banks’ defender attempts to naturalize the evictions and exploitation of 
workers in a manner strikingly similar to Steinbeck’s naturalistic descriptions of the 
migrants. The matter-of-fact explanation presents a world incapable of change even 
though the monstrous nature of banks and great landowners is acknowledged. Although 
the tenant farmer quibbles with the bank-man, Steinbeck leaves the latter with the final 
word. As the novel continues, Tom Joad and Jim Casy discover the necessity of 
overturning this illusion of the “monster’s” control along with the reader. But the motif of 
the wealthy elite’s monstrosity remains, not as an inevitable force but a writhing 
antagonist. 
 The problems of the farming economy’s inequity become more stark as the Joads 
enter California. They meet two travelers on the road and strike up a conversation. One 
speaker explains to them about the nature of the land around them: “She’s a nice country. 
But she was stole a long time ago. . . . you never seen such purty country . . . But you 
can’t have none of that lan’. That’s a Lan’ and Cattle Company. An’ if they don’t want ta 
work her, she ain’t gonna git worked. You go in there an’ plant you a little corn, an’ 
you’ll go to jail!” (205). Throughout the novel, the land of the West is depicted as 
something stolen from human livelihood and dignity for the sake of profits. Land belongs 
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to agricultural corporations, and indigenous right and even the ideals of Manifest Destiny 
are replaced with mass legal institutions dedicated to protecting corporate profits. 
 Surplus labor and manufactured wage scarcity are at the center of the crises in The 
Grapes Wrath once the Joads cross into California. The narrator describes how large 
growers have advertised for far more labor than their fields and orchards require: “And 
this was good, for wages went down and prices stayed up. The great owners were glad 
and they sent out more handbills to bring more people in. And wages went down and 
prices stayed up. And pretty soon now we’ll have serfs again” (283). This scheme 
exploits what Steinbeck represents as the good faith of Okies’ desire to work. And as 
another minor character remarks, “There’s always red agitators just before a pay cut. 
Always. Goddamn it, they got me trapped” (295). This man’s one-word sentence of 
“Always” implies that he has caught on to the ruse and is sharing his revelation with the 
Joads and the reader: the shadow of labor unrest is used as an excuse to further depress 
wages. 
The environment of scarcity then disrupts the potential for solidarity among 
migrants and other labor organizers. And as Shillinglaw notes, the dangers posed by these 
deflated wages are quite real to the Okies: “the average yearly wage for a migrant worker 
in California was $450. The minimum cost for an adequate diet for a family of four, 
according to the Department of Agriculture was $475” (172-3). Historian David Selvin 
summarizes how this treatment of Okies was, in fact, the dominant model of Californian 
agriculture for decades. He writes, “As centralization increased, demands for large 
quantities of seasonal labor mounted. Growers joined forces in area and commodity 
associations to recruit and direct armies of farm workers. Through such labor pools, they 
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were able to control competition for labor. They set and maintained wage rates, shared 
expenses of recruiting, transportation, housing” (61). With such levels of control, 
companies had the ability to increase the quality of life for their work force, but they 
instead turned toward further profit. 
 Steinbeck assigns much responsibility for the moral failings of California in this 
moment on large land property-holders’ lack of community and disconnect from the land. 
In the sweeping voice of his interchapter narrator, Steinbeck explicates, “And it came 
about that owners no longer worked on their farms. They farmed on paper; and they 
forgot the land, the smell, the feel of it, and remembered only that they owned it, 
remember only what they gained and lost by it” (Grapes 232). The author depicts this 
transformation of land in owners’ minds into primarily a source of profit as part and 
parcel of the crimes committed against migrants and the other poor in the novel. The 
landscape becomes a matter of accounts and commodities rather than a source of life and 
livelihood. The text implies that a more visceral connection to land would be an antidote 
to these owners’ moral failings. 
 Though The Grapes of Wrath does indict local police and corporate farms without 
reservation, the remainder of the novel’s political and economic critique becomes 
somewhat vague, overlooking the networks of power and wealth that also benefited from 
the exceptional treatment of migrant workers. In this context, Shillinglaw is correct when 
she claims, “While Steinbeck etches the faces of migrants in readers’ minds, he blurs the 
bodies of the opposition—power is sinister, nameless, faceless, dangerous, and hard to 
identify” (84). The author implicates “owners,” police, and local citizens in crimes 
against migrants, but he lays ultimate responsibility on abstractions like “the monster” or 
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“the crime” or even on to the elusive “we,” that inclusive pronoun that seems to really 
only include the middle-class and elites in the words of Steinbeck’s narrator. 
 In truth, the Associated Farmers that Steinbeck loosely centers as the cause of 
migrants’ misfortune was not an entity limited to corporate farm-owners. The network 
out of which arose the Associated Farmers was spread throughout California. Pichardo 
states that the Associated Farmers’ contributors and membership included state and local 
officials (26-7). Moreover, he claims, “Support for the [Associated Farmers] was not 
limited to the agricultural elite. In California many other industries were economically 
and ideologically linked to agriculture. These included packing companies, ginning 
combines, transportation, power and finance companies” (28). Pichardo lists two dozen 
other major industry and banking corporations to then summarize that “The industrial 
supporters of the [Associated Farmers] were among the largest corporations in 
California” (28). McWilliams reports in further depth, 
The Associated Farmers had organized in Stanislaus County in 
1936. Most of the money for the organization had come from the banks, 
hotels, oil companies, farm implement houses, and the canneries. . . . they 
decided to stage a ‘mobilization’ [in response to threat of further strikes]. 
Three thousand people assembled in the football stadium at the junior 
college and at the conclusion of the meeting rose and repeated the 
following pledge: “We pledge ourselves for law and order and the right to 
work.” The speakers at the meeting included the sheriff, the city attorney, 
an official of the Associated Farmers, the president of the Retail 
Merchants Association, the president of the Chamber of Commerce, the 
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president of one of the canneries, and representing “the farmers,” Roy 
Pike, manager of the El Solyo Ranch—one of the largest farm-factories in 
California. But no one spoke on behalf of labor; no one spoke on behalf of 
the Okies, although the meeting was being held for their benefit. . . . The 
leading citizens had mobilized; the little people were put in their place. 
(667-8) 
Corporate growers frequently turned to local and state government apparatuses to pursue 
its interests. McWilliams notes one example of this dynamic in a strike of apricot pickers 
in Yolo and Solano counties. On behalf of growers’ interest, the strike was broken, and 
McWilliams reports that the county expended $2,036.09 compared to the “niggardly 
pittance of $185.36” spent by the Associated Farmers. He summarizes that “otherwise the 
entire cost of the action fell upon the general taxpayers of the community. But if the 
nickel an hour increase had been granted, it would have cost the growers, for the season, 
about $66,600” (664-5). The Grapes of Wrath creates an impression that the Associated 
Farmers is a somewhat limited, localized organization that has corrupted the police. But 
in reality this group was deeply embedded with the economic and political elites of 
California. 
 Overall, the novel implies that the state’s economy is structured around the 
exceptional, extralegal, and inhuman treatment of migrant laborers. Not every industry 
directly participates in the exploitation of Okies and others, but the wealthy and powerful 
of California benefit from preventing workers in all sectors from organizing and 
accessing political and economic empowerment. Steinbeck aligns his readers with the 
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Joads, leaving them with an embedded call to action—albeit, liberal democratic actions 
like funding Weedpatch—to counter-act these predatory behaviors. 
 
Conclusion: The Hope of Wrath 
Although hope is shadowy and ultimately unfilled within the text, Steinbeck 
maintains an optimism for his characters and his homeland alongside the cynicism of his 
social critiques. The novel’s ending cannot be interpreted otherwise: Rose of Sharon 
gives her breast to a starving man after delivering her stillborn child to the floodwaters as 
a testimonial to migrants’ ordeals. The author’s letters clearly present his intent in this 
closing scene. To his editor in early 1939 he writes, “The fact that the Joads don’t know 
him, don’t care about him, have no ties to him—that is the emphasis” (Steinbeck, Letters 
178). Lisca describes this moment as the culmination of the novel’s action, claiming, 
“Although the primitive family unit is breaking up, the fragments are going to make up a 
larger group. The sense of a communal unit grows steadily through the narrative—the 
Wilsons, the Wainwrights—and is pointed to again and again in the interchapters” (Lisca, 
“Grapes” 743). The cruel forces of the modern world—the “monsters” of finance and 
classification of masses of people as subhuman are fracturing the familiar lives of tenant 
farmers and other laborers. But the author finds hope rising from those who have been 
metaphorically and literally thrown out on the road. 
The characterization of migrants is one of the novel’s central aesthetic tasks: 
Steinbeck must find an ethical solution to representing the lives of hundreds of thousands 
people in his few dozen characters. In a journal entry during the novel’s composition, 
Steinbeck writes, “But my people must be more than people. They must be an over-
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essence of people” (Working 39). He admits to himself that his characters are indeed 
representations, an effort to capture in text the experiences and personalities he himself 
observed. His declaration that his characters “must be more than people” and an “over-
essence of people” points to his literary style and much of the novel’s larger ethic. The 
author does not think of his text as a break from lived reality in favor of some grander 
aestheticized truth; his characters are both “people” and “more than people.” The Joads 
portray both a daily, mundane scope of life while also being representative of our 
national tribulations. This is not an artistic innovation in itself, but what Steinbeck does 
work toward is to thwart the separation of the purely real and purely representative. 
While in different manners critics have sought to distinguish moments of realistic 
depictions of migrant worker normalcy from Steinbeck’s epic vision and social 
commentaries, the text resists such compartmentalization. The Grapes of Wrath presents 
each individual struggle with the inequities and suffering thrust upon this people in flight 
as individually epic and significant in their importance. 
Steinbeck only offers the silhouette of an answer to the tragedies and injustice 
done to migrants. But, as Robert DeMott comments, “Like most significant American 
novels, The Grapes of Wrath does not offer codified solutions, but instead enacts the 
process of belief and embodies the shape of faith” (xxiv). This sense of faith that the text 
conjures has consistently been linked by critics to Judeo-Christian theology. Yet the 
biblical parallels and influences do not ultimately emerge as the dominating ethic or 
theme of the text. By the text’s closing, Steinbeck’s characters emerge from the failings 
of their church upbringings and their capitalist system to begin viewing the world through 
the same lens as Steinbeck would have his readers, what Carlson describes as “the 
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primary symbolic structure, as well as its meaning, is naturalistic and humanistic, not 
Christian” (749). By the novel’s conclusion, Steinbeck places faith in the adaptability and 
resilience of the “Okies” to form communities and resist the degradation turned against 
them. 
Though generally lauded in the present by critics as Steinbeck’s greatest text, the 
initial reception of The Grapes of Wrath was far more contentious. On the one hand, “The 
Grapes of Wrath topped best-seller lists in 1939. Readers devoured it. Critics lauded and 
lambasted it. Everyone in America, it seemed, knew about it” (Shillinglaw 158). On the 
other hand, some reviewers criticized it as inaccurate propaganda; a few libraries and 
schools banned the text altogether (Shockley 680). Yet, according to the author, these 
varied reactions emerge from the intentional design of his narrative. To his editor Pat 
Covici, Steinbeck writes in a letter, “Through I’ve tried to make the reader participate in 
the actuality, what he takes from it will be scaled entirely on his own depth or 
hollowness.” He then explains, “I am not writing a satisfying story. I’ve done my 
damnedest to rip a reader’s nerves to rags, I don’t want him satisfied” (Letters 178). 
Through the novel’s form, he works to affect a reader by entwining his grand historical 
observations and the very personal tragedies of the Joad family, pressuring his audience 
into a revealing response.  
 In the earlier novel In Dubious Battle, Steinbeck suggests a by-now cliché notion 
that a creature is most dangerous when trapped in a corner. As noted earlier, Mac the 
communist organizer declares, “There aren’t any rules a hungry man has to follow” 
(223). This declaration arrives after a scene where striking farm laborers march 
peacefully on the local town; the narrator states, “The guards were frightened, riots they 
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could stop, fighting they could stop; but this slow, silent movement of men with the wide 
eyes of sleep-walkers terrified them. They held to their places, but the sheriff started his 
car. The motorcycle police moved imperceptibly toward their parked machines” (128). 
The strikers appear like “sleep-walkers,” an image that today we might compare to the 
many instances of the walking dead in our contemporary popular culture. Like the Okies, 
these striking farm laborers have been pressed into a state mimetic of death. But without 
property or dignity left to lose in this liminal state of personhood, the strikers become all 
the more dangerous. 
 The same sentiment emerges multiple times in The Grapes of Wrath. Worried 
over her son’s demeanor toward “bank men,” Ma Joad says to Tom early in the text, 
“Tommy, don’t you go fightin’ ‘em alone. They’ll hunt you down like a coyote. Tommy, 
I got to thinkin’ an’ dreamin’ an’ wonderin’. They say there’s a hun’erd thousand of us 
shoved out. If we was all mad the same way, Tommy—they wouldn’t hunt nobody 
down—” (77). Ma herself is a step removed from most of the labor organizing figures in 
the novel, but this moment arrives well before the Joads encounter issues of unions and 
communists in California. She presages what another character will claim to Tom at 
Weedpatch Camp: “It’s ‘cause we’re all a-workin’ together. Depity can’t pick on one 
fella in this camp. He’s pickin’ on the whole darn camp. An’ he don’t dare. All we got to 
do is give a yell an’ they’s two hundred men out” (357). Ma’s and this character’s words 
lie in contrast to Muley’s plan in the novel’s opening chapters to wage a solo guerilla 
harassment campaign against the bank men evicting local tenant farmers. Though Ma’s 
idea of migrants becoming “all mad the same way” seems to emerge as a kind of 
momentary fantasy, this is the idea toward which Steinbeck directs the rest of the novel. 
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 The novel’s form facilitates the presentation of this idea. While The Grapes of 
Wrath continues to move toward this political ideal of oppressed populations forming 
communities of organized resistance, Steinbeck also coaxes readers into identifying with 
this population and recognizing the humanity, in the text, that so many Californians 
refuse. The novel’s interchapters continually magnify the specific, identifiable and 
empathy-provoking suffering of the Joads to the scales of thousands of other displaced 
people. The following passage demonstrates this narrative strategy as Steinbeck writes in 
an interchapter, 
I lost my land, a single tractor took my land. I am alone and I am 
bewildered. And in the night one family camps in a ditch and another 
family pulls in and the tents come out. The two men squat on their hams 
and the women and children listen. Here is the node, you who hate change 
and fear revolution. Keep these two squatting men apart; make them hate, 
fear suspect each other. Here is the anlage of thing you fear. This is the 
zygote. For here ‘I lost my land’ is changed; a cell is split and from its 
splitting grows the thing you hate—‘We lost our land.’ The danger is here, 
for two men are not as lonely as perplexed as one.” (151) 
Steinbeck uses the words “node,” “anlage,” and “zygote” to heavily emphasize the 
positive potential of individuals who have been similarly dispossessed forming new 
communities. The biological metaphors of “anlage” and “zygote” imply an organic, 
nearly inevitable nature to the transformation of “perplexed” individuals into larger units. 
Lisca highlights how these individuals are also the remnants of breaking “primitive 
family units,” marking the transition from family structures like the Joads’ (Lisca, 
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“Grapes” 743). Sentiments like these in The Grapes of Wrath have been frequently 
connected to Steinbeck’s personal naturalistic philosophy from the 1930s. For example, 
in his letters he writes, “For man is lonely when he is cut off. He dies. From the phalanx 
he takes a fluid necessary to his life” (Letters 81). The “phalanx” is an organically formed 
collective that contrasts notions of rugged American individualism. In other words, the 
necessity of community is not limited to the dispossessed working class of his novels but 
required for the healthy survival of all humans—in Steinbeck’s view. 
In the first sentence, the disembodied first person voice echoes the story of the 
Joads and so many other migrants. The source of this voice remains vague, allowing its 
attribution to be ambiguous and contradictory: this is the voice of the Joads, of the 
Wilsons, of the Okies—one and all. Even the reader momentarily inhabits the “I.” Ma 
shares this notion as she encounters the coldness from the clerk at the peach orchard’s 
company store, succinctly summarizing, “‘I’m learnin’ one good thing,’ she said. 
‘Learnin’ it all a time, ever’ day. If you’re in trouble or hurt or need—go to poor people. 
They’re the only ones that’ll help—the only ones’” (376). Throughout The Grapes of 
Wrath, Steinbeck offers collective action and identity as the most effective method to 
counter organized degradation. 
 While The Grapes of Wrath offers many scenes and images of abjection, the 
author also litters the text with just as many examples of migrant workers practicing 
community-formation on different scales. The infrastructure and legal privileges of the 
federal Weedpatch Camp is one such example: Okies govern themselves and seek to 
cooperate as much as possible. But Steinbeck suggests even more potently that life on the 
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road, despite its dangers, is a daily exercise in creating and defending community bonds. 
He writes of the ad hoc migrant camps, 
Every night a world created, complete with furniture—friends made and 
enemies established . . . Every night relationships that make a world, 
established; and every morning the world town down like a circus. . . . 
The families learned what rights must be observed. . . . 
And the families learned, although no one told them, what rights 
are monstrous and must be destroyed. (194) 
Migrants become practiced in this form of “world-building,” an apt metaphor for the 
work of transforming roadside camps from hostile spaces of exception into places of 
community. The language here suggests that, in order to survive, Okies are challenged to 
rebuild these microcosms of community after they have been outcast from the world they 
once knew. David Wyatt describes one aspect of this challenge to migrants, writing, “The 
Grapes of Wrath is not just a book about the difficult ‘way’ to California; its subtle 
rhetoric generalizes the project into the problem of learning to live in existential time” 
(“Steinbeck’s” 149). Arguing that Steinbeck seeks to make something noble out of the 
Okies transient communities, Wyatt states, “For what The Grapes of Wrath imagines is a 
world without origins or ends” (148). Critics have repeatedly turned to the turtle from 
Chapter 3 as the novel’s implied model for migrant survival. The creature carries its 
home on its back, and even when it is almost crushed by a truck, it is not defeated in its 
drive to survive (Steinbeck, Grapes 15). Steinbeck seems to suggest that Okies must 
remain equally resilient and adaptive, finding and forming communities wherever their 
lives take them. 
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 Steinbeck’s vision in The Grapes of Wrath for the positive potential for a politics 
of adaptable, just community formations is deeply rooted in naturalistic, organic 
metaphors. The narrator of the novel’s interchapters indicates the flawed bank men and 
“machine men” as antithetical to the dignity of both the land and other people. In one 
example, Steinbeck writes, “But the machine man, driving a dead tractor on land he does 
not know and love, understands only chemistry; and he is contemptuous of the land and 
of himself” (Grapes 116). The tractor driver views the world in uninspired empirical 
terms on behalf of the financial interests of owners who are even more severely separated 
from the natural spaces that, in the novel’s perspective, nurture just communities. 
This idea is crucial to the novel’s vision. Throughout the text Steinbeck calls, 
albeit vaguely and metaphorically, for displaced tenant farmers and corporate growers of 
California alike—as Shillinglaw points out—to reconceive of how a reverence for the 
landscape around them is intertwined with a politics and economy of respect for human 
beings (111). Robert Searway declares that “Steinbeck reveals that individuals who come 
to uphold regional values that protect the environment against economic exploitation 
serve as the antidote to encroaching global forces and exemplify a potential way to 
navigate conflicting economic perspectives” (175). Ultimately, however, Steinbeck’s 
political vision is not for the Okies, certainly not alone. His narrative calls upon his 
audience altogether to find just relationships with each other and the world around them. 
The Grapes of Wrath alone did not particularly alter the real lives of the migrants 
across California or the American political landscape. In fact, the economic stimulation 
of the Second World War changed Okies’ circumstances more than anything else. Selvin 
reports that war industries absorbed much of the white migrant workforce, and “before 
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long, the Mexican worker return to California’s fields” (Selvin 67). Shillinglaw states that 
its impact had not “changed wages substantially, or caused more government camps to be 
built, or eased labor/management tensions” (Shillinglaw 174). But, as the intertwining of 
the novel’s narrative and expository chapters demonstrate, Steinbeck’s text is not simply 
a directed attempt at political intervention. Though the Joad family journey functions as 
the lynchpin of the novel’s form, through the grand social critique of the interchapters the 
author attempts to interweave the particular historical circumstances of the Okies into the 
broader narratives of California and the United States. On the one hand, the text models 
the empathy for migrants and laborers so lacking within Depression-era Californian 
communities. Indeed, Steinbeck demands that his readers refuse the dehumanization of 
his characters. On the other hand, he also calls upon readers to consider how the dramas 
of the human lives and spaces around them—especially those socially cast as unwanted 




Chapter 4: Tastes Like Chicken: Disposable Bodies in Corporate Bioscience 
Spaces in The Space Merchants and Oryx and Crake 
 
Introduction 
In 1953, Frederik Pohl and C. M. Kornbluth published their serial novel Gravy 
Planet as The Space Merchants.
12
 This piece of satirical science fiction tells the story of 
an advertising executive, Mitch Courtenay, who works for the preeminent advertising 
agency in a future dystopian version of the United States. In this future, a corporate 
oligarchy has stratified society into two sectors, the corporate elite and the exploited 
laboring masses of “consumers.” The plot of a radical underground movement casts 
Courtenay unwillingly into the underclass; through his experience among consumers, his 
eyes are opened to the injustices of his world. The novel begins from Courtenay’s 
privileged perspective of the world as a corporate utopia, but after he is kidnapped to 
work in a biotech plantation, the exploitation of consumers becomes self-evident to both 
him and the reader. Through hyperbolic satire, The Space Merchants raises questions 
about the nature of real corporate America and its bioscience. 
In 2003, Margaret Atwood published Oryx and Crake, the first novel of her 
darkly satirical science fiction MaddAddam trilogy (2009, 2013). Her protagonist, Jimmy, 
                                                 
12
 The edition I use as my primary text for The Space Merchants is the 1984 Venus, Inc. Doubleday edition 
that includes an original version of the novel and Pohl’s sequel The Merchants’ War (1984), written after 
Kornbluth’s death. A revised “21
st
 Century” edition was released in 2011 which includes a number of 
changes. In the Preface to the revised edition of The Space Merchants, Pohl writes that “there are a few 
minor scientific or logical mistakes in [the original text], which I have tried to repair for this edition” (xii). 
While Pohl has also added a few new passages to the text and updated references from corporations in the 
1950s to their contemporary successors, the major details and the plot remain the same. A post by Pohl’s 
staff to his personal blog also states as much (“More”). From my reading of these editions, these alterations 
do not affect the spirit of the text, but the original edition remains the focus of my literary analysis. 
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navigates a post-apocalyptic landscape after a global pandemic engineered by his best 
friend, Crake, has killed the majority of the human population. The focalizer in this non-
linear third-person narrative, Jimmy mournfully reflects on the loss of human culture as 
he lives among the “Crakers,” his friend’s genetically engineered humans designed to be 
cooperative, non-wasteful, and non-violent so as to replace the doomed human species. 
Through Jimmy’s laments the reader learns that his former world is a socio-economically 
striated dystopia. Before Crake’s plague, bioscience corporations dominate society and 
exploit the underclass living in the squalid “pleeblands,” the overpopulated urban sprawl 
of the former U.S. The linear post-apocalyptic and non-linear dystopian memories are 
intertwined in the narrative to reveal both Crake’s motivation for purging the cruel and 
irrational human race from the world and how the practices of the unregulated corporate 
bioscience laboratory enables his genocidal rationale. 
A revolution in bioscience began in the period of The Space Merchants’s 
publication and rapidly expanded in the fifty years between this novel and Atwood’s. The 
1950s saw the discovery of DNA structure, and in 1972 the first recombinant DNA 
molecules were created, heralding new possibilities for designing life forms in the 
laboratory. In 1997, Dolly the sheep was the first mammal cloned from adult cells. 
Following this breakthrough, in 2014 human cells have been successfully cloned from 
adult cells. The first lab “grown” hamburger was cooked and eaten at a London news 
conference in 2013. The capacity to manipulate and create life has reached radical new 
levels and continues to be explored. Under the auspices of such new technologies, these 
novels imagine how commercial laboratories transform complex life forms into new 
kinds of objectified flesh that has no protection under the law or social norms. 
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While modern labs are regulated by laws and experimental ethics, the texts’ 
fictional sites of corporate bioscience have circumvented such legal and ethical norms. 
These labs operates as spaces of exception, mediated only by the desire for wealth and 
power. Experimental subjects become exposed to the unmediated power of techno-
science; corporate agents in these dystopias interact with other human and non-human 
bodies not as “people” or even “animals” but as fleshly commodities to which anything 
may be done without consequence. This approach to bodies as flesh is a practice that 
relies on both linguistic and material practices. Unlike the fictional torture chambers, 
ghettoes, and work camps analyzed in previous chapters, these sites of corporate 
bioscience not only seize and abuse bodies but also manufacture flesh, which is marked 
by its very nature as exploitable. The category of “flesh” becomes mimetic of death. 
Pohl, Kornbluth, and Atwood figure these exceptional lab spaces as the nexus out 
which emerges an exploitative paradigm that the corporate elite apply to their broader 
dystopian worlds. Once Pohl and Kornbluth’s protagonist witnesses how a corporation 
grows monstrous chicken flesh on a biotech plantation, the text reveals how the corporate 
oligarchy similarly manages the population of workers and consumers as an objectified 
mass of flesh. Just as plantation workers carefully manage the growth of the lab-created 
creature “Chicken Little’s” flesh, so do the corporate elite use modern scientific 
techniques of population management on consumers. 
Within Oryx and Crake, the absence of ethical regulation allows corporate 
bioscience to treat the world populace as non-consenting subjects in markets of illness 
and treatments. This dynamic culminates in Crake’s apocalypse, in which distinctions 
between the “lab” and the “world” collapse to the point at which Jimmy reflects, “The 
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whole world is now one vast uncontrolled experiment” (228). While the phrase 
“uncontrolled experiment” suggests a laboratory run amok out of scientists’ control, the 
notion of an experiment without control is oxymoronic. By definition, experiments 
require a control element and an observer; thus, the word “uncontrolled” both plays into a 
science fiction conceit of the danger of unintended consequences and a sense of 
unregulated, unchecked scientific power. The experiment is “uncontrolled” because 
without some kind of ethical oversight, Crake has enacted his murderous vision and will 
on the world. Thus, Atwood suggests that the lab as a space of exception operates as a 
concentrated model to be imitated and exported across the globe. 
These paradigm shifts in modern bioscience and American fiction’s depiction of 
corporate labs as potential spaces of exception requires a critical approach not yet 
adequately present in Americanist literary criticism and science studies. Science studies 
scholars like Donna Haraway and Bruno Latour pay heed to the ways through which 
laboratory spaces and scientific discourses can be used to excuse violence and 
exploitation. Yet, unlike the novelists under focus here, these fields—by their nature as 
academic disciplines—lack the social and historical vision that these science fictions 
offer. Both The Space Merchants and Oryx and Crake connect the operations of 
corporate labs to a wider network of exploited bodies and spaces of exception. The 
spectacles of monstrous creatures of engineered chicken flesh in The Space Merchants 
and Oryx and Crake depict the laboratory fantasy for passive, docile fleshly bodies 
available to be used and abused. Such spectacles, however, ultimately draw attention to 
the simultaneous risk to both humans and non-humans in proximity to such laboratory 
sites. In addition, by taking up a satirical mode, the novels use irony and hyperbole to 
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intervene in the otherwise totalizing language structures of corporate bioscience that have 
the potential to open up such exceptional spaces. These novels invoke competing 
complex networks of language, history, and agencies to point out the negative potential 
of unchecked corporate bioscience. 
 
Post-Poultry: Monstrous Chicken Flesh 
Though published fifty years apart, both The Space Merchants and Oryx and 
Crake depict monstrous, biologically engineered chicken creatures to illustrate how 
corporate labs can transform bodies into malleable flesh, ready to be commodified. In the 
early 1950s, during the “Second Agricultural Revolution” in the United States, Pohl and 
Kornbluth imagined the creature “Chicken Little” as the literal and symbolic center of 
their protagonist’s awful experience as a consumer-laborer in a high-tech corporate 
plantation. Courtenay describes “her” body and nest in the facility: “It was a great 
concrete dome, concrete-floored. Chicken Little filled most of it. She was a gray-brown, 
rubbery hemisphere some fifteen yards in diameter. Dozens of pipes ran into her 
pulsating flesh” (Venus 77). This creature is the plantation’s purpose: workers feed, 
maintain, and harvest this being of pure chicken flesh to be sold to the “consumer” 
underclass. In the novel, she is an incarnation of the corporate fantasy for a completely 
docile and usable body. The text assigns “her” a feminine gender, using the stereotype of 
feminine passivity to further highlight her role in the plantation. Though this creature 
shares the name “Chicken Little” with the hysterical folk-tale character who declares the 
“sky is falling!” and leads others to disaster, this monstrous version is a voiceless, passive 
object that simply waits to be devoured. The grotesque, monstrous figure is an 
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extrapolation from the ways through which bioscience reoriented consumer relationships 
with agricultural animals, changing their status from beings who live in the world with 
humans to objectified flesh that has no purpose except growth and consumption. 
Though not apparently influenced by the earlier novel, Atwood makes a similar 
figurative move in her twenty-first century novel with the creation of “ChickieNobs.” 
They are genetically modified chickens that lack heads, neurological function, and the 
sensation of pain that enable the production of chicken flesh at a much more efficient rate 
than previous methods (Oryx 202-3). Though ChickieNobs are created in the university 
setting of the fictional Watson-Crick Institute, the science here is long since fully 
commercialized (203). Atwood describes Jimmy’s first sight of the ChickieNobs: “What 
they were looking at was a large bulblike object that seemed to be covered with stippled 
whitish-yellow skin. Out of it came twenty thick fleshy tubes, and at the end of each tube 
another bulb was growing” (202). The creatures are barely recognizable as animal life, 
much less as chickens. The cute, ubiquitous name for this creation is clearly Atwood’s 
play on the introduction in 1983 of the Chicken McNugget and similar products that carry 
the name “chicken.” Yet the “chicken” label on these products only loosely signifies the 
original animal body after the harvesting and reassembling of its flesh into a commodity 
unrecognizable as chickens proper. These novels offer hyperbolic chicken monsters that 
embody how industrial meat processing already conceives of bodies as useable flesh. But 
by speculating about the future of scientific techniques for more efficiently producing 
animal flesh, the texts also imagine how further advances in bioscience could allow 
corporations to not simply process bodies into flesh but to fundamentally recreate bodies 
as only flesh without subjectivity. 
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While the spaces of exception considered in previous chapters have also focused 
on fictional portrayals of how bodies are treated or changed within normalized sites of 
violence, the corporate bioscience lab operates in a manner separately from torture 
chambers, ghettoes, and work camps. In Pohl and Kornbluth’s and Atwood’s fictions, 
bodies that enter sites of bioscience are recognized primarily as amalgams of organic 
material—flesh. The descriptions of both creatures emphasize their fleshiness, the fact 
that they are not bodies but masses of indistinct tissue in roughly spheroid shapes. 
Engineered as they are, neither Chicken Little nor ChickieNobs have natural forms or 
structures. They are more or less formless because flesh itself has no shape. They 
epitomize flesh. The word “flesh” is not defined by a particular scale, and it is only 
loosely signifies bodily material without any specific referent to kinds of cells or tissues. 
By targeting flesh as its object, corporate bioscience in these novels places the body in a 
secondary, occluded category as the source of flesh. The body becomes disposable.  
Both human and non-human flesh becomes a new kind of currency in these 
fictions, a fluid commodity to be managed and exploited beyond the limits of individual 
bodies when not part of a politically recognizable body. Even in our present, flesh itself, 
even when living, has no rights, but others can have property rights to it. The 1980 U.S. 
Supreme Court Case Diamond v. Chakrabarty permitted the assertion of intellectual 
property rights to “fabricated entities” as opposed to natural ones (Waldby and Mitchell 
24). In consequence, the bodies and parts of bodies that pass through laboratories as flesh 
can become property. Biological information also becomes a commodity once abstracted 
from biological material (Rajan 42-3). Under the auspices of this new scientific 
paradigm, Haraway reports, “Any objects or person can be reasonably thought of in terms 
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of disassembly and reassembly; no ‘natural’ architectures constrain system design” 
(Simians 212). In other words, as sociologist Nikolas Rose writes, “In principle, it seems, 
any element of a living organism—any element of life—can be isolated, its properties 
identified, mobilized, manipulated, and recombined with anything else” (83). Advances 
in genetic sciences break down individual bodies into systems defined by their newly 
understood biological properties. Once conceived as predictable systems of flesh, bodies 
are exposed to new techniques of coercive management and use. 
With their monstrous chicken creations as chief examples, both The Space 
Merchants and Oryx and Crake critically imagine corporate bioscience’s negative 
biopolitics—the trend in modern political structures away from recognizing citizen-
subjects toward the management and instrumentalization of biological populations. The 
novels imagine how new scientific technologies and discourses, without ethical 
regulations, could lead to a new mode of biopolitical economic exploitation and violence. 
While Foucault initially sites the “body” as “what is most important” in capitalist 
biopolitics (qtd. in Hardt and Negri 27), the novels present a biopolitics that takes flesh—
the body disassembled—as its object. Similarly, in Before the Law (2012), literature and 
animal studies scholar Carey Wolfe revises Foucault’s theory, writing “that biopolitics 
acts fundamentally not on the ‘person’ or the ‘individual,’ nor even, finally, on ‘the 
body,’ but rather at the even more elemental level called ‘flesh’” (50). Both The Space 
Merchants and Oryx and Crake have already taken up this thinking to show how, in their 




Despite the spectacles of their fleshy, fictional chicken monsters, Pohl and 
Kornbluth and Atwood are primarily concerned with the treatment of human bodies as 
disposable flesh. But the comparison of human and non-human bodies under corporate 
bioscience proves crucial to understanding the results of reducing humans en masse from 
political subjects to commidifiable and exploitable biological objects. Animals have 
already existed in this second category for centuries, and in many instances they have 
been engineered into near-perfect biological objects. Wolfe assesses the “eugenics, 
artificial insemination, and selective breeding, pharmaceutical enhancement, inoculation . 
. . in the modern factory farm” as the most intense practice of the biopolitical 
management of flesh in history (46). In the collection of essays Industrializing 
Organisms (2004), historian Edmund Russell calls for the reframing animals as the 
biological precursors to machine technology and as the original forms of both alienated 
labor and biotechnology (1-2, 9-10). Non-human animals are also models for systems of 
control that may be applied to human bodies.
13
 Furthermore, Haraway calls for the 
critical reconsideration of non-human animals not only as contested sites of rights and 
property but also labor (When 71). These perspectives enable critical anticipation of the 
exploitative consequences of corporate bioscience to human bodies by considering how 
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 Affirming this position, Haraway states that in the last century within the biosocial sciences “animal 
societies have been extensively employed in rationalization and naturalization of the oppressive orders of 
domination in the human body politic. They have provided the point of union of the physiological and 
political for modern liberal theorists” (When 11). Haraway endorses Jacques Derrida’s writing on a 
fundamental political distinction between humans and non-humans; only humans have the capacity to be 
murdered, whereas animals can only be killed (78). The importance in this distinction—what Giorgio 
Agamben describes as human history’s violent “anthropological machine”—is not the active differentiation 
among the types of beings but that these categories are produced at all (Open 37). For a humanist, the 
trouble here lies in the historically demonstrated potential for discursively and physically transferring 
human beings into the naturalized category of “animals,” bodies that are killable, disposable, and 
exploitable. As long as non-human bodies are used to continually sustain the distinction between which 
bodies may be murdered or killed, human bodies can be more or less easily dehumanized. Global histories 
of slavery, genocide, imprisonment, to mention only a few phenomena, bear out the reality of this problem, 
which is readily represented in the novels as well. 
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some non-human bodies have already been affected. By looking to how biocapital 
manages non-human labor and flesh, critics may better understand such systems can be 
applied to humans. The depiction of human bodies alongside animals in The Space 
Merchants and Oryx and Crake reveal how unregulated corporate bioscience, beginning 
in the laboratory, can work to transform all bodies into exploitable flesh. 
Chicken Little is the purest manifestation of the relationship between flesh and 
corporations in The Space Merchants. All the plantation’s tasks are oriented around the 
production of her flesh. The narrator, Courtenay, explains how the minor character 
Herrera and other “artisans” harvest Chicken Little: “He swung a sort of two-handed 
sword that carved off great slices of the tissue, leaving it to the lesser packers and 
trimmers and their faceless helpers to weigh it, shape it, freeze it, cook it, flavor it, 
package it, and ship it off to the area on quota for the day” (Venus 70). The text 
elaborates that Herrera also acts as “safety valve,” a steward who carefully husbands 
Chicken Little’s indiscriminate growth because, “As long as she got nutrient, she grew” 
(71). During Courtenay’s first visit to Chicken Little’s chamber, he asks, “Doesn’t she 
grow at night?” Herrera replies, “No. They turn down the nutrient just enough; they let 
the waste accumulate in her just right. Each night she almost dies. Each morning she 
comes to life like San Lázaro” (78). Pohl and Kornbluth imagine a tightly controlled 
method for producing animal protein that reduces life into a passive commodity in an 
abject middle-ground between life and death. This fleshy creature is the ideal resident and 
product of the laboratory space of exception. 
While the plantation chapters in The Space Merchants provide a broad critical 
perspective of corporate bioscience, the novel does so by satirizing the biotech 
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innovations in modern factory farming. Literary critic John Brennan is partly correct 
when he describes Chicken Little as “a delightfully absurd burlesque of industrial food 
processing” that emerged in the 1950s (105). But the creature’s depiction uses the history 
of chicken farming as the basis for the novel’s wider critique of corporate exploitation. 
During the “Second Agricultural Revolution,” agricultural labor and management 
of livestock radically changed. The novel implies what Edmund Russell argues for when 
he casts animal husbandry as, “in the root meaning of the word, biotechnology,” because 
the practice requires the technical manipulation of animal biology, either at the level of 
its earliest forms, breeding and behavior modification, or its latest variant, genetics (1). 
Historian Mark Finlay summarizes that during this “revolution” 
farmers and industrialists . . . sought to reshape and redesign organisms in 
ways that they deemed appropriate for an industrial society. Innovations 
with medical feeds, manufactured housing, and redesigned landscapes 
spurred farmers to increase the size and capital investment of their 
livestock operations, to manipulate the natural rhythms of animals’ 
breeding, birth, weaning, rebreeding, and slaughter, and to conduct the 
business in ever more confined, streamlined, and centralized operations. 
(237) 
While all of these innovations affected chickens most, turkeys, cattle, and pigs were also 
impacted (237). Their bodies became the object of a scientifically-charged transformation 
of animals into ubiquitous flesh. 
The turning point in the production of chicken products was in 1948 (Horowitz 
215). Before World War Two, chicken was considered a luxury food item, but after 
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changes in marketing and the industrialization of chicken production, it became “the 
center of three or four meals each week” (216). Chickens, at this time, “were the first 
farm animals to be permanently confined indoors and made to labor in automated 
systems” (Haraway, When 267). Haraway describes the new approach to producing 
chicken flesh as “the daily immolation of forced maturation and disproportionate tissue 
development that produces tasty (enough) young birds who are often enough unable to 
walk, flap their wings, or even stand up” (267). Ultimately, the common American 
conception of chicken was transformed from a kind of poultry, an animal being with 
breed-specifics and individual characteristics, to the more ambiguous category of meat 
that matters only in terms of its economic value (Horowitz 223). Chicken Little 
represents the next logical step in these new technologies that change bodies into flesh—
rather than change bodies, reconceive them as flesh. 
In Oryx and Crake, the depiction of manipulations to non-human flesh lays the 
ground for Crake’s global genocide. Critic Ashley Theissen points out that Jimmy’s 
earliest childhood recollection is a “bonfire of animal carcasses” tainted in some way; the 
moment “perhaps reveals the significant roles” of non-humans in the text (24).
14
 While 
comical and terrifying examples of genetic engineering abound in the novel, the 
particularly monstrous ChickieNobs epitomize the control exercised over biological 
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 In her 2013 article, Theissen considers how the capacity to manipulate the structures of life changes the 
perception “of all forms of life” (24). The thrust of her analysis parallels that of this chapter, but Theissen 
focuses narrowly on genetically engineered non-human species while I look to how the novel portrays the 
profitable management of all life, both human and non-human. Theissen also argues against “reading the 
transgenic species as performing one overarching function” and that “different animals . . . perform 
different functions in Atwood’s literary world” (24). Her claim is both literally and figuratively true to 
some degree: different animals are created for different purposes within the MaddAddam world, and 
Atwood’s depiction of each type of creature registers with different signification. But while these 
genetically engineered species are indeed different, they are all subsumed under a structure of corporate 
bioscience and created for the purposes of profit. Thus, a more productive reading engages the novel’s non-




bodies. The creatures are barely recognizable as animal life, much less as chickens. The 
post-war factory farming industry has already recast chickens in the ubiquitous, 
objectified category of “meat.” With ChickieNobs, Atwood imagines the fulfilled fantasy 
of this industry and corporate bioscience more broadly: pure flesh that resists any 
identification as a living being that may deserve ethical treatment. Like Pohl and 
Kornbluth’s Chicken Little, ChickieNobs are only recognized as a form of technology 
and property. 
The corporate lab space has enabled this desire for docile flesh by using 
biotechnology to create ChickieNobs in such a way that they are wholly improper to 
discourses of rights and protections. Crake explains one such explicit tactic when he tells 
Jimmy, “And the animal-welfare freaks won’t be able to say a word, because this thing 
feels no pain” (Oryx 203). By removing the biological capacity for pain, genetic 
engineers render ethical questions about suffering as not applicable to ChickieNobs. 
Atwood elaborates this sense of the creatures’ inconsequential status when Crake says, 
“It’s sort of like a chicken hookworm,” and another character in the novel’s sequel cannot 
help considering ChickieNobs more like vegetables than animals (Oryx 203; Year 129). 
These two statements demonstrate the success of the ChickieNobs’ engineering: once a 
traditionally recognizable biological body has been transformed in the corporate 
laboratory, the resultant life forms enter a sphere of sub-life or non-life that includes 
“hookworms” or “vegetables.” Even in discourses sympathetic to non-human animals, 
creatures like hookworms and ChickieNobs hold little to no value relative to humans or 
more charismatic animals like lions, tigers, and bears. Thus, by reconstructing chicken 
organisms into forms that seem inherently alien to ethical protection, the lab has pushed 
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these bodies into a zone of exception in which they can be objectified without 
consequence. 
The creatures further provoke the uncanny recognition of the lab’s potential as a 
space of exception to alter any body’s status, both physically and discursively. Jimmy 
initially balks when he encounters the ChickieNobs. He thinks, “The thing was a 
nightmare” (Oryx 202). Atwood further writes of his reaction, “Why is it he feels some 
line has been crossed, some boundary transgressed? How much is too much, how far is 
too far?” (206). Yet, as the text implies through the use of these rhetorical questions, 
Jimmy does not actively realize how these “transgressions” may be turned upon all 
bodies rather than limited to poultry bodies that American consumers already see as 
“meat.” Atwood imagines that once any bodies are as reconceived as malleable 
arrangements of cells, tissues, and flesh to be reshaped as desired, then any moral or 
ethical lines that once protected particular bodies could be erased. As critic Grayson 
Cooke claims, Crake along with his corporate peers view the world as “made up of 
discrete entities linked by cause and effect” that are thus “infinitely malleable, editable” 
(Cooke 120). The laboratories of Oryx and Crake are where all bodies are at risk to a 
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 Providing multiple references, Theissen indicates that while a number of other readings of Jimmy’s line-
crossing passage seize upon this moment as Jimmy’s own critical awareness about the problems of 
corporate bioscience. But these readings overlook how this question, “How much is too much?” arrives in a 
site where non-human life is being technologically altered and produced (29). Jimmy’s unease arrives from 




Fleshly Laborers and Consumers 
 In The Space Merchants, Chicken Little’s chamber implicates more than 
technologically-coerced animal flesh. Within this biotech space the authors align the 
objectification of both human and non-human bodies; the text metonymously links the 
treatment of Chicken Little and the human bodies around her. Courtenay describes the 
workers around the creature as the “lesser packers and trimmers and their faceless 
helpers” (Venus 70). While this reference makes these people momentarily visible in the 
novel’s world, their collective categorization and the appended adjectives “lesser” and 
“faceless” communicate an immediate sense of these workers’ disposability. They and 
the creature are “faceless,” literally or figuratively unable to be recognized as individual 
beings in their world. Much like Chicken Little, the workers are a cumulative 
arrangement of flesh that serves a particular use, consumed for labor rather than calories. 
The creature and workers are simultaneously produced and consumed. Like Chicken 
Little, consumers labor in the plantation to the point of an exhausted state, a condition 
mimetic of death. 
Both kinds of bodies are forced to consume each other, a cycle through which the 
Chlorella corporation profits. Courtenay’s exhausting labor serves to feed Chicken Little, 
and the plantation workers daily eat her flesh in turn (Venus 68). The representation of 
workers in this space of exception provides Courtenay’s and the reader’s basis for 
understanding consumer life at large in their world. Like Chicken Little, these workers’ 




The Second Agricultural Revolution transformed the treatment of human bodies 
as well as animals within industry spaces. Regardless of further modernizing efforts in 
factories between the 1950s and ‘90s, historian Roger Horowitz reports that the need for 
“hand labor” as “staggeringly high” in the early twenty-first century. These factories 
require the kind of labor that uses human bodies as machinic objects to such an extent as 
to produce enormous numbers of repetitive motion injuries—second to only the red meat 
industry in 1989. Horowitz writes that “these onerous jobs, paying about 60 percent of 
the average wage for American manufacturing since the mid-1960s, drew workers at the 
bottom rungs of the American labor market.” These workers were mostly African 
American workers at first; by the mid-nineties, Mexican and Central American 
immigrants became the primary labor demographic. The industry, Horowitz claims, 
actively attracts laborers with weak language and literacy skills, those who have the least 
means of recourse against exploitation. Workers endure a collective corporate “low wage 
strategy” that leads to “turnover rates as high as 100 percent annually” (Horowitz 230). 
Like in the Chlorella plantation, laborers in the factory farm industry are by and large 
treated as fleshly objects that are primarily valued for their profitability. This fictional site 
suggests that in the absence of other systems of values, this and other sectors of corporate 
bioscience could treat all bodies like exploitable sources of flesh. 
Courtenay’s ordeal as a plantation laborer elaborates the authors’ vision of how 
human bodies are affected in this regime. Even before the commencement of his actual 
labor, his first day leaves him in an abject state. At the close of the first chapter at the 
plantation, he narrates, “I just lay on my bunk and wished I were as dead as the rest of the 
world thought I was” (Venus 67). While Courtenay infuses this sentence with 
197 
 
melodramatic self-pity—as an accomplished corporate officer he feels that he deserves 
better—the authors use his lament to communicate a truth about ordinary consumer life. 
The reference to Courtenay’s “death” is most immediately a matter of plot; his true 
identity has been erased and replaced. But what seems like happenstance in Courtenay’s 
experience actually signifies everyday existence for consumers within the biotech 
plantation and wider dystopian society. The declaration of Courtenay’s death points to 
what it means to be classed as a consumer—a condition that is a variation of civil or 
social death, to function as a passive object within the structure of power rather than as an 
active citizen with rights and responsibilities.
16
 
The exploitation of consumer labor reinforces their class category as passive 
human objects. Courtenay provides the details of his work as an algae scum-skimmer 
from dawn to sunset, and he then lists the activities available in his limited free time. One 
might construe these options as the indication of a kind of active freedom. The text, 
however, breaks into another paragraph of a single sentence in which Pohl and Kornbluth 
write, “Mostly you went to sleep” (68). His work physically drains him to the point at 
which he cannot partake in the amenities intended to keep him docile; the labor functions 
as its own form of control, draining life from bodies. 
This part of the novel subtly dramatizes the transformation of active persons into 
passive laboring objects through a shift in pronoun usage. These two paragraphs about his 
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 Civil death refers to the “negative personhood” legally inscribed on felons in the tradition of Anglo-
American law, while social death, a term coined by anthropologist Claude Meillassoux but made famous by 
Orlando Patterson’s comparative study of slave societies in Slavery and Social Death (1985), refers to 
people like slaves who are legally denied existence as persons (Dayan 42, 43). In The Law is a White Dog 
(2011), Colin Dayan describes these categories as “legal engines of dispossession” that deny the right to 
both life and property (43). What Pohl and Kornbluth imagine of consumer life in The Space Merchants 
clearly exists in the legacy of civil and social death—the most significant part of plot does indeed occur in a 
futuristic “plantation.” But civil or social death is not quite the appropriate term for the condition Courtenay 
enters since law is not the particular engine of dispossession. 
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labor are a break in Courtenay’s first-person narration into the second-person. His use of 
“I” disappears as if even his labor’s description ejects a sense of individual grammatical 
agency from him. “I” is no longer appropriate when Courtenay becomes one more 
consumer. Replacing “I,” the ambiguous pronoun “you” does not distinguish between 
individuals or even between singular and collective beings. This section indicates that his 
individuation from other consumers is unnecessary or even perhaps impossible while he 
is at labor. The second-person address also implicates the reader in this scene. On the one 
hand, Pohl and Kornbluth use this technique to prompt the reader’s identification with the 
plantation’s laborers. On the other hand, “you” also uncannily insinuates the plantation’s 
desire to seize upon more human capital—readers themselves—to put to work. 
After Courtenay’s time at the Chlorella plantation reveals the true nature of this 
corporate utopia, The Space Merchants much more directly portrays consumer life. Both 
Courtenay’s and the reader’s experiences of the narrative are as if the encounter with the 
novel’s central site of corporate bioscience opens eyes to the broader iniquities of this 
world. Courtenay refers to the consumer population as “the submerged fifteen sixteenths 
of the population” (Venus 104). The word choice here implies that consumers are trapped 
at the bottom of the socio-economic order, metaphorically below the surface of their 
society. The word “submerged” further conjures images of buried or drowned bodies, 
further suggesting how consumers exist in a state mimetic of death as objectified flesh. 
Indeed, although corporations require the survival of consumers as both laborers and 
customers, Courtenay relates a stark example the corporate oligarchy’s lack of concern 
for consumers’ well-being. In a housing facility, he reads a sign that states, “NIGHT-
DWELLERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN POLICING. MANAGEMENT 
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ASSUMES NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEFTS, ASSAULTS, OR RAPES” (142). 
Neither law nor police are present to protect consumers. Instead, just as the authors have 
illustrated in the local site of the Chlorella plantation, consumers are disposable bodies 
exposed to violence. 
Fifty years later in Oryx and Crake, Atwood imagines how easily the 
technological power wielded over non-human like ChickieNobs could be transferred to 
human bodies. The novel offers Crake’s plague as the spectacular epitome of how 
corporate bioscience practiced in the lab could be harmfully deployed against the human 
population. In essence, Crake intends his plague to solve what he sees as the evolutionary 
problem of “human predation,” the inevitability of violence and exploitation generated by 
human culture and capitalism (Oryx 101). Of course, he fails to adequately acknowledge 
how the systems that have caused cruelty, suffering, wars, and poverty directly inform 
and enable his own actions. His ability to enact his genocide requires the exploitative 
structures of corporate bioscience to generate the technology. For example, Crake 
grinningly admits to using “desperate” test subjects “[f]rom the poorer countries” without 
informed consent (296). Moreover, the discourse that he deploys to negate notions of 
individual human life’s value is centuries in the making—as is evident in the fictions 
such as Wright’s and Steinbeck’s. 
The discussion of Crake’s character in the trilogy by either narration or dialogue 
utilizes a vocabulary and concepts that evoke categories more akin to political theory 
than to experimental ethics. During the first days of apocalypse, Jimmy angrily thinks of 
how Crake was “[s]itting in judgment on the world,” and Jimmy wonders “but why had 
that been his right?” (Oryx 341). Jimmy does not arrive at an answer; the thought 
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resonates more with outrage and grief rather than inquiry. Yet the trilogy takes up this 
question. By focusing on Crake’s “judgment” and “right,” the text invokes a political, 
legalistic context for understanding how he accesses a discourse that justifies his choices 
in much the same manner that a sovereign entity accesses the rights granted it through 
law. Writing of the life science’s influence on the Nazi genocide, philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben claims that when biology enters as a deciding factor of biopolitics, “the 
physician and the scientist move in the no-man’s-land into which at one point the 
sovereign alone could penetrate” (Homo 159). Just as Agamben theorizes that traditional 
sovereignty always exists in a nascent state of exception, so does he perceive the role of 
the physician/scientist reaching this same condition. Crake embodies this potential: 
claiming that human civilization catastrophically threatens the global ecology, he decides 
that his action is both justified and necessary. His genocide is the footprint of the 
sovereign authority he has assumed over the world via the power of corporate bioscience. 
Crake offers his genocide as a necessary response to imminent ecological disaster; 
without consent he acts upon others’ bodies as an objectified mass of flesh just as if he 
were in a corporate lab. He explains his motivations to Jimmy under the guise of their 
work on the BlyssPluss Pill, a revolutionary sexual enhancement drug.
17
 He says, 
“I’ve seen the latest confidential Corps demographic reports. As a species 
we’re in deep trouble, worse than anyone’s saying. They’re afraid to 
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 Even without Crake’s addition of his fatal virus to this drug, he explains to Jimmy how his corporate 
partners intend it to further control the pleeblands’ populations, to “steer [human nature] in a more 
beneficial direction” (Oryx 293). Atwood writes that the pill works as a powerful aphrodisiac and “would 
also act as a sure-fire one-time-does-it-all birth control pill, for male and female alike, thus automatically 
lowering the population level.” As Jimmy puts it, “So basically you’re going to sterilize people without 
them knowing it under the guise of giving them the ultra in orgies?” (294). While Atwood inflects Crake’s 
actions with ambiguously altruistic motives, both the false flag sterilization project and his impending 
genocide strongly resemble moments of injustice in the twentieth-century in the United States and abroad 
produced under a negative biopolitical ideology invested in the violent control of populations.  
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release the stats because people might just give up, but take it from me, 
we’re running out of space-time. Demand for resources has exceeded 
supply for decades in marginal geo-political areas, hence the famines and 
droughts; but very soon, demand is going to exceed supply for everyone.” 
(294-5) 
Though Jimmy remains ignorant to his friend’s true plans, this declaration of exigency is 
in earnest. Crake perversely envisions his actions as a survival tactic, a deployment of 
power in a moment of necessity that by all accounts is quite real and urgent in the novel. 
Regardless of this declaration’s legitimacy, however, Crake uses it to turn the laboratory 
space of exception inside-out to encompass the globe. 
Though Jimmy suggests and Atwood has said that Crake’s explanation here is 
ambiguous evidence of his ultimate altruism, the scientist’s diction is loaded with a 
biopolitical conceit that objectifies living beings (Oryx 294; Bethune 48). He articulates 
his concern at the level of the human “species,” the most inclusive yet flattening term for 
the vast array of individuals faced with this ecological threat. He codes suffering and 
death in the sterile, quantitative terms “supply” and “demand,” passing over the myriad 
experiences of suffering that these words signify. For him, the stakes of the looming 
disaster exist solely at the biopolitical plane of the species, a category that he ultimately 
preserves by annihilating most of its constituents. Despite the mass death, Crake’s 
rationale is satisfied with the new “space-time” he gains for homo sapiens in its modified 
Craker form, dismissing billions of other human lives as inconsequential except as a 
collective biological mass with ecological implications.
18
 Theissen writes that Crake 
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 Some critics like J. Brooks Bouson have argued that the novel’s representation of Crake’s hyper-
rationality and what I have called his flat ontology in this chapter is evidence that he “does not believe in 
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enacts the latter of the two mandates that Foucault ascribes to biopower, “to make live 
and let die” (32). This claim is somewhat inaccurate. From the humanist reader’s 
perspective, without question Crake actively “makes” rather than passively “lets” the 
global population die. But the blasé sense of the expression “to let die” in English does 
indeed seem to capture Crake’s affect; he perceives human bodies as disposable flesh 
without particular privileges or even a right to life—like any other flesh in the corporate 
lab. 
 
Landscapes of Exception under Corporate Bioscience 
 Both The Space Merchants and Oryx and Crake imagine how their exceptional 
sites of corporate bioscience are interconnected with exploitative practices across broader 
landscapes and histories. On the one hand, Pohl and Kornbluth place their dystopian 
depiction of the biotech plantation in a longer history of exploiting laboring bodies. The 
dynamic that they imagine in Chicken Little’s chamber proves to be part of an accretion 
of coercive practices used against capitalist underclasses for centuries. Courtenay’s 
experience is not far removed from the Joads’ in The Grapes of Wrath. On the other 
hand, Atwood presents her dystopian version of corporate bioscience as participating in 
new ways in global markets of flesh and death. Ultimately, she portrays how, if 
                                                                                                                                                 
the value of human life” (Bouson 146). This claim is partially true but overly simplified; like his peers in 
the laboratory, Crake has deflated the value of human life to a level commensurate with the value he holds 
for non-human life. Oryx and Crake offers a number of examples of how Crake rationalizes human culture 
into overdetermined biological phenomena. In one instance, Jimmy reflects on his friend’s “opinion of 
human ingenuity” as a result of “an advanced model of monkey brains but monkey brains all the same” 
(99). Playing with a derisive metaphor and imprecise science (we are, after all, more closely related to apes 
than monkeys), Crake’s assessment works to equalize the value placed on “monkey” and human life. 
Furthermore, Crake is most certainly invested in the value of the abstract notion of “human life”; the 
preservation of the human species—in a more sustainable form—is a key premise of his genocidal project. 
Thus, a more accurate statement about Crake’s scientific discourse would be that he does not believe in the 
liberal humanist value placed on individual human lives. 
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unregulated, the power of corporate bioscience threatens to universalize its treatment of 
bodies as objectified flesh. 
As part of The Space Merchants’s plot, Courtenay finds himself kidnapped and 
mistaken for a common consumer on a “Labor Freighter” bound for the Chlorella 
plantations in Costa Rica (Venus 59). The plantation operates under a thinly-veiled 
exceptional logic in that laborers are always exposed to the potential violence, like legal 
company torture chambers called “wrecking rooms,” if workers do not conform to the 
roles that corporations intend for them (44). The reader learns that the government of this 
Central American state, though on the periphery of the “developed” world and its 
capitalist hegemony, is ensconced in corporate neocolonialism. A “plantation-protection 
man” informs Courtenay of the consequences if he were to “bug out” from his contractual 
obligations to Chlorella. Since the full Costa Rican national budget of “about a hundred 
and eighty billion dollars” arrives directly from Chlorella’s taxes, “the government—and 
the courts—of Costa Rica do just about what Chlorella wants done” (original emphasis, 
64). But rather than using the stereotype of a “undeveloped” nation’s puppet government, 
Pohl and Kornbluth have already established that their world’s United State government 
is also under the thumb of the corporate oligarchy. Earlier in the text, Courtenay remarks 
to the reader, “[T]he government—it’s odd how we still think and talk of that 
clearinghouse for pressures as though it were an entity with a will of its own.” Indeed, in 
the following paragraph the text references the “Senator from Du Pont Chemicals” and 
the “Senator from Nash-Kelvinator” (9). So the authors depict the corporate corruption of 
government and the violation of moral norms not as a feature of the Third World but as 
an export from the First World. 
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Before Pohl and Kornbluth introduce Chicken Little and work inside the 
plantation, they already hint to the savvy reader that scenes of exploitation are to follow. 
These details connect this fiction to a long history in the Americas of coerced labor. At 
first, “plantation” seems only a conventional name following the Costa Rican coffee and 
banana industries. Instead of traditional crops, the company’s laborers grow the algae that 
nourishes Chicken Little. The geopolitical placement of the plantation evokes a world 
still caught up in neocolonial relationships; this fictional Costa Rica bears strong 
resemblance to the real Banana Republic dominated by the United Fruit Company from 
the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. Historian Monica Rankin writes that the 
UFC’s “dominant economic position within Latin America and its persuasive position in 
U.S. government circles allowed it to wield enormous influence over Latin American 
policy” (82). The United Fruit Company’s reliance on imported labor and the “deplorable 
working and living conditions” on its plantations clearly inspire Pohl and Kornbluth’s 
imagination of the Chlorella plantation (85). This site of bioscience builds upon this past 
system of exploitation. 
The details of Courtenay’s sudden employment also evoke an experience of the 
Middle Passage. He is transported without consent as a “cargo slob” from one continent 
to another under the terms of a “blind” labor contract  that consigns him as an indentured 
body, if not an outright slave, to Chlorella (Venus 59, 62). To label such an arrangement 
as a “contract” is disingenuous at best since the unnegotiable imposition of one party’s 
will on another can only be described as an exploitative legal tool. The continued use of 
the word “contract” for this particular practice suggests a corporate attempt to disguise 
the nature of this indentured employment as an agreement between equal parties. Of 
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course, any kind of “contract” that Courtenay finds his false identity engaged in as a part 
of his kidnapping would be a “blind” contract, but the knowledge of his fellow “cargo 
slob” indicates that the term “blind contract” does not solely apply to Courtenay’s 
situation. The novel suggests that through these contracts corporations regularly approach 
laborers as objects awaiting appropriation. In case readers overlook these initial allusions 
to slavery, Pohl and Kornbluth raise the specter of forced labor again when Courtenay 
mentions matter-of-factly “that children born on the plantation were automatically 
indentured to Chlorella if either parent was still an employee on the child’s tenth 
birthday” (70). Like its predecessors in the New World, the Chlorella plantation relies on 
legalized systems of forced labor. 
The novel also links the model of Chicken Little’s growth management to the 
global consumer population. At one point, Courtenay reads issues of Biometrika, a real 
journal in the field of statistical studies closely associated with eugenics. Co-founded in 
1901 by Francis Galton who first formalized and termed “eugenics,” the journal is “one 
of the everyday tools” for corporations in The Space Merchants. Courtenay summarizes 
Biometrika’s use: “It told the story of population changes, IQ changes, death rate and 
causes of death, and all the rest of it. Almost every issue had good news in it for us . . . 
Increase of population was always good news to us. More people, more sales” (Venus 
81). Like Chicken Little, the consumer population is encouraged to grow so that it will 
further facilitate corporate profits, which in turn facilitates the corporate power over the 
masses. But in the metonymy that authors construct between Chicken Little and 
consumers lies an even more sinister suggestion. Courtenay mentions that the artisan 
Herrera functions as a “safety valve,” violently removing excess flesh from Chicken 
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Little if she grows too large; this detail invites speculation that the corporate powers also 
excise elements from the consumer population to increase profit. 
Atwood also uses the word “plantation” to describe Crake’s final laboratory in her 
novel. She describes the setting: “It had its own park around it, a dense climate-
controlling plantation” (Oryx 297). As in The Space Merchants, the word “plantation” 
conjures associations with a long history of exploitation, obliquely placing Crake’s lab in 
this legacy. This specially designed laboratory is immune to even corporate oversight, 
and the texts notes that no one, including the corporate security force, may enter without 
his permission. In other words, within the world of the novel, he rules his lab as a space 
of exception in which he is the unchecked sovereign. 
He names the site “Paradice,” a pun on “paradise.” Here Crake recreates human 
life in the form of the genetically hybrid Crakers. His lab’s moniker blithely mocks the 
idea of divine sovereignty. In Judeo-Christian tradition God makes Adam and Eve in an 
unmatched gesture of divine power, but now corporate bioscience wields the same power 
to make human beings into any image it desires. By calling his facility “Paradice,” Crake 
recasts the biblical narrative of human destiny into a matter of chance—simultaneously a 
game, a wager, and an experiment of trial and error. The name transforms notions of 
intelligent design and human privilege among other life forms from a grand destiny into 
evolutionary happenstance, which corporate bioscience can now control. In this one 
punning gesture, Crake symbolically supplants divine sovereignty with his own authority 
over all life. 
Crake’s plague offers a spectacular illustration of the bioscience laboratory’s 
potential to reconfigure life across broader landscapes. Yet the logic of corporate 
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bioscience structures life and society long prior to the release of Crake’s virus. The 
plague’s global distribution itself relies its disguise as a sexual enhancement drug that 
circulates through global economic networks. Atwood presents both the pre- and post-
apocalyptic settings of her trilogy as universalized laboratory spaces of exception in 
which all bodies become exposed to processes of objectification and the incumbent 
exploitative violence. 
Though Jimmy kills his friend in the wake of the plague, the novel suggests that 
the sovereign specter of Crake continues to oversee his new world. As Jimmy survives 
alongside the Crakers in civilization’s ruins, he imagines that he is “immersed” in 
Crake’s dreams. Atwood writes, “So Crake never remembered his dreams. It’s [Jimmy] 
that remembers them instead. Worse than remembers: he’s immersed in them, he’d 
wading through them, he’s stuck in them. Every moment he’s lived in the past few 
months was dreamed first by Crake [sic]” (Oryx 218). Jimmy even takes this notion and 
translates it into the Crakers’ mythic belief system about their own creation in which an 
ironically god-like Crake dreams their reality for them (352). The figurative attribution of 
the new post-apocalyptic ecology to Crake’s “dreams” highlights his central, even 
ongoing role in the production of this environment. 
The novel’s reflection on Jimmy’s circumstances reveals, however, that Crake’s 
machinations within the unrestricted zone of the lab do not simply enact predicate 
changes in the world. As in The Space Merchants, entrance into labs in Oryx and Crake 
reveals how global space is already being transformed into the exceptional domain of 
corporate bioscience. Any distinctions between the “lab” and the “world” collapse to the 
point at which Jimmy reflects, “The whole world is now one vast uncontrolled 
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experiment” (Oryx 228). The text suggests that, unlike the expected laboratory 
environment, the post-apocalyptic landscape lacks “control” or the commanding presence 
of a scientist observer who establishes the experimental conditions. The implication is 
thus that Crake’s genocidal experiment has surpassed the boundaries of the lab and 
operates independently of its master. The reader might initially accept this seeming 
erasure of Crake’s ongoing involvement in the apocalyptic experiment and consequently 
assume the irrelevancy of the laboratory space once the experimental phenomenon 
trespasses into other zones. But, in fact, Crake’s figurative and literal absence from this 
world-wide experiment proves to be the ultimate performance of the ideal rational 
scientist. 
The performance of objectivity is a founding paradox of the Scientific 
Revolution; the veracity of an experiment requires the witness of an objective observer 
whose presence is intended as inconsequential. The scientist is figured as not mattering to 
an experiment, yet his presence is nevertheless a prerequisite for validating its procedure 
and results.
19
 In other words, the experiment cannot exist as such without its observer. 
Oryx and Crake implies as much about Crake: despite his physical absence, he remains a 
haunting presence, not unlike the immaterial half of the “King’s two bodies” that persists 
after the sovereign’s biological death.
20
 Indeed, Crake’s specter hangs over not only 
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 To describe this paradigm of modern scientific subjectivity, Haraway adopts the term “modest witness” 
from Shapin and Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985) (Haraway, Modest_Witness 23). She 
argues that invisibility is “the virtue that guarantees that the modest witness is the legitimate and authorized 
ventriloquist for the object world” (24). This model of subjectivity positions an individual as a self-
authorized sovereign and speaker of material reality; the subject of technoscience orders reality through 
witnessing technologies while performing an invisibility that belies the implication of his own body within 
the space of the laboratory.   
20
 In The King’s Two Bodies (1957), Ernst H. Kantorowicz discusses the medieval political theory that a 
monarch possesses both a physical and a kind of spiritual, symbolic body that represents the body politic 
over which he reigns. According to Kantorowicz, this theory allowed for the death of kings without 
challenging their sovereignty over their lands and subjects because the symbolic body of the king never 
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Jimmy, his best friend, but also Atwood’s other surviving characters. They all live within 
Crake’s ongoing “dreams,” “stuck” in them like Jimmy. So while by the end of the novel, 
Crake’s suicide-by-Jimmy removes him from a position to literally remark upon events as 
they unfold, the novels insistently invoke his disembodied presence to fulfill the role of 
an absent observer who invisibly structures and validates the world-become-laboratory 
(343). Crake’s body may have perished, but his scientific sovereignty continues to order 
the otherwise lawless space of his new world. 
The pre-apocalyptic world of Atwood’s trilogy is similarly structured by the 
corporate laboratory. In this dystopian setting, biotech corporations have taken the place 
of representative government, and they now manage life, deploying violence for the 
maintenance of their interlinked power and profits. Through Jimmy’s reflections on his 
past life, Oryx and Crake portrays how the power to manipulate flesh, generated within 
the lab, extended beyond its borders well before Crake’s apocalypse. Instead, this 
conflation of all life and bodies as disposable flesh functions as a normalized state of 
exception spread across all space. 
The “state of nature” condition of the post-apocalyptic half of the trilogy closely 
mirrors the experiences for the majority of the human populace in the “pleeblands.” As 
Jimmy survives with the Crakers, he feels like a “caged, wired-up lab animal, trapped 
into performing futile and perverse experiments on his own brain,” and the text 
elaborates: “Get me out! he hears himself thinking. But he isn’t locked up, he’s not in 
prison. What could be more out than where he is?” (Oryx 45). Through this last rhetorical 
question the text suggests that Jimmy has reached a liminal condition in which he cannot 
                                                                                                                                                 
dies. Crake’s death engenders another performance of the sovereign’s two bodies. This suggested dynamic 




imagine the possibility of being any more exposed to danger, not unlike the rightless 
condition of flesh within the corporate laboratory. The fulfillment of Crake’s laboratory 
discourse—treating the human population as a single fleshly amalgam of a species—has 
ejected Jimmy “out” from the sphere of political rights and social obligations. A later 
passage expresses Jimmy’s impressions about the pleeblands that are strikingly similar 
fashion: “Everything in the pleeblands seemed so boundless, so porous, so penetrable, so 
wide-open. So subject to chance” (196). To be in the pleeblands is to be “out” in the same 
way that Jimmy is “out” in the post-apocalyptic landscape. A condition of exposure to 
violence pervades both settings. 
The juxtaposition of these passages and the two different settings reveals Jimmy’s 
survival experience as something akin to being a prisoner without prison, an unprotected 
body contained in a world-wide zone without rights. Bodies in both the post-apocalyptic 
landscape and the pleeblands exist in this condition. “Everything” in the pleeblands—
objects, places, and people—is “so penetrable,” a particularly prescient adjective given 
the pervasiveness of sex crime and sex industries that Atwood focuses on in The Year of 
the Flood (2009), her sequel to Oryx and Crake. The word “penetrable” casts the 
pleeblands and its denizens alike as “boundless” and “porous,” having no social or even 
physical barriers that adequately protect bodies from ominous “chance,” Jimmy’s 
euphemism for the risk of violence.
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 The condition of pleebs that Atwood imagines is a stark parallel to Hannah Arendt’s discussion in The 
Origins of Totalitarianism (1973) of the condition of rightlessness for displaced or stateless persons. Arendt 
argues that the “calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom of opinion . . . but that they no longer belong to any 
community whatsoever” (87). She claims that rights and protections of life emerge from communities and 
that the crisis of statelessness is to no longer belong to a community through which one can access those 
rights and protections. In the MaddAddam trilogy, people of the pleeblands live in a similar state; 
communities like the nation have been replaced by marketplaces that sell rights and protection. 
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Atwood elaborates upon how the safety of the pleeblands’ inhabitants repeatedly 
proves subordinate to profit. Her sequel relates the rumors that CorpSeCorps, the 
monopolistic private police force, is profitably involved in every form of nominally illicit 
business. Canavan points to the joke in organization’s name, “corpse corps,” suggesting 
its investment in producing corpses (142). Atwood writes of this group, “They had an 
image to uphold among those citizens who still paid lip service to the old ideals: 
defenders of the peace, enforcers of public security, keeping the streets safe. It was a joke 
even then, but most people felt that the CorpSeCorps were better than total anarchy” 
(Year 34). The novels imagine that without outside regulation, the division between 
accepted and illicit business becomes a matter of public relations rather than the 
prevention of dangerous criminal activities. 
In the absence of competitive ideologies and political systems, Atwood suggests 
along with Pohl and Kornbluth that regimes of corporate bioscience interact with living 
beings not as citizens but as fleshly objects that serve the production of profit and power. 
Living in the pleeblands opens one to entwined conditions: a consumer, a subordinate 
partner to capitalist production, or flesh—a locus of exploitable organic material. Other 
forms of violence that do not interfere with the profitable management of consumers and 
bodies are ignored; for example, when not profiting from it themselves, corporations 
ignore rampant sexual violence in Atwood’s world. Thus, what Jimmy identifies as 
dangerous “chance” in the pleeblands is an exposure not to abstract contingency but to 
the risk of one’s changing from a valued consumer into valuable flesh. 
Oryx and Crake further depicts the pleeblands not simply as a space of capitalist 
exploitation but as a literal extension of the exceptional laboratory. Crake once applies to 
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the pleeblands the metaphor of “a giant Petri dish” that permits the circulation of “a lot of 
guck and contagious plasm” (Oryx 287). His use of the metaphor is casual and not 
uncommon; the OED catalogs a familiar figurative definition of the word, “a place, 
environment, etc., in which rapid growth or development can take place,” alongside a 
description of the actual laboratory device, a dish used especially to “culture 
microorganisms or cells.” Out of context, this metaphor suggests that the pleeblands 
promote the growth and circulation of new microscopic life forms by nature. But as the 
reader knows from a dialogue between Crake and Jimmy earlier in the novel, 
corporations literally treat the pleeblands like a “giant Petri dish.” In a conversation about 
the revenue streams of biomedical companies, Jimmy asks, “But don’t they keep 
discovering new diseases?” and Crake answers, “Not discovering . . . They’re creating 
them” (original emphasis, 211). Crake continues to explain how HelthWyzer, a 
preeminent biotech corporation, secretly develops and releases diseases into the 
pleeblands’ populations that HelthWyzer then treats at a price. In characteristic form, 
Crake describes this creation of a disease marketplace as a “brilliant” corporate tactic. 
But, as his further comments imply, the basis for this marketization of illness in 
the pleeblands is the absence of social or state institutions. He says, “[O]nce you’ve got a 
hostile bioform started in the pleeb population, the way people slosh around out there it 
more or less runs itself” (211). Without structures of positive biopolitical governance, 
little else exists to protect the populace’s health. The word “slosh” connotes the corporate 
perspective of pleeb “people”: instead of recognizing individuated persons, these 
corporations see mass undifferentiated substance of human flesh not unlike ChickieNobs. 
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In the terms of Jimmy’s assessment of Crake’s apocalyptic landscape, the pleeblands, 
too, are “one vast experiment,” but this experiment’s control lies in corporate hands. 
Though imagined in a dystopian fiction, this exaggerated enterprise nevertheless 
illustrates a core dynamic of contemporary corporate bioscience in which populations are 
conceived as markets of illness. Anthropologist of science Kaushik Sunder Rajan 
describes this function of capitalist bioscience as the casting of a person as “a patient-in-
waiting and, simultaneously, a consumer-in-waiting” (281). While the idea that 
corporations maliciously manufacture disease is hopefully only appropriate to fiction, 
Oryx and Crake draws attention through this hyperbolic conspiracy theory to how 
corporate bioscience invests in the potential of illness as a matter of profit. Jimmy’s 
comment that life in the pleeblands is “open to chance” gains new meaning in this 
context. Once contemporary corporate bioscience creates a market of life and death, these 
two poles are transformed from the stakes of individual existence into a matter of 
financial futurity and risk (Rajan 14). So while bodies in the pleeblands are exposed to 
violent chance, they are also the exploited objects of economic speculation. 
Both emulating the space of the corporate laboratory, the post-apocalyptic 
landscape and the pleeblands of Oryx and Crake function as exceptional zones in which 
bodies are exposed to predation. Without ethical regulation, the corporations of the 
MaddAddam trilogy create and monopolize markets of violence and death. Corporate 
interests loosely legislate permissible and impermissible violence as necessary to sustain 
their control and profit. As a result, in the pleeblands violence is always a looming 
potentiality not unlike the condition of life in the post-apocalyptic landscape.
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 Of course, although Atwood emphasizes the primacy and the particular role that the lab plays in 
modelling both versions of the global landscape, she introduces “Painball Arenas” in The Year of the Flood 
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Satirical Science Fiction: Disrupting the Ideology of Corporate Bioscience 
Both novels are invested in the status of art, methods of persuasion, and the 
linguistic production of ideology. The Space Merchants and Oryx and Crake portray the 
use of scientific and advertising discourses to maintain the absolute power of their 
dystopian worlds’ corporate oligarchies. The depiction of advertising and science in the 
novels is, of course, satirically exaggerated. But these hyperbolic representations of these 
discourses draws attention to the more obscured nature of the ideology that encourages 
the conception of bodies as primarily fleshly objects, even by consumers themselves. 
As discourses, advertising and science persuade audiences to accept versions of 
reality while occluding their operations as persuasive discourses. Science purports to 
objectively and empirically explain the natural world, supposedly functioning as an 
unmediated window on to reality. In other words, science in Western culture holds a 
monopoly upon natural truth. For example, as a boy, Jimmy overhears an argument 
between his scientist parents in which his father reveals as much: “There’s nothing sacred 
about cells and tissues” (Oryx 57). By declaring the fact that cells and tissues, the basic 
materials of organic bodies, are “nothing sacred,” Jimmy’s father authorizes the 
technological manipulation of bodies on any biological scale. Such statements ultimately 
operate as a form of persuasion, constructing a worldview for an audience to accept on 
the basis of scientific authority. But because that authority is premised on its supposed 
                                                                                                                                                 
as another space of exception in parallel with the corporate lab that further illustrates the unchecked 
corporate objectification of life. The Arenas offer prisoners with death sentences to participate in gladiator 
matches, the winners of which are granted freedom. The corporate elite enjoy the blood sport as 
entertainment and gambling opportunity (98). In both The Year of the Flood and the trilogy’s final text, 
MaddAddam (2013), Atwood extensively depicts the dehumanizing effects on the Arena’s participants to 
such an extent that even the idealist and empathetic God’s Gardeners put to death their Painballer prisoners, 
who are deemed incapable of reclaiming an ethical sociability (MaddAddam 368). 
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objectivity and unmediated representation of the world, the persuasive nature of scientific 
discourse is hidden. 
Crake is Atwood’s chief example of scientific persuasiveness. He rationalizes 
human culture into overdetermined biological phenomena. In a dialogue with Jimmy, 
Crake declares that humans are “hormone robots,” who, when sexually unsatisfied, act 
out their frustrations through various means, including art; art, he says, is simply an 
evolutionarily motivated reaction, a “stab at getting laid” (166, 168). Crake even reasons 
that God is “a consequence of grammar . . . because as soon as there’s a past tense, there 
has to be a past before the past, and you keep going back in time until you get to I don’t 
know, and that’s what God is” (Year 316). Since “grammar would be impossible without 
the FoxP2 gene,” “God is a brain mutation” (316). In Crake’s world view, nothing 
transcends or arrives before material and, for organic life, biological causality. The 
scientific discourse that allows him to rationalize all human behavior ultimately 
rationalizes his genocide. People, as he seems to tell himself, are assemblies of flesh and 
biological processes that he is qualified to manage as a scientist. He has been apparently 
persuaded by his own words and has tempted readers to be persuaded, to be seduced by 
his apparent altruism and authority. 
The Space Merchants lacks a character like Crake and the spectacle of his 
scientifically rationalized apocalypse, but the role of a scientific worldview constructed 
through language clearly permeates the perspective of the ruling class. As noted earlier, 
the corporate elite rely on the scientific management of populations through tools like the 
journal Biometrika that quantitatively represents the human species as biological systems. 
The system of mass control in the text mirrors new approaches in bioscience since the 
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Second World War. Advances in genetics created a culture around what Haraway calls 
the “new life science,” sociobiology—the biological study of groups. She describes how 
around 1940 sociobiology was intent on translating individual life forms into mass 
systems that could be controlled and predicted. This tactic “became a basic strategy of 
social institutions,” and Haraway ultimately claims, “The search has been for 
evolutionary stable strategies for maximizing profit” (Simians 46). Pohl and Kornbluth 
imagine how the sociobiology of the 1950s could be perfected into the degrading 
management of populations as flesh. 
Alongside the language and practices of corporate bioscience in laboratory 
spaces, both novels emphasize the importance of advertising for sustaining the power and 
ideology that emerges from the lab. Indeed, consumers need to be persuaded to purchase 
the commodities that the lab produces in order for corporate bioscience to prosper and 
maintain its power. As a character in The Year of the Flood states, “The Corps have to 
sell, but they can’t force people to buy” (266). In order to maintain their particular system 
of economically-generated power, the corporations in Atwood’s dystopia must continue 
to persuade the populace that they provide essential goods and services. The authors of 
both novels present advertising as another method of control in tandem with the direct 
manipulation of flesh and the threat of violence. 
In The Space Merchants, Pohl and Kornbluth almost immediately unveil the 
nature of advertising in their world. Their depiction points to the negative potential of 
real advertising to produce exploitative consumer ideologies. Courtenay’s boss, Fowler, 
complains in a staff meeting about the restrictions the government has put on their 
advertising tactics. He says, 
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You know what they’ve done. They outlawed compulsive subsonics in our 
aural advertising—but we’ve bounced back with a list of semantic cue 
words that tie in with every basic trauma and neurosis in American life 
today. They listened to the safety cranks and stopped us from projecting 
our messages on aircar windows—but we bounced back. Lab tells me . . . 
that soon we’ll be testing a system that projects directly on to the retina of 
the eye. (Venus 5-6) 
Like how the biotech plantation treats its laborers and Chicken Little, the advertising firm 
targets consumers as fleshly objects to be managed for profit. Fowler’s comments point 
to the desire of advertising to act upon a passive audience. He wants to use “compulsive” 
technology that bombards consumers, removing their agency as recipients who can 
choose to view advertising or not. 
Fowler’s firm, in line with advertising in the real world, seeks to persuasively 
compel certain consumer behavior. By making use of “every basic trauma and neurosis in 
American life,” advertising targets the psychological and biological substrates of human 
beings, seeking to create behavior while circumventing their will as active subjects. 
Courtenay explains as much to another character who has found himself purchasing one 
brand over another. He says, “It means we got you. [We] worked on you . . . We reached 
you. Smoothly, without your ever being aware that it was happening, you became 
persuaded that there was something rather nice about Starrzelius clothes and shoes” 
(Venus 35). This “smooth” operation that evades a person’s awareness is an approach to 
audiences that treats them as machinic, conditioned beings. Courtenay’s expression “you 
became persuaded” emphasizes the subtle, subliminal intent of advertising. By using the 
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verb “to persuade” in the passive voice without an active subject present to undertake the 
persuasion, the text highlights the self-erasing process of advertising. As Courtenay’s 
explanation suggests, advertising works better, like science, if its role as a persuasive 
discourse is not apparent to its audience. Thus, Courtenay’s firm works to create the 
sense of “something rather nice” about Starrzelius products as if this feeling were a basic 
fact of reality. 
Fowler’s commentary about the restrictions on advertising efforts also 
importantly reveals the entanglement of the linguistic persuasion of advertising with new 
techno-scientific practices. While his firm’s techniques rely on the linguistic technologies 
of, for example, “semantic cue words” that trigger neurotic responses, technologies for 
biologically manipulating body and mind are presented with more emphasis. The authors 
imagine the use of “compulsive subsonics,” “aircar” window projections, and retina 
projections along with fictional advanced technologies in The Space Merchants and its 
sequel, The Merchants’ War (1984). Such hyperbolic depictions of advertising 
technology reveal the nature of advertising as a technology for acting upon consumers’ 
bodies. 
Ultimately, the advertising efforts that Fowler describes are part of the unchecked 
exercise of corporate power. As Courtenay remarks, the highest ideal of his world is 
“Sales” that advertising promotes (Venus 38). As a corollary, Fowler says to him as an ad 
executive, “[Y]ou’ve got power. Five words from you, and in a matter of weeks or 
months half a million consumers will find their lives completely changed. That’s power, 
Mitch, absolute power. And you know the old saying. Power ennobles. Absolute power 
ennobles absolutely” (33). This corporate axiom reverses the traditional aphorism about 
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power’s corruptive nature. In this fictional “old saying,” power actively but naturally 
legitimates itself. On one hand, the sentence, “Power ennobles,” implies that to possess 
power is to impart a beneficent quality to its owner. On the other hand, the lack of a 
grammatical object for this normally transitive verb suggests that power self-reflexively 
ennobles itself, regardless of its employment, in a cyclical, even masturbatory fashion—
indeed, Fowler’s naïve, self-serving remark is laughable. The satire here, however, 
ultimately points to the core danger of the oligarchy’s ideology: within their power 
inheres the authorization to wield it without consent from those subject to power. This 
simple sentence reveals the oligarchy’s exceptional nature, maintained through its own 
persuasive self-assurances and the advertising that disciplines consumers. 
In Oryx and Crake, Atwood’s fictional take on corporate bioscience includes a 
similar depiction of advertising. In her neoliberal dystopia in which every skill must be 
marketable, her protagonist, Jimmy, goes to a liberal arts college to study “Problematics,” 
the academic field of advertising rhetoric. Upon his graduation, he finds employment as a 
“word” person in the advertising industry. Of his new position Atwood writes, “He was 
to cudgel his brains and spend ten-hour days wandering the labyrinths of the thesaurus 
and cranking out the verbiage” (Oryx 248). The text elaborates, “It was his task to 
describe and extol, to the present the vision of what – oh, so easily! – could come to be. 
Hope and fear, desire and revulsion, these were his stocks-in-trade, on these he rang his 
changes” (248). Jimmy’s job is to create an aspirational “vision” of reality for his 
corporation’s customers. In contrast to the power attributed to advertising executives in 




Despite his relatively privileged status as a corporate citizen, even Jimmy’s 
seeming intellectual labor transforms him into an passive, object-like being. He is 
alienated from his work, told by his superiors that “with time he improved, whatever that 
meant” (248). Although he is a “word” person, he loses track of how his words and 
meanings are taken up and used by his corporation. To him, his work is “verbiage,” 
excess without real meaning. His labor does not require critical or reflective thought. 
Still, the language he deploys registers on an ideological level. He uses trigger words that 
act on consumer sensibilities like programming code: “Pills to make you fatter, thinner, 
hairier, balder, whiter, browner, blacker, yellower, sexier, and happier” (248). These 
comparative adjectives are floating signifiers that represent not some sort of material 
product but an aspirational, immaterial sense of change. The text emphasizes how the 
pills and Jimmy’s words do not promise hair or thinness but only difference. 
Like Fowler’s firm in The Space Merchants, Jimmy’s work trades on “[h]ope and 
fear, desire and revulsion,” Atwood’s version of “neuroses and trauma” of daily 
“American life,” engaging consumers as malleable objects rather than through rational 
discourse as subjects. In addition, the changes that his advertising promises are, more or 
less, changes to consumers’ flesh. Advertising convinces people to add on to the work 
that corporate bioscience is already doing; to conceive of themselves as primarily fleshly 
entities. The narrative also admits, “Once in a while, he’d make up a word – tensicity, 
fibracionous, pheromonimal – but he never once got caught out. His proprietors like 
those kinds of words in the small print on packages because they sounded scientific and 
had a convincing effect [sic]” (248-9). So not only does Jimmy’s advertising language 
peddle the wares of corporate bioscience that treat consumers’ as flesh, but he also makes 
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use of science’s rhetorical authority. His words have no true definition, but their 
figurative, ideological meaning works potently on his audience. 
When Crake takes advantage of the technologies and resources and corporate 
bioscience to engineer his genocide, he also makes use of the ideological atmosphere that 
advertising firms have created in his future world. When he introduces Jimmy to his 
Crakers, radically genetically engineered passive, docile human surrogates, Crake 
describes them as “floor models.” He says to Jimmy, “They represent the art of the 
possible . . . We’ve done our market research” (Oryx 305). Truly, the Crakers, along with 
his plague, are part of Crake’s ecological survival strategy for imminent failure of the 
planet’s resources. But he is able to create them under the premise of fulfilling the market 
desires generated by the advertising of corporate bioscience technologies. Within this 
ruse, the Crakers are a technology of both science and advertising. They are “floor 
models” designed to attract interest in less extreme versions of human genetic 
engineering. They are intended by Crake’s corporate superiors to serve as a fleshly 
advertisement in order to persuade customers to make other fleshly purchases. Of course, 
the Crakers are a science fiction creation, used to provoke readers’ estrangement and then 
critical thought about the potential of lab-created flesh and its consequences in the world. 
But this example of flesh’s persuasive deployment baldly illustrates Atwood’s critique of 
how corporate bioscience works through an ideology in which consumers see themselves 
as flesh. By looking at the Crakers in their laboratory space, audiences are persuaded to 
think of their own bodies as radically malleable flesh. 
As linguistic art, both The Space Merchants and Oryx and Crake offer critical 
intervention into the language and practices of corporate bioscience, both in its labs and 
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auxiliary advertising industries. Yet both texts further emphasize that dystopian degree of 
persuasive power that belongs to scientific discourse and advertising emerges in these 
worlds in the absence of a potent culture of literary art. Pohl and Kornbluth have 
Courtenay explain how the market for persuasive language has turned the linguistic arts 
into an advertising utility. He says,  
The correlation is perfectly clear. Advertising up, lyric poetry down. There 
are only so many people capable of putting together words that stir and 
move and sing. When it became possible to earn a very good living in 
advertising by exercising this capability, lyric poetry was left to untalented 
screwballs who had to shriek for attention and compete by eccentricity. 
(Venus 36) 
Of course, the novel’s presentation of this “correlation” is ahistorical: advertising and 
poetry have long coexisted until this fictional future when one discourse has completely 
drowned out the other. 
In Oryx and Crake, Atwood makes a similar gesture about the transformation of 
linguistic art into advertising technology. In her dystopian future, she imagines how the 
arts and humanities have become defunct except for their role in entertainment and 
advertising production. Jimmy attends “The Martha Graham Academy,” one of the last 
“Arts-and-Humanities college” where “a lot of what went on . . . was like studying Latin, 
or book-binding: pleasant to contemplate in its way, but no longer central to anything” 
(Oryx 186, 187). He majors in “Problematics,” the “contemporary arena” for the study of 
language and rhetoric. The text comments on what Atwood imagines to the be the near 
future for the North American neoliberal university: “Like everything at Martha Graham 
223 
 
it had utilitarian aims” (188). The linguistic arts once used to stir feeling and provoke 
thought for so many different reasons have been reduced to marketing. Atwood writes, 
“Window-dressing was what he’d be doing at best – decorating the cold, hard, numerical 
real world in flossy 2-D verbiage” (188). Without immediate marketable, “utilitarian” 
value, linguistic art has vanished in both dystopias in favor of exploitative, deceptive 
advertising rhetoric. The corporate oligarchies essentially corner the market for affective 
language, using it in the service of their consumer ideologies. The novels suggest that, 
without alternatives to the objectifying discourses of science and advertising, American 
society might become a version of these dystopias. 
The novels offer themselves as such alternatives, using their satiric modes to give 
readers pause about the ideologies and narratives surrounding corporate bioscience. 
Satire is also a persuasive genre, by definition loaded with a moral or political agenda. 
But the key difference between the satire of The Space Merchants and Oryx and Crake 
and the scientific and advertising discourses that the novels lambast is that their satire 
draws sharp attention to its artfulness and persuasive methods. And by taking corporate 
advertising and bioscience as their subjects, these satirical novels directly invite readers 
to contemplate the function of representation in these three kinds of discourse. 
Satire, of course, is not some morally pure alternative to science and advertising. 
Nor are science and advertising inherently evil forms of persuasion. Any of these 
discourses could be used to the moral detriment or exploitation of audiences. Satire 
evokes the pleasure of ridiculing a target, and that pleasure invites audiences to identify 
with the satirist over the object of ridicule. While the audience or author of satire could 
actively ignore or occlude the visibility of satire’s method of persuasion, The Space 
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Merchants and Oryx and Crake draw attention to their persuasive efforts, asking readers 
to think not only about corporate bioscience and its advertising efforts but also about how 
the novels go about representing corporate bioscience. 
Unlike the science and advertising depicted in these texts, the ironic nature of 
satire prevents it from being able to create a totalizing ideology. The work of satire 
requires both its direct grammatical meaning and its referent to construct the ironic effect. 
For example, in 1953 a creature like Chicken Little does not exist in historical reality, but 
as a figure in The Space Merchants she refers to the real industrial chicken farming 
industry. When encountering this figure in text, readers engage both the literal and 
figurative meaning of Chicken Little, unable to disregard either. In fact, Pohl and 
Kornbluth include a passage that insists that readers not ignore either the literal or 
figurative aspect of this creature. This effect occurs when late in novel Courtenay’s boss, 
Fowler, attributes Courtenay’s tale of kidnapping to a psychotic break from reality. 
Referring to the role of Chicken Little in Courtenay’s narrative, Fowler remarks, “The 
symbolism— . . . well, it’s quite unmistakable” (Venus 124). Like the reader, he 
recognizes the creature’s metaphorical significance. But to Courtenay’s distress, Fowler 
dismisses Chicken Little as only a metaphor, a product of Courtenay’s traumatized mind. 
In part, this moment is a humorous self-reflexive jab by the authors for the heavy-handed 
symbolism of Chicken Little. But Fowler’s dismissal of Courtenay’s tale serves to 
frustrate him, pushing him further into an oppositional stance to the corporate regime. 
Since Courtenay knows that Chicken Little is real, he recognizes that the anecdotal 
manipulation and predation on her body by corporate bioscience is real and illustrates all 
bodies’ condition. The authors’ tactic here also persuades the reader to align with 
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Courtenay because the text is crafted so that the reader identifies and believes the truth-
value of his story. As a result, Fowler’s incredulous comment prompts the reader to 
disagree and become further entrenched in the truth value of Courtenay’s experience, 
which a few paragraphs later articulates his first earnest recognition of the corporate 
hegemony’s unjust social order.
23
 But at the same time, the text’s mention of Chicken 
Little’s metaphorical meaning prompts readers to think in those same terms, to consider 
what exactly she symbolizes outside the text as well as inside it.  
In Oryx and Crake, Atwood more directly articulates the truth value fiction has in 
relationship to discourses of “fact.” At one point Jimmy imagines or recalls a past 
conversation with his unworldly Craker wards: “Is it real? No, it is not real. What is this 
not real? Not real can tell us about real” (Oryx 102). Crake has intended them to not 
understand symbolic thinking, so pictures and other representative objects they find in the 
ruins of civilization confuse. Jimmy’s explanation about “real” and “not real” to the naïve 
Crakers also serves as a reminder to Atwood’s audience about the capacity for art to 
teach us about what we accept as “real,” including science. 
 
Conclusion: The Shortcomings of Satire 
 Both The Space Merchants and Oryx and Crake execute their satirical critiques to 
great effect. But the dark nature of the novels’ satire offers little in the place of corporate 
consumer ideologies that they warn against. While the two texts elicit cynical pleasure 
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 Brennan argues a similar case in his essay on the novel, that Fowler “uses psychoanalytic theory and 
jargon to erect an overwhelming defense against the reality of Mitch’s experience.” He calls the narrative a 
fiction of Courtenay’s mind, and in response Courtenay is driven further away from the corporate ideology 
to the point at which he finally embraces the Consie critique of the corporate hegemony (108). Brennan 
does not, however, make the clear connection that the text compels the reader to follow the same trajectory, 
rejecting Fowler’s ignorance in favor of the knowledge that Courtenay’s experience has revealed.  
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and gesture toward a counter-politics or ideology in response to the systems of 
exploitation they represent, neither novel fulfills those gestures on its own. The authors 
thus turn to sequel texts to supplement the shortcomings of their satirical originals. 
In The Space Merchants, Courtenay does encounter the possibility of recognizing 
bodies as more than disposable flesh. This moment occurs in the same space that 
epitomizes fleshliness, Chicken Little’s chamber. The artisan Herrera who explains 
Chicken Little to Courtenay also secretly holds a special bond with her—indeed, he 
introduces the use of the female pronoun into Courtenay’s narrative, treating the creature 
more as a living being than a fleshly object. Herrera speaks of Chicken Little with a sense 
of camaraderie, and the authors make this relationship evident with sentences like, “He 
whacked the rubbery thing affectionately with the flat of his slicer” (Venus 78). This 
relationship culminates in the revelation that Chicken Little is a co-conspirator with 
Herrera as part of the plantation’s “Consie” resistance movement. Using a secret 
command, Herrera prompts her to open a cavernous orifice that leads to a subterranean 
chamber in which Consies can meet unobserved. This hidden room, in fact, proves to be 
another kind of space of exception within the plantation. With the help of the corporate 
monster figuratively at the center of the oligarchy’s power in the novel, the radicals can 
temporarily escape corporate power. And despite her formulation as objectified flesh, 
Chicken Little’s display of social responsiveness destabilizes the intended absolute 
commodification of her body. This moment in the text suggests a hope that life itself, in 
its complexity and chaos, provides its own basis for resistance to political or economic 
systems of exploitation. 
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 In the end, however, this aspect of the narrative is only incidental, not to return as 
a thematic conceit. The novel’s plot lacks a satisfying conclusion. Courtenay ultimately 
but half-heartedly converts to the radical Consie cause and escapes with members of the 
movement to Venus. But this ending is more fit for an action or thriller film than to the 
narrative that Pohl and Kornbluth have developed so effectively to depict concerns about 
capitalism and bodies. Kornbluth comments in retrospect that their collaborative focus on 
social critique seems to have little room for redemption. In a lecture he explains, “By the 
time the reader has gone through 178 pages of misery, animosity, squalor and violence, 
he is understandably reluctant to believe that on Page 179 everything can suddenly be 
patched up so that these savage creatures can live happily ever after” (73). By apparent 
oversight, the logic of the plot ultimately suggests that the response to the problems of 
this world is to escape them. Courtenay and the radicals simply abandon the rest of the 
world to the corporate regime.  
Pohl’s solo sequel The Merchants’ War works to correct the first novel’s flawed 
ending. He imagines the more socially and environmentally conscious society that has 
taken root on Venus years after Courtenay’s narrative. But rather than exploring the 
Venusian utopia, Pohl returns another corporate citizen, Tennison Tarb, from his 
diplomatic post on Venus to Earth. Like Courtenay, Tarb finds himself passing through 
the bowels of the consumer underclass. The plot, however, does not whisk the newly 
radicalized Tarb back into the safety of Venus society. Once he learns of the Venusian 
plan to turn corporate brainwashing technology against Earth’s population in an effort to 
secure Venus’s independence, Tarb insists on an alternative to again abandoning Earth’s 
humans outside the equitable Consie community. In the last pages, rather than joining the 
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war effort that pits two populations against each other, he declares, “I’m opting out! I’m 
trying something different” (Venus 344). He hijacks the airwaves and leads a band of 
disaffected consumers in broadcasting testimonials across the globe about their 
experiences of suffering under the corporate regime. This truth-telling performance leads 
to a revolutionary moment when Earth society might reform itself into something better, 
though the novel ends without exploring the consequences of Tarb’s radical action. Both 
The Space Merchants and The Merchants’ War operate under this same ethos, telling the 
truth—albeit in fiction through satirical hyperbole—about the nature of unchecked 
corporate bioscience in the hopes of readers’ own dissent to such practices. 
In contrast, Atwood provides less grounds for optimism in Oryx and Crake and 
her sequels. The MaddAddam world faces ecological disaster with or without Crake’s 
intervention, and Oryx and Crake does not allow for humanity’s figurative redemption 
through Jimmy, who fears he is his species’ last representative. Throughout the text he 
reflects upon his personal failings and those of his capitalist civilization; he develops 
something of a better, more conscientious character in the course of the narrative. 
Atwood seems to offer Jimmy the chance to actualize his new self when he discovers a 
camp of other human survivors. But the novel ends in a cliffhanger before Jimmy meets 
the interlopers. This ending dramatizes the unresolved tension that the author instills 
throughout the text between starkly negative critique and a lack of potent ideas for 
intervention in the regime of corporate bioscience. Even on the small scale of strangers 
meeting in a wasteland, reading Oryx and Crake provides little clear evidence that new, 
better human communities are possible. Instead, the onus remains on the reader to 
imagine the possibilities. 
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Of course, Atwood’s two sequels reveal the identities of these other survivors and 
further elaborate the post-apocalyptic plot. By the beginning of the third novel, 
MaddAddam, some God’s Gardeners—a religious group that actively resists the 
corporate hegemony—and the Crakers have banded together. Three non-engineered 
women have even conceived hybrid offspring with Craker males. Their community of 
difference temporarily expands when pigoons—human-swine genetically-engineered 
hybrids—demonstrate a kind of language-use to communicate with the Crakers. The non-
hybrid humans, Crakers, and pigoons agree to a basic social contract to not “eat” each 
other, either alive or dead (270), and to combat the irredeemable cutthroat prisoner-
gladiators that have harassed the other survivors in this novel and The Year of the Flood. 
Their alliance wins out over these “Painballers,” opening the possibility that human and 
non-human life might coexist in non-exploitative relationships in the wake of 
capitalism’s destruction. 
Still, Atwood ends MaddAddam on the same note of tension as in Oryx and Crake 
ten years earlier. The reins of the narrative pass from human hands into the Craker child 
Blackbeard’s in a textual gesture of recognition that these beings are worthy of 
subjectivity and narrative voice despite their difference from “normal” humans. On the 
final page Blackbeard expresses the hopefulness he feels at the birth of the human-Craker 
children, but his optimism arrives only pages after three of the trilogy’s four main 
characters have died rather abruptly (390). At the very least then, if Blackbeard’s hope is 
not entirely misplaced, it at least does not belong to humans of the past world, suggesting 
an absence of hope for the reader’s world as well.
24
 
                                                 
24
 Although this social contract’s inclusiveness is quite radical compared to twenty-first century societies 
and the trilogy’s pre-apocalyptic world, all of these participants are biologically linked to the privileged 
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Atwood does not, however, entirely abandon her readers as helpless to an 
apocalyptic fate at the hands of corporate bioscience. In The Year of the Flood and 
MaddAddam, she develops the much critically commented upon ethos of the God’s 
Gardeners as a radical alternative to the exploitation and violence of their world and ours, 
what Frederic Jameson describes as a kind of “biopolitical saintliness” (“Then”).
25
 Their 
non-dogmatic ideology is premised on radical reinterpretations of the Bible alongside 
scientific fact. This creed resists the objectification of human and non-human bodies that 
has begun in the laboratory and spread to all social space. For example, in one of the 
Gardener leader’s sermons about God’s “Covenant with Noah, and with his sons, ‘and 
with every living creature,’” he explains, “No one can make a Covenant with a stone: for 
a Covenant to exist, there must be a minimum of two live and responsible parties to it. 
Therefore the Animals are not senseless matter, not mere chunks of meat” (Year 91). 
Though a striking attempt to reorient Western culture through one of its foundational 
texts, this reinterpretation and others like it in the trilogy do not offer a clear politics of 
action.
26
 Instead, the Gardeners’ teaching works to reorient the ethical consciousness of 
                                                                                                                                                 
category of the “human.” While two groups are “post-human,” the pact among these three groups is 
predicated upon their linked capacities for language. Atwood’s narrators do not speculate about how the 
pigoons and Crakers are capable of communicating, but readers are left to assume that these creatures’ 
participation in the alliance is due to their partially shared genetic heritage with homo sapiens. Thus, 
though this alliance serves to practically model the Gardeners’ ethics portrayed in The Year of the Flood 
and MaddAddam, this example of a revised human and non-human sociability just barely reaches outside 
the bounds of the “human.” This development points to the difficulty of creating non-anthropocentric plots 
that activate a truly inclusive ideology like Bruno Latour’s Democracy of Things or a politics premised on 
theories of new materialism. While Atwood demonstrates through the God’s Gardeners an investment in 
reaching beyond the category of the “human” to form more ethical communities and ecologies, from her 
example in the MaddAddam trilogy still seems to suggest that stories are only appropriate to human beings. 
25
 For examples of this criticism, see Hannes Bergthaller (2010), Shannon Hengen (2010), J. Brooks 
Bouson (2011), Gerry Canavan (2012), and the essays by Paula Anca Farca, Tomoko Kuribayashi, Lauren 
A. Rule Maxwell, and Carol Osborne in the 2010 special issue of Margaret Atwood Studies. 
26
 In an otherwise compelling reading about the “soulless vocabulary” and lack of ethics in the consumer 
culture portrayed in Oryx and Crake, Shannon Hengen concludes that “Atwood demands an 
interpenetration of the languages of traditional wisdom and ever-changing technology” (140). Hengen 
points in this essay to Adam One, the leader of God’s Gardeners, as the exemplar of this interpenetration. 
While Adam One’s sermons in The Year of the Flood do offer an inviting amalgamation of scientific, 
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its members and the surrounding world. Atwood clearly intends to do this same critical 
work upon her audience, to find, as Canavan writes, through these dystopian allegories 
some “outside” to the consumer capitalism that has “remade all of human history, all the 
way down to the level of the gene, in its image” (154, 155).
27
 The Gardeners and novels 
try to create a foothold for a kind of thought and existence beyond the exploitative 
models of corporate bioscience. 
While the fate of their fictional worlds is unresolved, the authors’ dystopian 
projections inscribe a speculative function into their art, forecasting the possible 
outcomes of our present reality. Yet both novels are incontestably bound to contemporary 
critique. When read together, the mixed temporalities of these dystopian worlds and the 
texts’ circulation—the Merchants’ duology’s periodic cultural resurfacing and the 
MaddAddam trilogy’s continued cultural production—all offer audiences a complex, 
fluid network of interstitial historical fact, fiction, and potential. The capabilities of 
bioscience change each year, but by translating concerns about the concomitant evolution 
of capitalism and bioscience into fiction, these novels create fields of critical signification 
that will only continue to accumulate more meaning from new audiences. Even if later 
                                                                                                                                                 
religious, and environmentalist discourse, his wisdom is decidedly radical rather than “traditional.” The 
quote used above indicates as much: in the context of Western modernity and capitalism, there is nothing 
traditional to the notion that human beings should have a Covenant or social contract with all animals. 
Adam One may emulate and even references past writers, like the poets Robert Burns, Christopher Smart, 
and Farley Mowat, demonstrating that his ideas are part of a tradition (Year 311). This tradition, however, 
represents a radical margin of Western culture and capitalism. Indeed, Atwood offers the God’s Gardeners 
ideology precisely as a way to un-think what theorists like Bruno Latour describe as the traditional schism 
of Western modernity between nature and human culture. When Hengen describes Adam One’s discourse 
as the interpenetration of the traditional and the new, she actually in part re-performs this schism that has 
overtaken the world of the novel to apocalyptic proportions. 
27
 Reviews of The Year of the Flood, however, seem to belie the effectiveness of Atwood’s message. Gina 
Wisker reports that many reviewers found the sequel’s “post-apocalyptic, sustainability theme and its 
mixture of the homey arts and crafts, its quasi-religious tone, and its sometimes cartoonish characters” less 
than compelling (176). Indeed, skeptics of the novel’s ideas seem unable to accept the politics of the God’s 
Gardeners, but as I have argued, the trilogy proves ultimately more invested in challenging its readers’ 
conceptions rather than endorsing the Gardeners’ lifestyle wholesale. 
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twenty-first century readers do not take up a historicist reading practice of these novels, 
these texts nevertheless produce a more capacious historical and ethical awareness of the 




Coda: Spaces and Beyond 
 
 
This dissertation, as is true of most intellectual exercises and certainly of all 
academic efforts, is only a tentative starting point for the topics it broaches. By no means 
does it attempt to offer the final word on the theories of American history, law, or 
politics, and without question is does not foreclose other critical approaches to the six 
novels I cover. As an organizing conceit, “spaces of exception” offers a method for 
identifying the interconnections among these novels and others, as well as the histories 
and possibilities represented in their pages. Yet, as becomes apparent in each text, the 
stakes surrounding each of these sites are far from limited to specific locales or moments 
in time. 
 The major conclusion of this project is twofold. First, the torture chamber, ghetto, 
farm labor camp, and corporate laboratory in these novels are only the epicenters for 
much more diffuse networks of power. Sites that mirror in some way Agamben’s model 
space of exception in the “camp” are only one kind of technique for managing bodies 
marked as disposable. In fact, to think of my conceit more broadly, the truest, most 
persistent yet ephemeral spaces of exception are the bodies of people and other living 
beings not fully enfolded into the polity of the State. To be racialized, economically 
dispossessed, or otherwise dehumanized is to begin inhabiting a space of exception 
defined by the body. 
 Secondly, in each chapter I have discussed how Butler, Walter, Wright, 
Steinbeck, Pohl, Kornbluth, and Atwood have emplotted particular spaces as a strategy to 
234 
 
reveal the iniquity that reaches across our national and global landscapes. Somewhat 
paradoxically, these authors utilize spaces of exception that are difficult to both 
materially access and ethically imagine in order to expose even larger insights. These 
sites become lenses, a technique of representation that works to reverse how these spaces 
are deployed as techniques of violence and marginalization. Trouble arises, however, as 
techniques of power evolve beyond tangible sites and new methods of focusing attention 
and understanding are required. Policies like “stop and frisk” and racial profiling extend 
exceptional police powers beyond zones of racial containment. The neoliberal “new 
economy” generates wealth in part via the precarity of temporary labor without the 
arrangements of space and bodies found in The Grapes of Wrath. At the close of this 
dissertation, one way to think of these spaces together are as laboratories of power 
through which stakeholders across different networks experiment with how to better 
justify and maintain their power. 
 Even without such a consideration, however, this project leaves room for 
significant expansion. As one example, gender and sexuality remain a kind of blind spot 
here. While I have paid attention to politicized bodies, racialized bodies, laboring bodies, 
and commodified bodies, there remains a needed exploration of spaces of exception that 
exploit sexual and gender difference. In fact, a new chapter could be written about the 
brothels and pornography industry in Atwood’s MaddAddam trilogy alongside The 
Handmaid’s Tale. Ultimately, the topic of each chapter could be expanded into multiple 
book projects of their own, some of which already exist: the long history of State torture 
and police violence; depictions of spaces intended to contain blackness like the slave 
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ship, plantation, ghetto, and prison; centuries of migratory labor; and the role of scientific 
discourse in fueling American arrangements of power and exploitation. 
 Beyond an expansion of subjects, this dissertation could evolve into a project that 
more firmly commits to either its investment in literary history or genre. I pose Chapter 1 
and 4 as “contemporary” while Chapters 2 and 3 offer a broader historical perspective. 
Yet each Chapter primarily functions as a case study with interlinking topical concerns. A 
fuller project could commit to taking the long twentieth-century or more as its subject, 
encompassing more literary and non-literary forms. In contrast, this dissertation could 
more fully embrace the genre of science fiction that already makes up half of my primary 
texts. One approach would to be take up the comparative model in Chapter 1 to pair 
Wright’s Native Son with a novel like Samuel Delany’s Trouble on Triton (1976) which 
reverses engineers a space like the ghetto into the absolute freedom of the “unlicensed 
zone” on a moon of Neptune. Similarly, the post-apocalyptic vision of Cormac 
McCarthy’s The Road (2006) productively mirrors the depiction of the “road” in The 
Grapes of Wrath. If we accept my contention that spaces of exception and their kin litter 
the pages of American history, then a study of most any genre, comparative or otherwise, 
is not out of reach. 
 At the end of this dissertation, I would also speculate that the intersection of 
literature and spaces of exception is not a matter of happenstance. The injustices in the 
margins of our societies are always in need of strategies of ethical representation and 
redress, and American writers have developed a strong ethic in response. But spaces of 
exception in particular are designed and operated in a manner to avoid representation and 
legibility under modern liberalism. In many ways, the work of literary fiction is directly 
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opposed to this occlusion of lives that occurs in torture chambers, ghettoes, camps, labs, 
and networks that have produced them. As a result, we should be doubly vigilant against 
efforts to curtail the study and production in the arts and humanities, especially by those 
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